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ABSTRACTS

Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

By R. JERVIS

International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.

Compulsion and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development Problems?

By F. R. FRANKEL

The view of critics like Myrdal that a solution to problems of mass poverty requires sweeping changes in established cultural attitudes and institutions which cannot be carried out through democratic methods remains influential in India among intellectuals and radical political parties. Yet, a frontal assault on the existing social order would delay or abort basic economic reforms by fragmenting large numbers of the poorer classes along more potent allegiances to religion, language, and caste. An alternative solution can be devised based on the distinction between *direct* and *indirect* obstacles to economic development which are part of the social setting. Direct constraints are found in patterns of land ownership and land tenure. By contrast, the cultural attitudes, caste structures, and power relations are indirect obstacles in the sense that they strengthen ideological and political patterns that stand in the way of agrarian reform. Under Indian conditions democratic rather than authoritarian institutions offer the best prospect over the long term for carrying out basic economic changes. They strengthen egalitarian values and provide an opportunity for direct organization of the more numerous lower castes to weaken both the legitimacy and power of the dominant landed castes—without risking the social disorder of a direct confrontation.

Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity

By O. R. YOUNG

The concept "social choice" provides a means of injecting new life into systemic analyses of the international polity. Bargaining, organized warfare, and coercive diplomacy are the most important mechanisms of social choice in the international polity. Third-party settlement is of lesser importance, though not irrelevant. Each of these mechanisms is evaluated in terms of criteria such as decisiveness, efficiency, justice, and the production of externalities. Systems of rights and rules serve to constrain processes of social choice, but they are also apt to become focal points of such processes themselves.

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George Liska

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Urban Political Development

By H. BIENEN and M. N. DANIELSON

Because many aspects of urbanization are similar in different societies, urban politics provides a rich opportunity for comparative analysis. Most urban political studies tend to focus on government rather than politics. In the case of the books under review, however, political variables are offered as the key to understanding. Anton's work on Stockholm, Baker's on Lagos, Cohen's on Abidjan, Cornelius's on Mexico City, Elkin's on London, Fried's on Rome, Taubman's on cities in the U.S.S.R., and Wolpe's on Port Harcourt share a concern with the ability of political systems to deal with forces of urban growth and change. Studies of industrial countries try to account for the ability of systems to develop policies that control the urban environment, while studies of developing countries attempt to analyze patterns of resource distribution, social mobility, and class formation. Despite their flaws, gaps, and manifold differences, these studies are important steps in the right direction.

Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report

By R. ROGOWSKI

Rational-choice theories of politics have gained acceptance rapidly and may soon dominate the field. Their popularity is due in part to their real successes, which can be demonstrated in several areas, and to their hypothetical-deductive structure. But some students, in their eagerness to embrace what is by now a theoretical fad, have either ignored inconvenient facts or weakened the theory to fit them. Both the promise and the risk are demonstrated by reference to recent works by Mayhew, Niskanen, Rabushka and Shepsle, and de Swaan.

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

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COOPERATION UNDER THE SECURITY DILEMMA

By ROBERT JERVIS*

I. Anarchy and the Security Dilemma

THE lack of an international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest. Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because states are aware of this, anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which all states would like to freeze the status quo. This is true of the men in Rousseau's "Stag Hunt." If they cooperate to trap the stag, they will all eat well. But if one person defects to chase a rabbit—which he likes less than stag—none of the others will get anything. Thus, all actors have the same preference order, and there is a solution that gives each his first choice: (1) cooperate and trap the stag (the international analogue being cooperation and disarmament); (2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts (maintain a high level of arms while others are disarmed); (3) all chase rabbits (arms competition and high risk of war); and (4) stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit (being disarmed while others are armed).[1]

* I am grateful to Robert Art, Bernard Brodie, and Glenn Snyder for comments, and to the Committee on Research of the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support. An earlier version of this essay appeared as Working Paper No. 5, UCLA Program in Arms Control and International Security.

[1] This kind of rank-ordering is not entirely an analyst's invention, as is shown by the following section of a British army memo of 1903 dealing with British and Russian railroad construction near the Persia-Afghanistan border:

> The conditions of the problem may . . . be briefly summarized as follows:
>
> a) If we make a railway to Seistan while Russia remains inactive, we gain a considerable defensive advantage at considerable financial cost;
>
> b) If Russia makes a railway to Seistan, while we remain inactive, she gains a considerable offensive advantage at considerable financial cost;
>
> c) If both we and Russia make railways to Seistan, the defensive and offensive advantages may be held to neutralize each other; in other words, we shall have spent a good deal of money and be no better off than we are at present. On the

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Unless each person thinks that the others will cooperate, he himself will not. And why might he fear that any other person would do something that would sacrifice his own first choice? The other might not understand the situation, or might not be able to control his impulses if he saw a rabbit, or might fear that some other member of the group is unreliable. If the person voices any of these suspicions, others are more likely to fear that he will defect, thus making them more likely to defect, thus making it more rational for him to defect. Of course in this simple case—and in many that are more realistic—there are a number of arrangements that could permit cooperation. But the main point remains: although actors may know that they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it.

Even when there is a solution that is everyone's first choice, the international case is characterized by three difficulties not present in the Stag Hunt. First, to the incentives to defect given above must be added the potent fear that even if the other state now supports the staus quo, it may become dissatisfied later. No matter how much decision makers are committed to the status quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path. Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise.

The second problem arises from a possible solution. In order to protect their possessions, states often seek to control resources or land outside their own territory. Countries that are not self-sufficient must try to assure that the necessary supplies will continue to flow in wartime. This was part of the explanation for Japan's drive into China and Southeast Asia before World War II. If there were an international authority that could guarantee access, this motive for control would disappear. But since there is not, even a state that would prefer the status quo to increasing its area of control may pursue the latter policy.

When there are believed to be tight linkages between domestic and foreign policy or between the domestic politics of two states, the quest for security may drive states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics of others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone. Thus,

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other hand, we shall be no worse off, whereas under alternative (b) we shall be much worse off. Consequently, the theoretical balance of advantage lies with the proposed railway extension from Quetta to Seistan.

W. G. Nicholson, "Memorandum on Seistan and Other Points Raised in the Discussion on the Defence of India," (Committee of Imperial Defence, March 20, 1903). It should be noted that the possibility of neither side building railways was not mentioned, thus strongly biasing the analysis.

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Metternich's justification for supervising the politics of the Italian states has been summarized as follows:

> Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs. But this implies that every state must do nothing to interfere in the internal affairs of any other. However, any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this consequent disturbance of another state's repose constitutes an interference in that state's internal affairs. Therefore, every state—or rather, every sovereign of a great power—has the duty, in the name of the sacred right of independence of every state, to supervise the governments of smaller states and to prevent them from taking false and pernicious steps in their internal affairs.[2]

More frequently, the concern is with direct attack. In order to protect themselves, states seek to control, or at least to neutralize, areas on their borders. But attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm others who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased. When buffers are are sought in areas empty of great powers, expansion tends to feed on itself in order to protect what is acquired, as was often noted by those who opposed colonial expansion. Balfour's complaint was typical: "Every time I come to a discussion—at intervals of, say, five years—I find there is a new sphere which we have got to guard, which is supposed to protect the gateways of India. Those gateways are getting further and further away from India, and I do not know how far west they are going to be brought by the General Staff."[3]

Though this process is most clearly visible when it involves territorial expansion, it often operates with the increase of less tangible power and influence. The expansion of power usually brings with it an expansion of responsibilities and commitments; to meet them, still greater power is required. The state will take many positions that are subject to challenge. It will be involved with a wide range of controversial issues unrelated to its core values. And retreats that would be seen as normal if made by a small power would be taken as an index of weakness inviting predation if made by a large one.

The third problem present in international politics but not in the Stag Hunt is the security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others. In domestic

[2] Paul Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820–1823* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1969), 126.

[3] Quoted in Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1974), 67.

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society, there are several ways to increase the safety of one's person and property without endangering others. One can move to a safer neighborhood, put bars on the windows, avoid dark streets, and keep a distance from suspicious-looking characters. Of course these measures are not convenient, cheap, or certain of success. But no one save criminals need be alarmed if a person takes them. In international politics, however, one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others. In explaining British policy on naval disarmament in the interwar period to the Japanese, Ramsey MacDonald said that "Nobody wanted Japan to be insecure."[4] But the problem was not with British desires, but with the consequences of her policy. In earlier periods, too, Britain had needed a navy large enough to keep the shipping lanes open. But such a navy could not avoid being a menace to any other state with a coast that could be raided, trade that could be interdicted, or colonies that could be isolated. When Germany started building a powerful navy before World War I, Britain objected that it could only be an offensive weapon aimed at her. As Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, put it to King Edward VII: "If the German Fleet ever becomes superior to ours, the German Army can conquer this country. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany; for however superior our Fleet was, no naval victory could bring us any nearer to Berlin." The English position was half correct: Germany's navy was an anti-British instrument. But the British often overlooked what the Germans knew full well: "in every quarrel with England, German colonies and trade were . . . hostages for England to take." Thus, whether she intended it or not, the British Navy constituted an important instrument of coercion.[5]

II. What Makes Cooperation More Likely?

Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma? The workings of several

[4] Quoted in Gerald Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press 1963), 167.

[5] Quoted in Leonard Wainstein, "The Dreadnought Gap," in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 155; Raymond Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871–1932* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1933), 147. The French had made a similar argument 50 years earlier; see James Phinney Baxter III, *The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1933), 149. For a more detailed discussion of the security dilemma, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 62-76.

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can be seen in terms of the Stag Hunt or repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma differs from the Stag Hunt in that there is no solution that is in the best interests of all the participants; there are offensive as well as defensive incentives to defect from the coalition with the others; and, if the game is to be played only once, the only rational response is to defect. But if the game is repeated indefinitely, the latter characteristic no longer holds and we can analyze the game in terms similar to those applied to the Stag Hunt. It would be in the interest of each actor to have others deprived of the power to defect; each would be willing to sacrifice this ability if others were similarly restrained. But if the others are not, then it is in the actor's interest to retain the power to defect.[6] The game theory matrices for these two situations are given below, with the numbers in the boxes being the order of the actors' preferences.



We can see the logical possibilities by rephrasing our question: "Given either of the above situations, what makes it more or less likely that the players will cooperate and arrive at CC?" The chances of achieving this outcome will be increased by: (1) anything that increases incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC) and/or decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not (CD); (2) anything that decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other (DC) and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation (DD); (3) anything that increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate.[7]

[6] Experimental evidence for this proposition is summarized in James Tedeschi, Barry Schlenker, and Thomas Bonoma, *Conflict, Power, and Games* (Chicago: Aldine 1973), 135-41.

[7] The results of Prisoner's Dilemma games played in the laboratory support this argument. See Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1965), 33-50. Also see Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham 1970), 60-70.

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THE COSTS OF BEING EXPLOITED (CD)

The fear of being exploited (that is, the cost of CD) most strongly drives the security dilemma; one of the main reasons why international life is not more nasty, brutish, and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature. People are easy to kill, but as Adam Smith replied to a friend who feared that the Napoleonic Wars would ruin England, "Sir, there is a great deal of ruin in a nation."[8] The easier it is to destroy a state, the greater the reason for it either to join a larger and more secure unit, or else to be especially suspicious of others, to require a large army, and, if conditions are favorable, to attack at the slightest provocation rather than wait to be attacked. If the failure to eat that day—be it venison or rabbit—means that he will starve, a person is likely to defect in the Stag Hunt even if he really likes venison and has a high level of trust in his colleagues. (Defection is especially likely if the others are also starving or if they know that he is.) By contrast, if the costs of CD are lower, if people are well-fed or states are resilient, they can afford to take a more relaxed view of threats.

A relatively low cost of CD has the effect of transforming the game from one in which both players make their choices simultaneously to one in which an actor can make his choice after the other has moved. He will not have to defect out of fear that the other will, but can wait to see what the other will do. States that can afford to be cheated in a bargain or that cannot be destroyed by a surprise attack can more easily trust others and need not act at the first, and ambiguous, sign of menace. Because they have a margin of time and error, they need not match, or more than match, any others' arms in peacetime. They can mobilize in the prewar period or even at the start of the war itself, and still survive. For example, those who opposed a crash program to develop the H-bomb felt that the U.S. margin of safety was large enough so that even if Russia managed to gain a lead in the race, America would not be endangered. The program's advocates disagreed: "If we let the Russians get the super first, catastrophe becomes all but certain."[9]

When the costs of CD are tolerable, not only is security easier to attain but, what is even more imporant here, the relatively low level of arms and relatively passive foreign policy that a status-quo power will be able to adopt are less likely to threaten others. Thus it is easier for

[8] Quoted in Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959), 6.

[9] Herbert York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976), 56-60.

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status-quo states to act on their common interests if they are hard to conquer. All other things being equal, a world of small states will feel the effects of anarchy much more than a world of large ones. Defensible borders, large size, and protection against sudden attack not only aid the state, but facilitate cooperation that can benefit all states.

Of course, if one state gains invulnerability by being more powerful than most others, the problem will remain because its security provides a base from which it can exploit others. When the price a state will pay for DD is low, it leaves others with few hostages for its good behavior. Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, which will lead them to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation. The best situation is one in which a state will not suffer greatly if others exploit it, for example, by cheating on an arms control agreement (that is, the costs of CD are low); but it will pay a high long-run price if cooperation with the others breaks down—for example, if agreements cease functioning or if there is a long war (that is, the costs of DD are high). The state's invulnerability is then mostly passive; it provides some protection, but it cannot be used to menace others. As we will discuss below, this situation is approximated when it is easier for states to defend themselves than to attack others, or when mutual deterrence obtains because neither side can protect itself.

The differences between highly vulnerable and less vulnerable states are illustrated by the contrasting policies of Britain and Austria after the Napoleonic Wars. Britain's geographic isolation and political stability allowed her to take a fairly relaxed view of disturbances on the Continent. Minor wars and small changes in territory or in the distribution of power did not affect her vital interests. An adversary who was out to overthrow the system could be stopped after he had made his intentions clear. And revolutions within other states were no menace, since they would not set off unrest within England. Austria, surrounded by strong powers, was not so fortunate; her policy had to be more closely attuned to all conflicts. By the time an aggressor-state had clearly shown its colors, Austria would be gravely threatened. And foreign revolutions, be they democratic or nationalistic, would encourage groups in Austria to upset the existing order. So it is not surprising that Metternich propounded the doctrine summarized earlier, which defended Austria's right to interfere in the internal affairs of others, and that British leaders rejected this view. Similarly, Austria wanted the Congress system to be a relatively tight one, regulating most disputes. The British favored a less centralized system. In other words, in order

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to protect herself, Austria had either to threaten or to harm others, whereas Britain did not. For Austria and her neighbors the security dilemma was acute; for Britain it was not.

The ultimate cost of CD is of course loss of sovereignty. This cost can vary from situation to situation. The lower it is (for instance, because the two states have compatible ideologies, are similar ethnically, have a common culture, or because the citizens of the losing state expect economic benefits), the less the impact of the security dilemma; the greater the costs, the greater the impact of the dilemma. Here is another reason why extreme differences in values and ideologies exacerbate international conflict.

It is through the lowering of the costs of CD that the proposed Rhodesian "safety net"—guaranteeing that whites who leave the country will receive fair payment for their property—would have the paradoxical effect of making it more likely that the whites will stay. This is less puzzling when we see that the whites are in a multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma with each other. Assume that all whites are willing to stay if most of the others stay; but, in the absence of guarantees, if there is going to be a mass exodus, all want to be among the first to leave (because late-leavers will get less for their property and will have more trouble finding a country to take them in). Then the problem is to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy in which each person rushes to defect because he fears others are going to. In narrowing the gap between the payoff for leaving first (DC) and leaving last (CD) by reducing the cost of the latter, the guarantees make it easier for the whites to cooperate among themselves and stay.

Subjective Security Demands. Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which can differ from the actual situation; we must therefore examine the decision makers' subjective security requirements.[10] Two dimensions are involved. First, even if they agree about the objective situation, people can differ about how much security they desire—or, to put it more precisely, about the price they are willing to pay to gain increments of security. The more states value their security above all else (that is, see a prohibitively high cost in CD), the more they are likely to be sensitive to even minimal threats, and to demand high levels of arms. And if arms are positively valued be-

[10] For the development of the concept of subjective security, see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1962), chap. 10. In the present section we assume that the state believes that its security can be best served by increasing its arms; later we will discuss some of the conditions under which this assumption does not hold.

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cause of pressures from a military-industrial complex, it will be especially hard for status-quo powers to cooperate. By contrast, the security dilemma will not operate as strongly when pressing domestic concerns increase the opportunity costs of armaments. In this case, the net advantage of exploiting the other (DC) will be less, and the costs of arms races (that is, one aspect of DD) will be greater; therefore the state will behave as though it were relatively invulnerable.

The second aspect of subjective security is the perception of threat (that is, the estimate of whether the other will cooperate).[11] A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that sees its environment as benign. Indeed, when a state believes that another not only is not likely to be an adversary, but has sufficient interests in common with it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome an increase in the other's power.

British and French foreign policies in the interwar years illustrate these points. After the rise of Hitler, Britain and France felt that increases in each other's arms increased rather than decreased their own security. The differing policies that these states followed toward Germany can be explained by their differences on both dimensions of the variable of subjective security.[12] Throughout the period, France perceived Germany as more of a threat than England did. The British were more optimistic and argued that conciliation could turn Germany into a supporter of the status quo. Furthermore, in the years immediately following World War I, France had been more willing to forego other values in order to increase her security and had therefore followed a more belligerent policy than England, maintaining a larger army and moving quickly to counter German assertiveness. As this example shows, one cannot easily say how much subjective security a state should seek. High security requirements make it very difficult to capitalize on a common interest and run the danger of setting off spirals of arms races and hostility. The French may have paid this price in the 1920's. Low security requirements avoid this trap, but run the risk of having too few arms and of trying to conciliate an aggressor.

One aspect of subjective security related to the predisposition to per-

[11] The question of when an actor will see another as a threat is important and understudied. For a valuable treatment (although one marred by serious methodological flaws), see Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Relations," Ph.D. diss. (Hebrew University 1974). Among the important factors, touched on below, are the lessons from the previous war.

[12] Still the best treatment is Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars* (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1940).

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ceive threat is the state's view of how many enemies it must be prepared to fight. A state can be relaxed about increases in another's arms if it believes that there is a functioning collective security system. The chances of peace are increased in a world in which the prevailing international system is valued in its own right, not only because most states restrain their ambitions and those who do not are deterred (these are the usual claims for a Concert system), but also because of the decreased chances that the status-quo states will engage in unnecessary conflict out of the quest for security. Indeed, if there were complete faith in collective security, no state would want an army. By contrast, the security dilemma is insoluble when each state fears that many others, far from coming to its aid, are likely to join in any attack. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was setting a high security requirement when he noted:

> Besides the Great Powers, there are many small states who are buying or building great ships of war and whose vessels may by purchase, by some diplomatic combination, or by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these powers need, like us, navies to defend their actual safety of independence. They build them so as to play a part in world affairs. It is sport to them. It is death to us.[13]

It takes great effort for any one state to be able to protect itself alone against an attack by several neighbors. More importantly, it is next to impossible for all states in the system to have this capability. Thus, a state's expectation that allies will be available and that only a few others will be able to join against it is almost a necessary condition for security requirements to be compatible.

GAINS FROM COOPERATION AND COSTS OF A BREAKDOWN (CC AND DD)

The main costs of a policy of reacting quickly and severely to increases in the other's arms are not the price of one's own arms, but rather the sacrifice of the potential gains from cooperation (CC) and the increase in the dangers of needless arms races and wars (DD). The greater these costs, the greater the incentives to try cooperation and wait for fairly unambiguous evidence before assuming that the other must be checked by force. Wars would be much more frequent—even if the first choice of all states was the status quo—if they were less risky and costly, and if peaceful intercourse did not provide rich benefits. Ethiopia recently asked for guarantees that the Territory of Afars and Issas would not join a hostile alliance against it when it gained independ-

[13] Quoted in Peter Gretton, *Former Naval Person* (London: Cassell 1968), 151.

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ence. A spokesman for the Territory replied that this was not necessary: Ethiopia "already had the best possible guarantee in the railroad" that links the two countries and provides indispensable revenue for the Territory.[14]

The basic points are well known and so we can move to elaboration. First, most statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of unpredictable and uncontrollable events. Even if everything they see points to a quick victory, they are likely to hesitate before all the uncertainties. And if the battlefield often produces startling results, so do the council chambers. The state may be deserted by allies or attacked by neutrals. Or the postwar alignment may rob it of the fruits of victory, as happened to Japan in 1895. Second, the domestic costs of wars must be weighed. Even strong states can be undermined by dissatisfaction with the way the war is run and by the necessary mobilization of men and ideas. Memories of such disruptions were one of the main reasons for the era of relative peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars. Liberal statesmen feared that large armies would lead to despotism; conservative leaders feared that wars would lead to revolution. (The other side of this coin is that when there are domestic consequences of foreign conflict that are positively valued, the net cost of conflict is lowered and cooperation becomes more difficult.) Third—turning to the advantages of cooperation—for states with large and diverse economies the gains from economic exchange are rarely if ever sufficient to prevent war. Norman Angell was wrong about World War I being impossible because of economic ties among the powers; and before World War II, the U.S. was Japan's most important trading partner. Fourth, the gains from cooperation can be increased, not only if each side gets more of the traditional values such as wealth, but also if each comes to value the other's well-being positively. Mutual cooperation will then have a double payoff: in addition to the direct gains, there will be the satisfaction of seeing the other prosper.[15]

While high costs of war and gains from cooperation will ameliorate the impact of the security dilemma, they can create a different problem. If the costs are high enough so that DD is the last choice for both sides, the game will shift to "Chicken." This game differs from the Stag Hunt in that each actor seeks to exploit the other; it differs from Prisoner's Dilemma in that both actors share an interest in avoiding

[14] Michael Kaufman, "Tension Increases in French Colony," *New York Times*, July 11, 1976.

[15] Experimental support for this argument is summarized in Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1973), 181-95.

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mutual non-cooperation. In Chicken, if you think the other side is going to defect, you have to cooperate because, although being exploited (CD) is bad, it is not as bad as a total breakdown (DD). As the familiar logic of deterrence shows, the actor must then try to convince his adversary that he is going to stand firm (defect) and that the only way the other can avoid disaster is to back down (cooperate). Commitment, the rationality of irrationality, manipulating the communications system, and pretending not to understand the situation, are among the tactics used to reach this goal. The same logic applies when both sides are enjoying great benefits from cooperation. The side that can credibly threaten to disrupt the relationship unless its demands are met can exploit the other. This situation may not be stable, since the frequent use of threats may be incompatible with the maintenance of a cooperative relationship. Still, de Gaulle's successful threats to break up the Common Market unless his partners acceded to his wishes remind us that the shared benefits of cooperation as well as the shared costs of defection can provide the basis for exploitation. Similarly, one reason for the collapse of the Franco-British entente more than a hundred years earlier was that decision makers on both sides felt confident that their own country could safely pursue a policy that was against the other's interest because the other could not afford to destroy the highly valued relationship.[16] Because statesmen realize that the growth of positive interdependence can provide others with new levers of influence over them, they may resist such developments more than would be expected from the theories that stress the advantages of cooperation.

GAINS FROM EXPLOITATION (DC)

Defecting not only avoids the danger that a state will be exploited (CD), but brings positive advantages by exploiting the other (DC). The lower these possible gains, the greater the chances of cooperation. Even a relatively satisfied state can be tempted to expand by the hope of gaining major values. The temptation will be less when the state sees other ways of reaching its goals, and/or places a low value on what exploitation could bring. The gains may be low either because the immediate advantage provided by DC (for example, having more arms than the other side) cannot be translated into a political advantage (for example, gains in territory), or because the political advantage itself

[16] Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot, and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (London: Athlone Press 1974), 81, 88, 93, 212. For a different view of this case, see Stanley Mellon, "Entente, Diplomacy, and Fantasy," *Reviews in European History*, II (September 1976), 376-80.

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is not highly valued. For instance, a state may not seek to annex additional territory because the latter lacks raw materials, is inhabited by people of a different ethnic group, would be costly to garrison, or would be hard to assimilate without disturbing domestic politics and values. A state can reduce the incentives that another state has to attack it, by not being a threat to the latter and by providing goods and services that would be lost were the other to attempt exploitation.

Even where the direct advantages of DC are great, other considerations can reduce the net gain. Victory as well as defeat can set off undesired domestic changes within the state. Exploitation has at times been frowned upon by the international community, thus reducing the prestige of a state that engages in it. Or others might in the future be quicker to see the state as a menace to them, making them more likely to arm, and to oppose it later. Thus, Bismarck's attempts to get other powers to cooperate with him in maintaining the status quo after 1871 were made more difficult by the widely-held mistrust of him that grew out of his earlier aggressions.[17]

THE PROBABILITY THAT THE OTHER WILL COOPERATE

The variables discussed so far influence the payoffs for each of the four possible outcomes. To decide what to do, the state has to go further and calculate the expected value of cooperating or defecting. Because such calculations involve estimating the probability that the other will cooperate, the state will have to judge how the variables discussed so far act on the other. To encourage the other to cooperate, a state may try to manipulate these variables. It can lower the other's incentives to defect by decreasing what it could gain by exploiting the state (DC)—the details would be similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph—and it can raise the costs of deadlock (DD). But if the state cannot make DD the worst outcome for the other, coercion is likely to be ineffective in the short run because the other can respond by refusing to cooperate, and dangerous in the long run because the other is likely to become convinced that the state is aggressive. So the state will have to concentrate on making cooperation more attractive. One way to do this is to decrease the costs the other will pay if it cooperates and the state defects (CD). Thus, the state could try to make the other less vulnerable. It was for this reason that in the late 1950's and early 1960's

[17] Similarly, a French diplomat has argued that "the worst result of Louis XIV's abandonment of our traditional policy was the distrust it aroused towards us abroad." Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, VIII (January 1930), 179.

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some American defense analysts argued that it would be good for both sides if the Russians developed hardened missiles. Of course, decreasing the other's vulnerability also decreases the state's ability to coerce it, and opens the possibility that the other will use this protection as a shield behind which to engage in actions inimical to the state. But by sacrificing some ability to harm the other, the state can increase the chances of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The state can also try to increase the gains that will accrue to the other from mutual cooperation (CC). Although the state will of course gain if it receives a share of any new benefits, even an increment that accrues entirely to the other will aid the state by increasing the likelihood that the other will cooperate.[18]

This line of argument can be continued through the infinite regressions that game theory has made familiar. If the other is ready to cooperate when it thinks the state will, the state can increase the chances of CC by showing that it *is* planning to cooperate. Thus the state should understate the gains it would make if it exploited the other (DC) and the costs it would pay if the other exploited it (CD), and stress or exaggerate the gains it would make under mutual cooperation (CC) and the costs it would pay if there is deadlock (DD). The state will also want to convince the other that it thinks that the other is likely to cooperate. If the other believes these things, it will see that the state has strong incentives to cooperate, and so it will cooperate in turn. One point should be emphasized. Because the other, like the state, may be driven to defect by the fear that it will be exploited if it does not, the state should try to reassure it that this will not happen. Thus, when Khrushchev indicated his willingness to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, he simultaneously stressed to Kennedy that "we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well" that Russia could not launch a successful attack against the U.S., and therefore that there was no reason for the U.S. to contemplate a defensive, pre-emptive strike of its own.[19]

There is, however, a danger. If the other thinks that the state has little choice but to cooperate, it can credibly threaten to defect unless the state provides it with additional benefits. Great advantages of mutual cooperation, like high costs of war, provide a lever for com-

[18] This assumes, however, that these benefits to the other will not so improve the other's power position that it will be more able to menace the state in the future.

[19] Walter LaFeber, ed., *The Dynamics of World Power; A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945–1973*, II: *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Chelsea House in association with McGraw-Hill 1973), 700.

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petitive bargaining. Furthermore, for a state to stress how much it gains from cooperation may be to imply that it is gaining much more than the other and to suggest that the benefits should be distributed more equitably.

When each side is ready to cooperate if it expects the other to, inspection devices can ameliorate the security dilemma. Of course, even a perfect inspection system cannot guarantee that the other will not later develop aggressive intentions and the military means to act on them. But by relieving immediate worries and providing warning of coming dangers, inspection can meet a significant part of the felt need to protect oneself against future threats, and so make current cooperation more feasible. Similar functions are served by breaking up one large transaction into a series of smaller ones.[20] At each transaction each can see whether the other has cooperated; and its losses, if the other defects, will be small. And since what either side would gain by one defection is slight compared to the benefits of continued cooperation, the prospects of cooperation are high. Conflicts and wars among status-quo powers would be much more common were it not for the fact that international politics is usually a series of small transactions.

How a statesman interprets the other's past behavior and how he projects it into the future is influenced by his understanding of the security dilemma and his ability to place himself in the other's shoes. The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do not see that their arms—sought only to secure the status quo—may alarm others and that others may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first state. These two failures of empathy are linked. A state which thinks that the other knows that it wants only to preserve the status quo and that its arms are meant only for self-preservation will conclude that the other side will react to its arms by increasing its own capability only if it is aggressive itself. Since the other side is not menaced, there is no legitimate reason for it to object to the first state's arms; therefore, objection proves that the other is aggressive. Thus, the following exchange between Senator Tom Connally and Secretary of State Acheson concerning the ratification of the NATO treaty:

> Secretary Acheson: [The treaty] is aimed solely at armed aggression.
> Senator Connally: In other words, unless a nation . . . contemplates, meditates, or makes plans looking toward aggression or armed attack on another nation, it has no cause to fear this treaty.

[20] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 134-35.

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> Secretary Acheson: That is correct, Senator Connally, and it seems to me that any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that 'The guilty flee when no man pursueth.'
>
> Senator Connally: That is a very apt illustration.
>
> What I had in mind was, when a State or Nation passes a criminal act, for instance, against burglary, nobody but those who are burglars or getting ready to be burglars need have any fear of the Burglary Act. Is that not true?
>
> Secretary Acheson: The only effect [the law] would have [on an innocent person] would be for his protection, perhaps, by deterring someone else. He wouldn't worry about the imposition of the penalties on himself.[21]

The other side of this coin is that part of the explanation for détente is that most American decision makers now realize that it is at least possible that Russia may fear American aggression; many think that this fear accounts for a range of Soviet actions previously seen as indicating Russian aggressiveness. Indeed, even 36 percent of military officers consider the Soviet Union's motivations to be primarily defensive. Less than twenty years earlier, officers had been divided over whether Russia sought world conquest or only expansion.[22]

Statesmen who do not understand the security dilemma will think that the money spent is the only cost of building up their arms. This belief removes one important restraint on arms spending. Furthermore, it is also likely to lead states to set their security requirements too high. Since they do not understand that trying to increase one's security can actually decrease it, they will overestimate the amount of security that is attainable; they will think that when in doubt they can "play it safe" by increasing their arms. Thus it is very likely that two states which support the status quo but do not understand the security dilemma will end up, if not in a war, then at least in a relationship of higher conflict than is required by the objective situation.

The belief that an increase in military strength always leads to an increase in security is often linked to the belief that the only route to security is through military strength. As a consequence, a whole range of meliorative policies will be downgraded. Decision makers who do not believe that adopting a more conciliatory posture, meeting the

[21] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty*, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949), 17.

[22] Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson, *Interest and Ideology* (San Francisco: Freeman 1975), 260; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press 1960), chap. 13.

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other's legitimate grievances, or developing mutual gains from cooperation can increase their state's security, will not devote much attention or effort to these possibilities.

On the other hand, a heightened sensitivity to the security dilemma makes it more likely that the state will treat an aggressor as though it were an insecure defender of the status quo. Partly because of their views about the causes of World War I, the British were predisposed to believe that Hitler sought only the rectification of legitimate and limited grievances and that security could best be gained by constructing an equitable international system. As a result they pursued a policy which, although well designed to avoid the danger of creating unnecessary conflict with a status-quo Germany, helped destroy Europe.

GEOGRAPHY, COMMITMENTS, BELIEFS, AND SECURITY THROUGH EXPANSION

A final consideration does not easily fit in the matrix we have been using, although it can be seen as an aspect of vulnerability and of the costs of CD. Situations vary in the ease or difficulty with which all states can simultaneously achieve a high degree of security. The influence of military technology on this variable is the subject of the next section. Here we want to treat the impact of beliefs, geography, and commitments (many of which can be considered to be modifications of geography, since they bind states to defend areas outside their homelands). In the crowded continent of Europe, security requirements were hard to mesh. Being surrounded by powerful states, Germany's problem—or the problem created by Germany—was always great and was even worse when her relations with both France and Russia were bad, such as before World War I. In that case, even a status-quo Germany, if she could not change the political situation, would almost have been forced to adopt something like the Schlieffen Plan. Because she could not hold off both of her enemies, she had to be prepared to defeat one quickly and then deal with the other in a more leisurely fashion. If France or Russia stayed out of a war between the other state and Germany, they would allow Germany to dominate the Continent (even if that was not Germany's aim). They therefore had to deny Germany this ability, thus making Germany less secure. Although Germany's arrogant and erratic behavior, coupled with the desire for an unreasonably high level of security (which amounted to the desire to escape from her geographic plight), compounded the problem, even wise German statesmen would have been hard put to gain a high degree of security without alarming their neighbors.

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A similar situation arose for France after World War I. She was committed to protecting her allies in Eastern Europe, a commitment she could meet only by taking the offensive against Germany. But since there was no way to guarantee that France might not later seek expansion, a France that could successfully launch an attack in response to a German move into Eastern Europe would constitute a potential danger to German core values. Similarly, a United States credibly able to threaten retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union attacks Western Europe also constitutes a menace, albeit a reduced one, to the Soviet ability to maintain the status quo. The incompatibility of these security requirements is not complete. Herman Kahn is correct in arguing that the United States could have Type II deterrence (the ability to deter a major Soviet provocation) without gaining first-strike capability because the expected Soviet retaliation following an American strike could be great enough to deter the U.S. from attacking unless the U.S. believed it would suffer enormous deprivation (for instance, the loss of Europe) if it did not strike.[23] Similarly, the Franco-German military balance could have been such that France could successfully attack Germany if the latter's armies were embroiled in Eastern Europe, but could not defeat a Germany that was free to devote all her resources to defending herself. But this delicate balance is very hard to achieve, especially because states usually calculate conservatively. Therefore, such a solution is not likely to be available.

For the United States, the problem posed by the need to protect Europe is an exception. Throughout most of its history, this country has been in a much more favorable position: relatively self-sufficient and secure from invasion, it has not only been able to get security relatively cheaply, but by doing so, did not menace others.[24] But ambitions and commitments have changed this situation. After the American conquest of the Philippines, "neither the United States nor Japan could assure protection for their territories by military and naval means without compromising the defenses of the other. This problem would plague American and Japanese statesmen down to 1941."[25] Furthermore, to the extent that Japan could protect herself, she could resist American threats to go to war if Japan did not respect China's inde-

[23] Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 138-60. It should be noted that the French example is largely hypothetical because France had no intention of fulfilling her obligations once Germany became strong.

[24] Wolfers (fn. 9), chap. 15; C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 67 (October 1960), 1-19.

[25] William Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (Austin: University of Texas Press 1958), 240.

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pendence. These complications were minor compared to those that followed World War II. A world power cannot help but have the ability to harm many others that is out of proportion to the others' ability to harm it.

Britain had been able to gain security without menacing others to a greater degree than the Continental powers, though to a lesser one than the United States. But the acquisition of colonies and a dependence on foreign trade sacrificed her relative invulnerability of being an island. Once she took India, she had to consider Russia as a neighbor; the latter was expanding in Central Asia, thus making it much more difficult for both countries to feel secure. The need to maintain reliable sea lanes to India meant that no state could be allowed to menace South Africa and, later, Egypt. But the need to protect these two areas brought new fears, new obligations, and new security requirements that conflicted with those of other European nations. Furthermore, once Britain needed a flow of imports during both peace and wartime, she required a navy that could prevent a blockade. A navy sufficient for that task could not help but be a threat to any other state that had valuable trade.

A related problem is raised by the fact that defending the status quo often means protecting more than territory. Nonterritorial interests, norms, and the structure of the international system must be maintained. If all status-quo powers agree on these values and interpret them in compatible ways, problems will be minimized. But the potential for conflict is great, and the policies followed are likely to exacerbate the security dilemma. The greater the range of interests that have to be protected, the more likely it is that national efforts to maintain the status quo will clash. As a French spokesman put it in 1930: "Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation."[26] When security is thought of in this sense, it almost automatically has a competitive connotation. It involves asserting one state's will over others, showing a high degree of leadership if not dominance, and displaying a prickly demeanor. The resulting behavior will almost surely clash with that of others who define their security in the same way.

The problem will be almost insoluble if statesmen believe that their security requires the threatening or attacking of others. "That which

[26] Cambon (fn. 17), 185.

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stops growing begins to rot," declared a minister to Catherine the Great.[27] More common is the belief that if the other is secure, it will be emboldened to act against one's own state's interests, and the belief that in a war it will not be enough for the state to protect itself: it must be able to take the war to the other's homeland. These convictions make it very difficult for status-quo states to develop compatible security policies, for they lead the state to conclude that its security requires that others be rendered insecure.

In other cases, "A country engaged in a war of defense might be obliged for strategic reasons to assume the offensive," as a French delegate to an interwar disarmament conference put it.[28] That was the case for France in 1799:

> The Directory's political objectives were essentially defensive, for the French wanted only to protect the Republic from invasion and preserve the security and territory of the satellite regimes in Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. French leaders sought no new conquests; they wanted only to preserve the earlier gains of the Revolution. The Directory believed, however, that only a military offensive could enable the nation to achieve its defensive political objective. By inflicting rapid and decisive defeats upon one or more members of the coalition, the directors hoped to rupture allied unity and force individual powers to seek a separate peace.[29]

It did not matter to the surrounding states that France was not attacking because she was greedy, but because she wanted to be left in peace. Unless there was some way her neighbors could provide France with an alternate route to her goal, France had to go to war.

III. Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma

Another approach starts with the central point of the security dilemma—that an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others—and examines the conditions under which this proposition holds. Two crucial variables are involved: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and whether the

[27] Quoted in Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Co-Existence* (New York: Praeger 1968), 5. In 1920 the U.S. Navy's General Board similarly declared "A nation must advance or retrocede in world position." Quoted in William Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922* (Austin: University of Texas Press 1971), 488.

[28] Quoted in Marion Boggs, *Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Studies, XVI, No. 1, 1941), 41.

[29] Steven Ross, *European Diplomatic History, 1789–1815* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1969), 194.

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defense or the offense has the advantage. The definitions are not always clear, and many cases are difficult to judge, but these two variables shed a great deal of light on the question of whether status-quo powers will adopt compatible security policies. All the variables discussed so far leave the heart of the problem untouched. But when defensive weapons differ from offensive ones, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure. And when the defense has the advantage over the offense, a large increase in one state's security only slightly decreases the security of the others, and status-quo powers can all enjoy a high level of security and largely escape from the state of nature.

OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE

When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take. If effective defenses can be erected quickly, an attacker may be able to keep territory he has taken in an initial victory. Thus, the dominance of the defense made it very hard for Britain and France to push Germany out of France in World War I. But when superior defenses are difficult for an aggressor to improvise on the battlefield and must be constructed during peacetime, they provide no direct assistance to him.

The security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion. Status-quo powers must then act like aggressors; the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security has no implications for their behavior. Even if expansion is not sought as a goal in itself, there will be quick and drastic changes in the distribution of territory and influence. Conversely, when the defense has the advantage, status-quo states can make themselves more secure without gravely endangering others.[30] Indeed, if the defense has enough of an advantage and if the states are of roughly equal size, not only will the security dilemma cease to inhibit status-quo states from cooperating, but aggression will be next to impossible, thus rendering international anarchy relatively unimportant. If states cannot conquer each other, then the

[30] Thus, when Wolfers (fn. 10), 126, argues that a status-quo state that settles for rough equality of power with its adversary, rather than seeking preponderance, may be able to convince the other to reciprocate by showing that it wants only to protect itself, not menace the other, he assumes that the defense has an advantage.

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lack of sovereignty, although it presents problems of collective goods in a number of areas, no longer forces states to devote their primary attention to self-preservation. Although, if force were not usable, there would be fewer restraints on the use of nonmilitary instruments, these are rarely powerful enough to threaten the vital interests of a major state.

Two questions of the offense-defense balance can be separated. First, does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the other side on forces that could be used to attack? If the state has one dollar to spend on increasing its security, should it put it into offensive or defensive forces? Second, with a given inventory of forces, is it better to attack or to defend? Is there an incentive to strike first or to absorb the other's blow? These two aspects are often linked: if each dollar spent on offense can overcome each dollar spent on defense, and if both sides have the same defense budgets, then both are likely to build offensive forces and find it attractive to attack rather than to wait for the adversary to strike.

These aspects affect the security dilemma in different ways. The first has its greatest impact on arms races. If the defense has the advantage, and if the status-quo powers have reasonable subjective security requirements, they can probably avoid an arms race. Although an increase in one side's arms and security will still decrease the other's security, the former's increase will be larger than the latter's decrease. So if one side increases its arms, the other can bring its security back up to its previous level by adding a smaller amount to its forces. And if the first side reacts to this change, its increase will also be smaller than the stimulus that produced it. Thus a stable equilibrium will be reached. Shifting from dynamics to statics, each side can be quite secure with forces roughly equal to those of the other. Indeed, if the defense is much more potent than the offense, each side can be willing to have forces much smaller than the other's, and can be indifferent to a wide range of the other's defense policies.

The second aspect—whether it is better to attack or to defend—influences short-run stability. When the offense has the advantage, a state's reaction to international tension will increase the chances of war. The incentives for pre-emption and the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" in this situation have been made clear by analyses of the dangers that exist when two countries have first-strike capabilities.[31] There is no way for the state to increase its security without menacing,

[31] Schelling (fn. 20), chap. 9.

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or even attacking, the other. Even Bismarck, who once called preventive war "committing suicide from fear of death," said that "no government, if it regards war as inevitable even if it does not want it, would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to wait for the moment which is most convenient for the enemy."[32] In another arena, the same dilemma applies to the policeman in a dark alley confronting a suspected criminal who appears to be holding a weapon. Though racism may indeed be present, the security dilemma can account for many of the tragic shootings of innocent people in the ghettos.

Beliefs about the course of a war in which the offense has the advantage further deepen the security dilemma. When there are incentives to strike first, a successful attack will usually so weaken the other side that victory will be relatively quick, bloodless, and decisive. It is in these periods when conquest is possible and attractive that states consolidate power internally—for instance, by destroying the feudal barons—and expand externally. There are several consequences that decrease the chance of cooperation among status-quo states. First, war will be profitable for the winner. The costs will be low and the benefits high. Of course, losers will suffer; the fear of losing could induce states to try to form stable cooperative arrangements, but the temptation of victory will make this particularly difficult. Second, because wars are expected to be both frequent and short, there will be incentives for high levels of arms, and quick and strong reaction to the other's increases in arms. The state cannot afford to wait until there is unambiguous evidence that the other is building new weapons. Even large states that have faith in their economic strength cannot wait, because the war will be over before their products can reach the army. Third, when wars are quick, states will have to recruit allies in advance.[33] Without the opportunity for bargaining and re-alignments during the opening stages of hostilities, peacetime diplomacy loses a degree of the fluidity that facilitates balance-of-power policies. Because alliances must be secured during peacetime, the international system is more likely to become bipolar. It is hard to say whether war therefore becomes more or less likely, but this bipolarity increases tension between the two camps and makes it harder for status-quo states to gain the benefits of cooperation. Fourth, if wars are frequent, statesmen's perceptual thresholds will be adjusted accordingly and they will be quick to perceive

[32] Quoted in Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions* (New York: Norton 1975), 377, 461.
[33] George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: John Wiley 1977), 105-06; Sontag (fn. 5), 4-5.

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ambiguous evidence as indicating that others are aggressive. Thus, there will be more cases of status-quo powers arming against each other in the incorrect belief that the other is hostile.

When the defense has the advantage, all the foregoing is reversed. The state that fears attack does not pre-empt—since that would be a wasteful use of its military resources—but rather prepares to receive an attack. Doing so does not decrease the security of others, and several states can do it simultaneously; the situation will therefore be stable, and status-quo powers will be able to cooperate. When Herman Kahn argues that ultimatums "are vastly too dangerous to give because . . . they are quite likely to touch off a pre-emptive strike,"[34] he incorrectly assumes that it is always advantageous to strike first.

More is involved than short-run dynamics. When the defense is dominant, wars are likely to become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost. Relatively small and weak states can hold off larger and stronger ones, or can deter attack by raising the costs of conquest to an unacceptable level. States then approach equality in what they can do to each other. Like the .45-caliber pistol in the American West, fortifications were the "great equalizer" in some periods. Changes in the status quo are less frequent and cooperation is more common wherever the security dilemma is thereby reduced.

Many of these arguments can be illustrated by the major powers' policies in the periods preceding the two world wars. Bismarck's wars surprised statesmen by showing that the offense had the advantage, and by being quick, relatively cheap, and quite decisive. Falling into a common error, observers projected this pattern into the future.[35] The resulting expectations had several effects. First, states sought semi-permanent allies. In the early stages of the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon III had thought that there would be plenty of time to recruit Austria to his side. Now, others were not going to repeat this mistake. Second, defense budgets were high and reacted quite sharply to increases on the other side. It is not surprising that Richardson's theory of arms races fits this period well. Third, most decision makers thought that the next Euro-

[34] Kahn (fn. 23), 211 (also see 144).

[35] For a general discussion of such mistaken learning from the past, see Jervis (fn. 5), chap. 6. The important and still not completely understood question of why this belief formed and was maintained throughout the war is examined in Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan 1973), 262-70; Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1976), 290-92; and Douglas Porch, "The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900–14," in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds., *War and Society* (New York: Holmes & Meier 1975), 117-43.

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pean war would not cost much blood and treasure.[36] That is one reason why war was generally seen as inevitable and why mass opinion was so bellicose. Fourth, once war seemed likely, there were strong pressures to pre-empt. Both sides believed that whoever moved first could penetrate the other deep enough to disrupt mobilization and thus gain an insurmountable advantage. (There was no such belief about the use of naval forces. Although Churchill made an ill-advised speech saying that if German ships "do not come out and fight in time of war they will be dug out like rats in a hole,"[37] everyone knew that submarines, mines, and coastal fortifications made this impossible. So at the start of the war each navy prepared to defend itself rather than attack, and the short-run destabilizing forces that launched the armies toward each other did not operate.)[38] Furthermore, each side knew that the other saw the situation the same way, thus increasing the perceived danger that the other would attack, and giving each added reasons to precipitate a war if conditions seemed favorable. In the long and the short run, there were thus both offensive and defensive incentives to strike. This situation casts light on the common question about German motives in 1914: "Did Germany unleash the war deliberately to become a world power or did she support Austria merely to defend a weakening ally," thereby protecting her own position?[39] To some extent, this question is misleading. Because of the perceived advantage of the offense, war was seen as the best route both to gaining expansion and to avoiding drastic loss of influence. There seemed to be no way for Germany merely to retain and safeguard her existing position.

Of course the war showed these beliefs to have been wrong on all points. Trenches and machine guns gave the defense an overwhelming advantage. The fighting became deadlocked and produced horrendous casualties. It made no sense for the combatants to bleed themselves to death. If they had known the power of the defense beforehand, they would have rushed for their own trenches rather than for the enemy's territory. Each side could have done this without increasing the other's

[36] Some were not so optimistic. Gray's remark is well-known: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time." The German Prime Minister, Bethmann Hollweg, also feared the consequences of the war. But the controlling view was that it would certainly pay for the winner.

[37] Quoted in Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, III, *The Challenge of War, 1914–1916* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1971), 84.

[38] Quester (fn. 33), 98-99. Robert Art, *The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower*, II (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies Series, 1973), 14-18, 26-28.

[39] Konrad Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History*, II (March 1969), 50.

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incentives to strike. War might have broken out anyway, just as DD is a possible outcome of Chicken, but at least the pressures of time and the fear of allowing the other to get the first blow would not have contributed to this end. And, had both sides known the costs of the war, they would have negotiated much more seriously. The obvious question is why the states did not seek a negotiated settlement as soon as the shape of the war became clear. Schlieffen had said that if his plan failed, peace should be sought.[40] The answer is complex, uncertain, and largely outside of the scope of our concerns. But part of the reason was the hope and sometimes the expectation that breakthroughs could be made and the dominance of the offensive restored. Without that hope, the political and psychological pressures to fight to a decisive victory might have been overcome.

The politics of the interwar period were shaped by the memories of the previous conflict and the belief that any future war would resemble it. Political and military lessons reinforced each other in ameliorating the security dilemma. Because it was believed that the First World War had been a mistake that could have been avoided by skillful conciliation, both Britain and, to a lesser extent, France were highly sensitive to the possibility that interwar Germany was not a real threat to peace, and alert to the danger that reacting quickly and strongly to her arms could create unnecessary conflict. And because Britain and France expected the defense to continue to dominate, they concluded that it was safe to adopt a more relaxed and nonthreatening military posture.[41] Britain also felt less need to maintain tight alliance bonds. The Allies' military posture then constituted only a slight danger to Germany; had the latter been content with the status quo, it would have been easy for both sides to have felt secure behind their lines of fortifications. Of course the Germans were not content, so it is not surprising that they devoted their money and attention to finding ways out of a defense-dominated stalemate. *Blitzkrieg* tactics were necessary if they were to use force to change the status quo.

The initial stages of the war on the Western Front also contrasted with the First World War. Only with the new air arm were there any

[40] Brodie (fn. 8), 58.

[41] President Roosevelt and the American delegates to the League of Nations Disarmament Conference maintained that the tank and mobile heavy artillery had reestablished the dominance of the offensive, thus making disarmament more urgent (Boggs, fn. 28, pp. 31, 108), but this was a minority position and may not even have been believed by the Americans. The reduced prestige and influence of the military, and the high pressures to cut government spending throughout this period also contributed to the lowering of defense budgets.

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incentives to strike first, and these forces were too weak to carry out the grandiose plans that had been both dreamed and feared. The armies, still the main instrument, rushed to defensive positions. Perhaps the allies could have successfully attacked while the Germans were occupied in Poland.[42] But belief in the defense was so great that this was never seriously contemplated. Three months after the start of the war, the French Prime Minister summed up the view held by almost everyone but Hitler: on the Western Front there is "deadlock. Two Forces of equal strength and the one that attacks seeing such enormous casualties that it cannot move without endangering the continuation of the war or of the aftermath."[43] The Allies were caught in a dilemma they never fully recognized, let alone solved. On the one hand, they had very high war aims; although unconditional surrender had not yet been adopted, the British had decided from the start that the removal of Hitler was a necessary condition for peace.[44] On the other hand, there were no realistic plans or instruments for allowing the Allies to impose their will on the other side. The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff noted, "The French have no intention of carrying out an offensive for years, if at all"; the British were only slightly bolder.[45] So the Allies looked to a long war that would wear the Germans down, cause civilian suffering through shortages, and eventually undermine Hitler. There was little analysis to support this view—and indeed it probably was not supportable—but as long as the defense was dominant and the numbers on each side relatively equal, what else could the Allies do?

To summarize, the security dilemma was much less powerful after World War I than it had been before. In the later period, the expected power of the defense allowed status-quo states to pursue compatible security policies and avoid arms races. Furthermore, high tension and fear of war did not set off short-run dynamics by which each state, trying to increase its security, inadvertently acted to make war more likely. The expected high costs of war, however, led the Allies to believe

[42] Jon Kimche, *The Unfought Battle* (New York: Stein 1968); Nicholas William Bethell, *The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939* (New York: Holt 1972); Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," *World Politics*, XXIX (April 1977), 404-24.

[43] Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., *Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries, 1937–1940* (New York: McKay 1962), 173.

[44] For a short time, as France was falling, the British Cabinet did discuss reaching a negotiated peace with Hitler. The official history ignores this, but it is covered in P.M.H. Bell, *A Certain Eventuality* (Farnborough, England: Saxon House 1974), 40-48.

[45] Macleod and Kelly (fn. 43), 174. In flat contradiction to common sense and almost everything they believed about modern warfare, the Allies planned an expedition to Scandinavia to cut the supply of iron ore to Germany and to aid Finland against the Russians. But the dominant mood was the one described above.

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that no sane German leader would run the risks entailed in an attempt to dominate the Continent, and discouraged them from risking war themselves.

Technology and Geography. Technology and geography are the two main factors that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage. As Brodie notes, "On the tactical level, as a rule, few physical factors favor the attacker but many favor the defender. The defender usually has the advantage of cover. He characteristically fires from behind some form of shelter while his opponent crosses open ground."[46] Anything that increases the amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes his progress across it, or makes him more vulnerable while crossing, increases the advantage accruing to the defense. When states are separated by barriers that produce these effects, the security dilemma is eased, since both can have forces adequate for defense without being able to attack. Impenetrable barriers would actually prevent war; in reality, decision makers have to settle for a good deal less. Buffer zones slow the attacker's progress; they thereby give the defender time to prepare, increase problems of logistics, and reduce the number of soldiers available for the final assault. At the end of the 19th century, Arthur Balfour noted Afghanistan's "non-conducting" qualities. "So long as it possesses few roads, and no railroads, it will be impossible for Russia to make effective use of her great numerical superiority at any point immediately vital to the Empire." The Russians valued buffers for the same reasons; it is not surprising that when Persia was being divided into Russian and British spheres of influence some years later, the Russians sought assurances that the British would refrain from building potentially menacing railroads in their sphere. Indeed, since railroad construction radically altered the abilities of countries to defend themselves and to attack others, many diplomatic notes and much intelligence activity in the late 19th century centered on this subject.[47]

Oceans, large rivers, and mountain ranges serve the same function as buffer zones. Being hard to cross, they allow defense against superior numbers. The defender has merely to stay on his side of the barrier and so can utilize all the men he can bring up to it. The attacker's men, however, can cross only a few at a time, and they are very vulnerable

[46] Brodie (fn. 8), 179.

[47] Arthur Balfour, "Memorandum," Committee on Imperial Defence, April 30, 1903, pp. 2-3; see the telegrams by Sir Arthur Nicolson, in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Vol. 4 (London: H.M.S.O. 1929), 429, 524. These barriers do not prevent the passage of long-range aircraft; but even in the air, distance usually aids the defender.

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when doing so. If all states were self-sufficient islands, anarchy would be much less of a problem. A small investment in shore defenses and a small army would be sufficient to repel invasion. Only very weak states would be vulnerable, and only very large ones could menace others. As noted above, the United States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, have partly been able to escape from the state of nature because their geographical positions approximated this ideal.

Although geography cannot be changed to conform to borders, borders can and do change to conform to geography. Borders across which an attack is easy tend to be unstable. States living within them are likely to expand or be absorbed. Frequent wars are almost inevitable since attacking will often seem the best way to protect what one has. This process will stop, or at least slow down, when the state's borders reach—by expansion or contraction—a line of natural obstacles. Security without attack will then be possible. Furthermore, these lines constitute salient solutions to bargaining problems and, to the extent that they are barriers to migration, are likely to divide ethnic groups, thereby raising the costs and lowering the incentives for conquest.

Attachment to one's state and its land reinforce one quasi-geographical aid to the defense. Conquest usually becomes more difficult the deeper the attacker pushes into the other's territory. Nationalism spurs the defenders to fight harder; advancing not only lengthens the attacker's supply lines, but takes him through unfamiliar and often devastated lands that require troops for garrison duty. These stabilizing dynamics will not operate, however, if the defender's war materiel is situated near its borders, or if the people do not care about their state, but only about being on the winning side. In such cases, positive feedback will be at work and initial defeats will be insurmountable.[48]

Imitating geography, men have tried to create barriers. Treaties may provide for demilitarized zones on both sides of the border, although such zones will rarely be deep enough to provide more than warning. Even this was not possible in Europe, but the Russians adopted a gauge for their railroads that was broader than that of the neighboring states, thereby complicating the logistics problems of any attacker—including Russia.

Perhaps the most ambitious and at least temporarily successful attempts to construct a system that would aid the defenses of both sides were the interwar naval treaties, as they affected Japanese-American

[48] See, for example, the discussion of warfare among Chinese warlords in Hsi-Sheng Chi, "The Chinese Warlord System as an International System," in Morton Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's 1968), 405-25.

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relations. As mentioned earlier, the problem was that the United States could not defend the Philippines without denying Japan the ability to protect her home islands.[49] (In 1941 this dilemma became insoluble when Japan sought to extend her control to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. If the Philippines had been invulnerable, they could have provided a secure base from which the U.S. could interdict Japanese shipping between the homeland and the areas she was trying to conquer.) In the 1920's and early 1930's each side would have been willing to grant the other security for its possessions in return for a reciprocal grant, and the Washington Naval Conference agreements were designed to approach this goal. As a Japanese diplomat later put it, their country's "fundamental principle" was to have "a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense."[50] Thus, Japan agreed in 1922 to accept a navy only three-fifths as large as that of the United States, and the U.S. agreed not to fortify its Pacific islands.[51] (Japan had earlier been forced to agree not to fortify the islands she had taken from Germany in World War I.) Japan's navy would not be large enough to defeat America's anywhere other than close to the home islands. Although the Japanese could still take the Philippines, not only would they be unable to move farther, but they might be weakened enough by their efforts to be vulnerable to counterattack. Japan, however, gained security. An American attack was rendered more difficult because the American bases were unprotected and because, until 1930, Japan was allowed unlimited numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that could weaken the American fleet as it made its way across the ocean.[52]

The other major determinant of the offense-defense balance is technology. When weapons are highly vulnerable, they must be employed before they are attacked. Others can remain quite invulnerable in their bases. The former characteristics are embodied in unprotected missiles and many kinds of bombers. (It should be noted that it is not vulnerability *per se* that is crucial, but the location of the vulnerability. Bombers and missiles that are easy to destroy only after having been launched toward their targets do not create destabilizing dynamics.) Incentives to strike first are usually absent for naval forces that are threatened by

[49] Some American decision makers, including military officers, thought that the best way out of the dilemma was to abandon the Philippines.

[50] Quoted in Elting Morrison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1960), 326.

[51] The U.S. "refused to consider limitations on Hawaiian defenses, since these works posed no threat to Japan." Braisted (fn. 27), 612.

[52] That is part of the reason why the Japanese admirals strongly objected when the civilian leaders decided to accept a seven-to-ten ratio in lighter craft in 1930. Stephen Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974), 3.

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a naval attack. Like missiles in hardened silos, they are usually well protected when in their bases. Both sides can then simultaneously be prepared to defend themselves successfully.

In ground warfare under some conditions, forts, trenches, and small groups of men in prepared positions can hold off large numbers of attackers. Less frequently, a few attackers can storm the defenses. By and large, it is a contest between fortifications and supporting light weapons on the one hand, and mobility and heavier weapons that clear the way for the attack on the other. As the erroneous views held before the two world wars show, there is no simple way to determine which is dominant. "[T]hese oscillations are not smooth and predictable like those of a swinging pendulum. They are uneven in both extent and time. Some occur in the course of a single battle or campaign, others in the course of a war, still others during a series of wars." Longer-term oscillations can also be detected:

> The early Gothic age, from the twelfth to the late thirteenth century, with its wonderful cathedrals and fortified places, was a period during which the attackers in Europe generally met serious and increasing difficulties, because the improvement in the strength of fortresses outran the advance in the power of destruction. Later, with the spread of firearms at the end of the fifteenth century, old fortresses lost their power to resist. An age ensued during which the offense possessed, apart from short-term setbacks, new advantages. Then, during the seventeenth century, especially after about 1660, and until at least the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740, the defense regained much of the ground it had lost since the great medieval fortresses had proved unable to meet the bombardment of the new and more numerous artillery.[53]

Another scholar has continued the argument: "The offensive gained an advantage with new forms of heavy mobile artillery in the nineteenth century, but the stalemate of World War I created the impression that the defense again had an advantage; the German invasion in World War II, however, indicated the offensive superiority of highly mechanized armies in the field."[54]

The situation today with respect to conventional weapons is un-

[53] John Nef, *War and Human Progress* (New York: Norton 1963), 185. Also see *ibid.*, 237, 242-43, and 323; C. W. Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1953), 70-72; John Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730–1200* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1971), 212-14; Michael Howard, *War in European History* (London: Oxford University Press 1976), 33-37.

[54] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (abridged ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), 142. Also see 63-70, 74-75. There are important exceptions to these generalizations—the American Civil War, for instance, falls in the middle of the period Wright says is dominated by the offense.

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clear. Until recently it was believed that tanks and tactical air power gave the attacker an advantage. The initial analyses of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war indicated that new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have restored the primacy of the defense. These weapons are cheap, easy to use, and can destroy a high proportion of the attacking vehicles and planes that are sighted. It then would make sense for a status-quo power to buy lots of $20,000 missiles rather than buy a few half-million dollar tanks and multi-million dollar fighter-bombers. Defense would be possible even against a large and well-equipped force; states that care primarily about self-protection would not need to engage in arms races. But further examinations of the new technologies and the history of the October War cast doubt on these optimistic conclusions and leave us unable to render any firm judgment.[55]

Concerning nuclear weapons, it is generally agreed that defense is impossible—a triumph not of the offense, but of deterrence. Attack makes no sense, not because it can be beaten off, but because the attacker will be destroyed in turn. In terms of the questions under consideration here, the result is the equivalent of the primacy of the defense. First, security is relatively cheap. Less than one percent of the G.N.P. is devoted to deterring a direct attack on the United States; most of it is spent on acquiring redundant systems to provide a lot of insurance against the worst conceivable contingencies. Second, both sides can simultaneously gain security in the form of second-strike capability. Third, and related to the foregoing, second-strike capability can be maintained in the face of wide variations in the other side's military posture. There is no purely military reason why each side has to react quickly and strongly to the other's increases in arms. Any spending that the other devotes to trying to achieve first-strike capability can be neutralized by the state's spending much smaller sums on protecting its second-strike capability. Fourth, there are no incentives to strike first in a crisis.

Important problems remain, of course. Both sides have interests that go well beyond defense of the homeland. The protection of these interests creates conflicts even if neither side desires expansion. Furthermore, the shift from defense to deterrence has greatly increased the importance and perceptions of resolve. Security now rests on each side's belief that the other would prefer to run high risks of total destruction rather than sacrifice its vital interests. Aspects of the se-

[55] Geoffrey Kemp, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Uri Ra'anan, eds., *The Other Arms Race* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1975); James Foster, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control," *Policy Sciences*, No. 8 (Spring 1977), 1-19.

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curity dilemma thus appear in a new form. Are weapons procurements used as an index of resolve? Must they be so used? If one side fails to respond to the other's buildup, will it appear weak and thereby invite predation? Can both sides simultaneously have images of high resolve or is there a zero-sum element involved? Although these problems are real, they are not as severe as those in the prenuclear era: there are many indices of resolve, and states do not so much judge images of resolve in the abstract as ask how likely it is that the other will stand firm in a particular dispute. Since states are most likely to stand firm on matters which concern them most, it is quite possible for both to demonstrate their resolve to protect their own security simultaneously.

OFFENSE-DEFENSE DIFFERENTIATION

The other major variable that affects how strongly the security dilemma operates is whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack. If they do not, the basic postulate of the security dilemma no longer applies. A state can increase its own security without decreasing that of others. The advantage of the defense can only ameliorate the security dilemma. A differentiation between offensive and defensive stances comes close to abolishing it. Such differentiation does not mean, however, that all security problems will be abolished. If the offense has the advantage, conquest and aggression will still be possible. And if the offense's advantage is great enough, status-quo powers may find it too expensive to protect themselves by defensive forces and decide to procure offensive weapons even though this will menace others. Furthermore, states will still have to worry that even if the other's military posture shows that it is peaceful now, it may develop aggressive intentions in the future.

Assuming that the defense is at least as potent as the offense, the differentiation between them allows status-quo states to behave in ways that are clearly different from those of aggressors. Three beneficial consequences follow. First, status-quo powers can identify each other, thus laying the foundations for cooperation. Conflicts growing out of the mistaken belief that the other side is expansionist will be less frequent. Second, status-quo states will obtain advance warning when others plan aggression. Before a state can attack, it has to develop and deploy offensive weapons. If procurement of these weapons cannot be disguised and takes a fair amount of time, as it almost always does, a status-quo state will have the time to take countermeas-

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ures. It need not maintain a high level of defensive arms as long as its potential adversaries are adopting a peaceful posture. (Although being so armed should not, with the one important exception noted below, alarm other status-quo powers.) States do, in fact, pay special attention to actions that they believe would not be taken by a status-quo state because they feel that states exhibiting such behavior are aggressive. Thus the seizure or development of transportation facilities will alarm others more if these facilities have no commercial value, and therefore can only be wanted for military reasons. In 1906, the British rejected a Russian protest about their activities in a district of Persia by claiming that this area was "only of [strategic] importance [to the Russians] if they wished to attack the Indian frontier, or to put pressure upon us by making us think that they intend to attack it."[56]

The same inferences are drawn when a state acquires more weapons than observers feel are needed for defense. Thus, the Japanese spokesman at the 1930 London naval conference said that his country was alarmed by the American refusal to give Japan a 70 percent ratio (in place of a 60 percent ratio) in heavy cruisers: "As long as America held that ten percent advantage, it was possible for her to attack. So when America insisted on sixty percent instead of seventy percent, the idea would exist that they were trying to keep that possibility, and the Japanese people could not accept that."[57] Similarly, when Mussolini told Chamberlain in January 1939 that Hitler's arms program was motivated by defensive considerations, the Prime Minister replied that "German military forces were now so strong as to make it impossible for any Power or combination of Powers to attack her successfully. She could not want any further armaments for defensive purposes; what then did she want them for?"[58]

Of course these inferences can be wrong—as they are especially likely to be because states underestimate the degree to which they menace others.[59] And when they are wrong, the security dilemma is deepened. Because the state thinks it has received notice that the other is aggressive, its own arms building will be less restrained and the chances of

[56] Richard Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973), 273; Grey to Nicolson, in Gooch and Temperley (fn. 47), 414.

[57] Quoted in James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), 49. American naval officers agreed with the Japanese that a ten-to-six ratio would endanger Japan's supremacy in her home waters.

[58] E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, Third series, III (London: H.M.S.O. 1950), 526.

[59] Jervis (fn. 5), 69-72, 352-55.

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cooperation will be decreased. But the dangers of incorrect inferences should not obscure the main point: when offensive and defensive postures are different, much of the uncertainty about the other's intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed.

The third beneficial consequence of a difference between offensive and defensive weapons is that if all states support the status quo, an obvious arms control agreement is a ban on weapons that are useful for attacking. As President Roosevelt put it in his message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933: "If all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defenses automatically will become impregnable, and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become secure."[60] The fact that such treaties have been rare—the Washington naval agreements discussed above and the anti-ABM treaty can be cited as examples—shows either that states are not always willing to guarantee the security of others, or that it is hard to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons.

Is such a distinction possible? Salvador de Madariaga, the Spanish statesman active in the disarmament negotiations of the interwar years, thought not: "A weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of it you are looking at." The French Foreign Minister agreed (although French policy did not always follow this view): "Every arm can be employed offensively or defensively in turn. . . . The only way to discover whether arms are intended for purely defensive purposes or are held in a spirit of aggression is in all cases to enquire into the intentions of the country concerned." Some evidence for the validity of this argument is provided by the fact that much time in these unsuccessful negotiations was devoted to separating offensive from defensive weapons. Indeed, no simple and unambiguous definition is possible and in many cases no judgment can be reached. Before the American entry into World War I, Woodrow Wilson wanted to arm merchantmen only with guns in the back of the ship so they could not initiate a fight, but this expedient cannot be applied to more common forms of armaments.[61]

There are several problems. Even when a differentiation is possible, a status-quo power will want offensive arms under any of three conditions. (1) If the offense has a great advantage over the defense, protection through defensive forces will be too expensive. (2) Status-quo

[60] Quoted in Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1948), 108.
[61] Boggs (fn. 28), 15, 40.

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states may need offensive weapons to regain territory lost in the opening stages of a war. It might be possible, however, for a state to wait to procure these weapons until war seems likely, and they might be needed only in relatively small numbers, unless the aggressor was able to construct strong defenses quickly in the occupied areas. (3) The state may feel that it must be prepared to take the offensive either because the other side will make peace only if it loses territory or because the state has commitments to attack if the other makes war on a third party. As noted above, status-quo states with extensive commitments are often forced to behave like aggressors. Even when they lack such commitments, status-quo states must worry about the possibility that if they are able to hold off an attack, they will still not be able to end the war unless they move into the other's territory to damage its military forces and inflict pain. Many American naval officers after the Civil War, for example, believed that "only by destroying the commerce of the opponent could the United States bring him to terms."[62]

A further complication is introduced by the fact that aggressors as well as status-quo powers require defensive forces as a prelude to acquiring offensive ones, to protect one frontier while attacking another, or for insurance in case the war goes badly. Criminals as well as policemen can use bulletproof vests. Hitler as well as Maginot built a line of forts. Indeed, Churchill reports that in 1936 the German Foreign Minister said: "As soon as our fortifications are constructed [on our western borders] and the countries in Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all these countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies, and a new constellation will develop."[63] So a state may not necessarily be reassured if its neighbor constructs strong defenses.

More central difficulties are created by the fact that whether a weapon is offensive or defensive often depends on the particular situation—for instance, the geographical setting and the way in which the weapon is used. "Tanks . . . spearheaded the fateful German thrust through the Ardennes in 1940, but if the French had disposed of a properly concentrated armored reserve, it would have provided the best means for their cutting off the penetration and turning into a disaster for the Germans what became instead an overwhelming victory."[64] Anti-aircraft weapons seem obviously defensive—to be used, they must wait

[62] Kenneth Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1973), 20.
[63] Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton 1948), 206.
[64] Brodie, *War and Politics* (fn. 35), 325.

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for the other side to come to them. But the Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 would have been impossible without effective air defenses that covered the battlefield. Nevertheless, some distinctions are possible. Sir John Simon, then the British Foreign Secretary, in response to the views cited earlier, stated that just because a fine line could not be drawn, "that was no reason for saying that there were not stretches of territory on either side which all practical men and women knew to be well on this or that side of the line." Although there are almost no weapons and strategies that are useful only for attacking, there are some that are almost exclusively defensive. Aggressors could want them for protection, but a state that relied mostly on them could not menace others. More frequently, we cannot "determine the absolute character of a weapon, but [we can] make a comparison . . . [and] discover whether or not the offensive potentialities predominate, whether a weapon is more useful in attack or in defense."[65]

The essence of defense is keeping the other side out of your territory. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land. Thus a committee of military experts in an interwar disarmament conference declared that armaments "incapable of mobility by means of self-contained power," or movable only after long delay, were "only capable of being used for the defense of a State's territory."[66] The most obvious examples are fortifications. They can shelter attacking forces, especially when they are built right along the frontier,[67] but they cannot occupy enemy territory. A state with only a strong line of forts, fixed guns, and a small army to man them would not be much of a menace. Anything else that can serve only as a barrier against attacking troops is similarly defensive. In this category are systems that provide warning of an attack, the Russian's adoption of a different railroad gauge, and nuclear land mines that can seal off invasion routes.

If total immobility clearly defines a system that is defensive only, limited mobility is unfortunately ambiguous. As noted above, short-range fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles can be used to cover an attack. And, unlike forts, they can advance with the troops. Still, their inability to reach deep into enemy territory does make them more

[65] Boggs (fn. 28), 42, 83. For a good argument about the possible differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons in the 1930's, see Basil Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," *English Review*, Vol. 55 (July 1932), 71-78.

[66] Quoted in Boggs (fn. 28), 39.

[67] On these grounds, the Germans claimed in 1932 that the French forts were offensive (*ibid.*, 49). Similarly, fortified forward naval bases can be necessary for launching an attack; see Braisted (fn. 27), 643.

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useful for the defense than for the offense. Thus, the United States and Israel would have been more alarmed in the early 1970's had the Russians provided the Egyptians with long-range instead of short-range aircraft. Naval forces are particularly difficult to classify in these terms, but those that are very short-legged can be used only for coastal defense.

Any forces that for various reasons fight well only when on their own soil in effect lack mobility and therefore are defensive. The most extreme example would be passive resistance. Noncooperation can thwart an aggressor, but it is very hard for large numbers of people to cross the border and stage a sit-in on another's territory. Morocco's recent march on the Spanish Sahara approached this tactic, but its success depended on special circumstances. Similarly, guerrilla warfare is defensive to the extent to which it requires civilian support that is likely to be forthcoming only in opposition to a foreign invasion. Indeed, if guerrilla warfare were easily exportable and if it took ten defenders to destroy each guerrilla, then this weapon would not only be one which could be used as easily to attack the other's territory as to defend one's own, but one in which the offense had the advantage: so the security dilemma would operate especially strongly.

If guerrillas are unable to fight on foreign soil, other kinds of armies may be unwilling to do so. An army imbued with the idea that only defensive wars were just would fight less effectively, if at all, if the goal were conquest. Citizen militias may lack both the ability and the will for aggression. The weapons employed, the short term of service, the time required for mobilization, and the spirit of repelling attacks on the homeland, all lend themselves much more to defense than to attacks on foreign territory.[68]

Less idealistic motives can produce the same result. A leading student of medieval warfare has described the armies of that period as follows: "Assembled with difficulty, insubordinate, unable to maneuver, ready to melt away from its standard the moment that its short period of service was over, a feudal force presented an assemblage of unsoldierlike qualities such as have seldom been known to coexist. Primarily intended to defend its own borders from the Magyar, the Northman, or the Saracen . . . , the institution was utterly unadapted to take the offensive."[69] Some political groupings can be similarly described. In-

[68] The French made this argument in the interwar period; see Richard Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms* (New York: Columbia University Press 1955), 181-82. The Germans disagreed; see Boggs (fn. 28), 44-45.

[69] Oman (fn. 53), 57-58.

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ternational coalitions are more readily held together by fear than by hope of gain. Thus Castlereagh was not being entirely self-serving when in 1816 he argued that the Quadruple Alliance "could only have owed its origin to a sense of common danger; in its very nature it must be conservative; it cannot threaten either the security or the liberties of other States."[70] It is no accident that most of the major campaigns of expansion have been waged by one dominant nation (for example, Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany), and that coalitions among relative equals are usually found defending the status quo. Most gains from conquest are too uncertain and raise too many questions of future squabbles among the victors to hold an alliance together for long. Although defensive coalitions are by no means easy to maintain—conflicting national objectives and the free-rider problem partly explain why three of them dissolved before Napoleon was defeated—the common interest of seeing that no state dominates provides a strong incentive for solidarity.

Weapons that are particularly effective in reducing fortifications and barriers are of great value to the offense. This is not to deny that a defensive power will want some of those weapons if the other side has them: Brodie is certainly correct to argue that while their tanks allowed the Germans to conquer France, properly used French tanks could have halted the attack. But France would not have needed these weapons if Germany had not acquired them, whereas even if France had no tanks, Germany could not have foregone them since they provided the only chance of breaking through the French lines. Mobile heavy artillery is, similarly, especially useful in destroying fortifications. The defender, while needing artillery to fight off attacking troops or to counterattack, can usually use lighter guns since they do not need to penetrate such massive obstacles. So it is not surprising that one of the few things that most nations at the interwar disarmament conferences were able to agree on was that heavy tanks and mobile heavy guns were particularly valuable to a state planning an attack.[71]

Weapons and strategies that depend for their effectiveness on surprise are almost always offensive. That fact was recognized by some of the delegates to the interwar disarmament conferences and is the principle behind the common national ban on concealed weapons. An earlier representative of this widespread view was the mid-19th-century Philadelphia newspaper that argued: "As a measure of defense, knives, dirks,

[70] Quoted in Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, II, *1815–1822* (London: G. Bell and Sons 1963), 510.
[71] Boggs (fn. 28), 14-15, 47-48, 60.

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and sword canes are entirely useless. They are fit only for attack, and all such attacks are of murderous character. Whoever carries such a weapon has prepared himself for homicide."[72]

It is, of course, not always possible to distinguish between forces that are most effective for holding territory and forces optimally designed for taking it. Such a distinction could not have been made for the strategies and weapons in Europe during most of the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Neither naval forces nor tactical air forces can be readily classified in these terms. But the point here is that when such a distinction is possible, the central characteristic of the security dilemma no longer holds, and one of the most troublesome consequences of anarchy is removed.

Offense-Defense Differentiation and Strategic Nuclear Weapons. In the interwar period, most statesmen held the reasonable position that weapons that threatened civilians were offensive.[73] But when neither side can protect its civilians, a counter-city posture is defensive because the state can credibly threaten to retaliate only in response to an attack on itself or its closest allies. The costs of this strike are so high that the state could not threaten to use it for the less-than-vital interest of compelling the other to abandon an established position.

In the context of deterrence, offensive weapons are those that provide defense. In the now familiar reversal of common sense, the state that could take its population out of hostage, either by active or passive defense or by destroying the other's strategic weapons on the ground, would be able to alter the status quo. The desire to prevent such a situation was one of the rationales for the anti-ABM agreements; it explains why some arms controllers opposed building ABM's to protect cities, but favored sites that covered ICBM fields. Similarly, many analysts want to limit warhead accuracy and favor multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV's), but oppose multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). The former are more useful than single warheads for penetrating city defenses, and ensure that the state has a second-strike capability. MIRV's enhance counterforce capabilities. Some arms controllers argue that this is also true of cruise missiles, and therefore do not want them to be deployed either. There is some evidence that the Russians are not satisfied with deterrence and are seeking to regain the capability for defense. Such an effort, even if not inspired by aggressive designs, would create a severe security dilemma.

[72] Quoted in Philip Jordan, *Frontier Law and Order* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1970), 7; also see 16-17.

[73] Boggs (fn. 28), 20, 28.

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What is most important for the argument here is that land-based ICBM's are both offensive and defensive, but when both sides rely on Polaris-type systems (SLBM's), offense and defense use different weapons. ICBM's can be used either to destroy the other's cities in retaliation or to initiate hostilities by attacking the other's strategic missiles. Some measures—for instance, hardening of missile sites and warning systems—are purely defensive, since they do not make a first strike easier. Others are predominantly offensive—for instance, passive or active city defenses, and highly accurate warheads. But ICBM's themselves are useful for both purposes. And because states seek a high level of insurance, the desire for protection as well as the contemplation of a counterforce strike can explain the acquisition of extremely large numbers of missiles. So it is very difficult to infer the other's intentions from its military posture. Each side's efforts to increase its own security by procuring more missiles decreases, to an extent determined by the relative efficacy of the offense and the defense, the other side's security. That is not the case when both sides use SLBM's. The point is not that sea-based systems are less vulnerable than land-based ones (this bears on the offense-defense ratio) but that SLBM's are defensive, retaliatory weapons. First, they are probably not accurate enough to destroy many military targets.[74] Second, and more important, SLBM's are not the main instrument of attack against other SLBM's. The hardest problem confronting a state that wants to take its cities out of hostage is to locate the other's SLBM's, a job that requires not SLBM's but anti-submarine weapons. A state might use SLBM's to attack the other's submarines (although other weapons would probably be more efficient), but without anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability the task cannot be performed. A status-quo state that wanted to forego offensive capability could simply forego ASW research and procurement.

There are two difficulties with this argument, however. First, since the state's SLBM's are potentially threatened by the other's ASW capabilities, the state may want to pursue ASW research in order to know what the other might be able to do and to design defenses. Unless it does this, it cannot be confident that its submarines are safe. Second, because some submarines are designed to attack surface ships, not launch missiles, ASW forces have missions other than taking cities out of hostage. Some U.S. officials plan for a long war in Europe which would require keeping the sea lanes open against Russian submarines. De-

[74] See, however, Desmond Ball, "The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM Systems," *Journal of Peace Research*, XIV (No. 1, 1977), 23-40.

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signing an ASW force and strategy that would meet this threat without endangering Soviet SLBM's would be difficult but not impossible, since the two missions are somewhat different.[75] Furthermore, the Russians do not need ASW forces to combat submarines carrying out conventional missions; it might be in America's interest to sacrifice the ability to meet a threat that is not likely to materialize in order to reassure the Russians that we are not menacing their retaliatory capability.

When both sides rely on ICBM's, one side's missiles can attack the other's, and so the state cannot be indifferent to the other's building program. But because one side's SLBM's do not menace the other's, each side can build as many as it wants and the other need not respond. Each side's decision on the size of its force depends on technical questions, its judgment about how much destruction is enough to deter, and the amount of insurance it is willing to pay for—and these considerations are independent of the size of the other's strategic force. Thus the crucial nexus in the arms race is severed.

Here two objections not only can be raised but have been, by those who feel that even if American second-strike capability is in no danger, the United States must respond to a Soviet buildup. First, the relative numbers of missiles and warheads may be used as an index of each side's power and will. Even if there is no military need to increase American arms as the Russians increase theirs, a failure to respond may lead third parties to think that the U.S. has abandoned the competition with the U.S.S.R. and is no longer willing to pay the price of world leadership. Furthermore, if either side believes that nuclear "superiority" matters, then, through the bargaining logic, it will matter. The side with "superiority" will be more likely to stand firm in a confrontation if it thinks its "stronger" military position helps it, or if it thinks that the other thinks its own "weaker" military position is a handicap. To allow the other side to have more SLBM's—even if one's own second-strike capability is unimpaired—will give the other an advantage that can be translated into political gains.

The second objection is that superiority *does* matter, and not only because of mistaken beliefs. If nuclear weapons are used in an all-or-none fashion, then all that is needed is second-strike capability. But limited, gradual, and controlled strikes are possible. If the other side has superiority, it can reduce the state's forces by a slow-motion war

[75] Richard Garwin, "Anti-Submarine Warfare and National Security," *Scientific American*, Vol. 227 (July 1972), 14-25.

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of attrition. For the state to strike at the other's cities would invite retaliation; for it to reply with a limited counterforce attack would further deplete its supply of missiles. Alternatively, the other could employ demonstration attacks—such as taking out an isolated military base or exploding a warhead high over a city—in order to demonstrate its resolve. In either of these scenarios, the state will suffer unless it matches the other's arms posture.[76]

These two objections, if valid, mean that even with SLBM's one cannot distinguish offensive from defensive strategic nuclear weapons. Compellence may be more difficult than deterrence,[77] but if decision makers believe that numbers of missiles or of warheads influence outcomes, or if these weapons can be used in limited manner, then the posture and policy that would be needed for self-protection is similar to that useful for aggression. If the second objection has merit, security would require the ability to hit selected targets on the other side, enough ammunition to wage a controlled counterforce war, and the willingness to absorb limited countervalue strikes. Secretary Schlesinger was correct in arguing that this capability would not constitute a first-strike capability. But because the "Schlesinger Doctrine" could be used not only to cope with a parallel Russian policy, but also to support an American attempt to change the status quo, the new American stance would decrease Russian security. Even if the U.S.S.R. were reassured that the present U.S. Government lacked the desire or courage to do this, there could be no guarantee that future governments would not use the new instruments for expansion. Once we move away from the simple idea that nuclear weapons can only be used for all-out strikes, half the advantage of having both sides rely on a sea-based force would disappear because of the lack of an offensive-defensive differentiation. To the extent that military policy affects political relations, it would be harder for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate even if both supported the status quo.

Although a full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the objections rest on decision makers' beliefs—beliefs, furthermore, that can be strongly influenced by American policy and American statements. The perceptions of third

[76] The latter scenario, however, does not require that the state closely match the number of missiles the other deploys.

[77] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 69-78. Schelling's arguments are not entirely convincing, however. For further discussion, see Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Re-Visited," Working Paper No. 14, UCLA Program in Arms Control and International Security.

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nations of whether the details of the nuclear balance affect political conflicts—and, to a lesser extent, Russian beliefs about whether superiority is meaningful—are largely derived from the American strategic debate. If most American spokesmen were to take the position that a secure second-strike capability was sufficient and that increments over that (short of a first-strike capability) would only be a waste of money, it is doubtful whether America's allies or the neutrals would judge the superpowers' useful military might or political will by the size of their stockpiles. Although the Russians stress war-fighting ability, they have not contended that marginal increases in strategic forces bring political gains; any attempt to do so could be rendered less effective by an American assertion that this is nonsense. The bargaining advantages of possessing nuclear "superiority" work best when both sides acknowledge them. If the "weaker" side convinces the other that it does not believe there is any meaningful difference in strength, then the "stronger" side cannot safely stand firm because there is no increased chance that the other will back down.

This kind of argument applies at least as strongly to the second objection. Neither side can employ limited nuclear options unless it is quite confident that the other accepts the rules of the game. For if the other believes that nuclear war cannot be controlled, it will either refrain from responding—which would be fine—or launch all-out retaliation. Although a state might be ready to engage in limited nuclear war without acknowledging this possibility—and indeed, that would be a reasonable policy for the United States—it is not likely that the other would have sufficient faith in that prospect to initiate limited strikes unless the state had openly avowed its willingness to fight this kind of war. So the United States, by patiently and consistently explaining that it considers such ideas to be mad and that any nuclear wars will inevitably get out of control, could gain a large measure of protection against the danger that the Soviet Union might seek to employ a "Schlesinger Doctrine" against an America that lacked the military ability or political will to respond in kind. Such a position is made more convincing by the inherent implausibility of the arguments for the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

In summary, as long as states believe that all that is needed is second-strike capability, then the differentiation between offensive and defensive forces that is provided by reliance on SLBM's allows each side to increase its security without menacing the other, permits some inferences about intentions to be drawn from military posture, and removes the main incentive for status-quo powers to engage in arms races.

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IV. Four Worlds

The two variables we have been discussing—whether the offense or the defense has the advantage, and whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones—can be combined to yield four possible worlds.

	OFFENSE HAS THE ADVANTAGE	DEFENSE HAS THE ADVANTAGE
OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOT DISTINGUISHABLE FROM DEFENSIVE ONE	1 Doubly dangerous	2 Security dilemma, but security requirements may be compatible.
OFFENSIVE POSTURE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM DEFENSIVE ONE	3 No security dilemma, but aggression possible. Status-quo states can follow different policy than aggressors. Warning given.	4 Doubly stable

The first world is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain. Because offensive and defensive postures are the same, status-quo states acquire the same kind of arms that are sought by aggressors. And because the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have; status-quo states will therefore behave like aggressors. The situation will be unstable. Arms races are likely. Incentives to strike first will turn crises into wars. Decisive victories and conquests will be common. States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them. Cooperation among status-quo powers will be extremely hard to achieve.

There are no cases that totally fit this picture, but it bears more than a passing resemblance to Europe before World War I. Britain and Germany, although in many respects natural allies, ended up as enemies. Of course much of the explanation lies in Germany's ill-chosen policy. And from the perspective of our theory, the powers' ability to avoid war in a series of earlier crises cannot be easily explained. Nevertheless, much of the behavior in this period was the product of technology and beliefs

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that magnified the security dilemma. Decision makers thought that the offense had a big advantage and saw little difference between offensive and defensive military postures. The era was characterized by arms races. And once war seemed likely, mobilization races created powerful incentives to strike first.

In the nuclear era, the first world would be one in which each side relied on vulnerable weapons that were aimed at similar forces and each side understood the situation. In this case, the incentives to strike first would be very high—so high that status-quo powers as well as aggressors would be sorely tempted to pre-empt. And since the forces could be used to change the status quo as well as to preserve it, there would be no way for both sides to increase their security simultaneously. Now the familiar logic of deterrence leads both sides to see the dangers in this world. Indeed, the new understanding of this situation was one reason why vulnerable bombers and missiles were replaced. Ironically, the 1950's would have been more hazardous if the decision makers had been aware of the dangers of their posture and had therefore felt greater pressure to strike first. This situation could be recreated if both sides were to rely on MIRVed ICBM's.

In the second world, the security dilemma operates because offensive and defensive postures cannot be distinguished; but it does not operate as strongly as in the first world because the defense has the advantage, and so an increment in one side's strength increases its security more than it decreases the other's. So, if both sides have reasonable subjective security requirements, are of roughly equal power, and the variables discussed earlier are favorable, it is quite likely that status-quo states can adopt compatible security policies. Although a state will not be able to judge the other's intentions from the kinds of weapons it procures, the level of arms spending will give important evidence. Of course a state that seeks a high level of arms might be not an aggressor but merely an insecure state, which if conciliated will reduce its arms, and if confronted will reply in kind. To assume that the apparently excessive level of arms indicates aggressiveness could therefore lead to a response that would deepen the dilemma and create needless conflict. But empathy and skillful statesmanship can reduce this danger. Furthermore, the advantageous position of the defense means that a status-quo state can often maintain a high degree of security with a level of arms lower than that of its expected adversary. Such a state demonstrates that it lacks the ability or desire to alter the status quo, at least at the present time. The strength of the defense also allows states to

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react slowly and with restraint when they fear that others are menacing them. So, although status-quo powers will to some extent be threatening to others, that extent will be limited.

This world is the one that comes closest to matching most periods in history. Attacking is usually harder than defending because of the strength of fortifications and obstacles. But purely defensive postures are rarely possible because fortifications are usually supplemented by armies and mobile guns which can support an attack. In the nuclear era, this world would be one in which both sides relied on relatively invulnerable ICBM's and believed that limited nuclear war was impossible. Assuming no MIRV's, it would take more than one attacking missile to destroy one of the adversary's. Pre-emption is therefore unattractive. If both sides have large inventories, they can ignore all but drastic increases on the other side. A world of either ICBM's or SLBM's in which both sides adopted the "Schlesinger Doctrine" would probably fit in this category too. The means of preserving the status quo would also be the means of changing it, as we discussed earlier. And the defense usually would have the advantage, because compellence is more difficult than deterrence. Although a state might succeed in changing the status quo on issues that matter much more to it than to others, status-quo powers could deter major provocations under most circumstances.

In the third world there may be no security dilemma, but there are security problems. Because states can procure defensive systems that do not threaten others, the dilemma need not operate. But because the offense has the advantage, aggression is possible, and perhaps easy. If the offense has enough of an advantage, even a status-quo state may take the initiative rather than risk being attacked and defeated. If the offense has less of an advantage, stability and cooperation are likely because the status-quo states will procure defensive forces. They need not react to others who are similarly armed, but can wait for the warning they would receive if others started to deploy offensive weapons. But each state will have to watch the others carefully, and there is room for false suspicions. The costliness of the defense and the allure of the offense can lead to unnecessary mistrust, hostility, and war, unless some of the variables discussed earlier are operating to restrain defection.

A hypothetical nuclear world that would fit this description would be one in which both sides relied on SLBM's, but in which ASW techniques were very effective. Offense and defense would be different, but

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the former would have the advantage. This situation is not likely to occur; but if it did, a status-quo state could show its lack of desire to exploit the other by refraining from threatening its submarines. The desire to have more protecting you than merely the other side's fear of retaliation is a strong one, however, and a state that knows that it would not expand even if its cities were safe is likely to believe that the other would not feel threatened by its ASW program. It is easy to see how such a world could become unstable, and how spirals of tensions and conflict could develop.

The fourth world is doubly safe. The differentiation between offensive and defensive systems permits a way out of the security dilemma; the advantage of the defense disposes of the problems discussed in the previous paragraphs. There is no reason for a status-quo power to be tempted to procure offensive forces, and aggressors give notice of their intentions by the posture they adopt. Indeed, if the advantage of the defense is great enough, there are no security problems. The loss of the ultimate form of the power to alter the status quo would allow greater scope for the exercise of nonmilitary means and probably would tend to freeze the distribution of values.

This world would have existed in the first decade of the 20th century if the decision makers had understood the available technology. In that case, the European powers would have followed different policies both in the long run and in the summer of 1914. Even Germany, facing powerful enemies on both sides, could have made herself secure by developing strong defenses. France could also have made her frontier almost impregnable. Furthermore, when crises arose, no one would have had incentives to strike first. There would have been no competitive mobilization races reducing the time available for negotiations.

In the nuclear era, this world would be one in which the superpowers relied on SLBM's, ASW technology was not up to its task, and limited nuclear options were not taken seriously. We have discussed this situation earlier; here we need only add that, even if our analysis is correct and even if the policies and postures of both sides were to move in this direction, the problem of violence below the nuclear threshold would remain. On issues other than defense of the homeland, there would still be security dilemmas and security problems. But the world would nevertheless be safer than it has usually been.

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COMPULSION AND SOCIAL CHANGE:

Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development Problems?

By FRANCINE R. FRANKEL*

HISTORIANS, sociologists, and psychologists have by now all challenged the notion that conditions determining economic development can be adequately explained through the use of growth models limited to economic variables. They have stressed the importance of preconditions, whether national integration, social structure, value systems, or political organization. Economists, for their part, have graciously acknowledged the utility of these critiques, but have nevertheless continued to formulate their theories of development in terms of economic variables. They seem to have decided, as Albert Hirschman aptly observed twenty years ago, that "in spite of the many valuable insights gained from these [non-economic] theories, their cumulative impact on the unwary reader could well raise serious doubts about the possibility of any economic development at all."[1] If economists now appear chastened, it is not because of rival theories, but as the result of experience. The great majority of new states have failed to make a significant impact on the problem of mass poverty. They seem unable to achieve the economic transformations that the economic theories were so painstakingly designed to help bring about.

Attention has turned to the peculiarities and special conditions that constitute the historical and social setting in which economic development must take place in each state. A decade has passed since Gunnar Myrdal advanced the most influential statement of an alternative "broad institutional approach" in his *Asian Drama*, a ten-year, three-volume study that is "mainly about India with numerous and systematic attempts at comparisons with other countries of South Asia."[2] Myrdal's

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[1] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1958), 2.

[2] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, I (New York: Pantheon 1968), 40.

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critique of the narrowly "economic" framework of analysis rests largely on the argument that Western theories, models, and concepts have distorted the study of economic development in South Asia by separating economic theories from the radically different—and unfavorable—environment in the attitudes, cultures, and institutions of the area.

If we accept the proposition that economic development is a function of overall social development, the prospects of new states assume an even more hopeless aspect than disappointment about poor performance might warrant. The erratic gains, the narrow spread effects, and the reverses or stagnation characteristic of many of the economies of the underdeveloped countries (which otherwise might be rationalized as the result of still imperfect growth models), take on an aspect of inevitability and permanence once they are traced to the intractable obstacles of an unfavorable environment. Myrdal's attempt to carry out a "realistic" analysis of development problems, which restores the initial conditions of the South Asian context—conditions that were ignored by the more abstract Western theories—ends, in fact, with little to offer either in the realm of theory or of practice that could solve these problems, short of a complete social transformation.

The obstacles to development in the South Asian context turn out to be the very same limitations that were "prominent in the thought of the old European colonial masters."[3] They include the irrational beliefs sanctioned by religion, cultural attitudes deprecating manual labor, and styles of living and working accepted as immutable on the strength of these beliefs—all inimical to development. Myrdal considers the "inefficiency, rigidity and inequality of the established institutions and attitudes" and the "economic and social power relations embodied in this framework of institutions and attitudes"[4] to be the primary reasons for the new states' inability to implement economic plans effectively. The "precondition" for economic development that logically follows from this kind of reasoning is that old religious attitudes, cultural patterns, and social structures have to be destroyed before development can take place.

The possibility of achieving such a revolutionary social transformation through democratic processes of government is, of course, remote. Arguments that accept the need for a direct attack on traditional attitudes and modes of economic and social stratification have therefore inevitably stressed the need for compulsion. In this view, countries that limit themselves to democratic planning are doomed to failure since they cannot use force to impose obligations. They are, in Myr-

[3] *Ibid.*, 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, 47.

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dal's increasingly fashionable terminology, "soft states."[5] Indeed, he considers assertions by the first generation of the post-Independence leadership in India that they were ideologically committed to political democracy to be an opportunist political compromise with powerful propertied interests, for the purpose of remaining in office. By contrast, the litmus test of genuine commitment to development is said to be the willingness to take direct action in a frontal assault on religion and the attitudes and institutions sanctified by it which perpetuate inequalities inimical to change.

The notion that development requires revolutionary social change (which can be accomplished only through imposing greater obligations and social discipline by resort to force) has only recently assumed the aspect of official dogma in India. "Talk Less Work More" became the rationale as well as the political slogan of the authoritarian regime imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the period of National Emergency declared on June 26, 1975, when leading members of the opposition were arrested and all the civil liberties that had been guaranteed by the constitution were suspended. The 20-point Economic Program that followed the Proclamation of Emergency by only five days promised to apply the government's sweeping new powers to enforce long-standing policies for basic social change, including the redistribution of agricultural assets and the "socialization" of urban land.[6]

The experiment with authoritarian social transformation was brief. It was cut short in March 1977, by the completely unexpected rout of Mrs. Gandhi and her ruling Congress Party at the first opportunity afforded the population to openly express its opinion on the new political order. The majority of India's electorate remained illiterate and impoverished, but had little difficulty in drawing up a balance sheet of the economic gains and social costs of the new forms of authoritarian planning. On the one hand, the Congress Party's policies of redistribution, designed to improve the condition of the "poor and downtrod-

[5] Myrdal uses this term to characterize the governments of South Asia where "policies decided on are often not enforced if they are enacted at all, and . . . the authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place obligations on people." *Ibid.*, 66.

[6] The 20-Point Program, announced by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on July 1, 1975, was designed to rally maximum public support for the Proclamation of National Emergency by pledging to meet the unfulfilled demands of diverse social groups. The government promised, among other things, to implement agricultural land ceilings, provide house sites for landless laborers, abolish bonded labor, liquidate rural debt, increase agricultural wages, bring prices down, step up agricultural and industrial production, socialize urban land, prevent tax evasion, confiscate the property of smugglers, provide cheaper books for students, and increase overall employment. For a full description of the 20-Point Economic Program by one of the Prime Minister's strong supporters, see J. S. Bright, *Emergency in India and 5 + 20 Point Programme* (New Delhi: Pankaj Publications 1976).

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den," had remained confined largely to schemes that could not be effectively implemented. On the other hand, the stepped-up family planning programs of the Government bureaucracy had scored dramatic successes in overfulfilling targets, through methods that ended in the abuses of enforced mass sterilization. Similarly, the administrative machinery had been successful in carrying out its accelerated "slum clearance" projects, by bulldozing the makeshift shacks and shops of the urban squatter population who were subsequently "relocated" outside the cities. India's voters—that is, the poor, both rural and urban—once given the chance to endorse or reject the kind of social discipline enforced during the Emergency, rallied behind the hastily combined opposition (the Janata Party and the Congress for Democracy) to remove the Congress Party from power after 30 years of uninterrupted rule. The poor responded once again to the promise, this time by the leadership of the anti-Congress opposition, of "both bread and freedom."[7]

The renewed vote of popular confidence in democratic methods of social change appears all the more poignant in the face of the doubts about the efficacy of the democratic process that still trouble not only Western intellectuals (and business leaders), but even the leading architect of the opposition's momentous triumph. Jayaprakash Narayan, who became the most revered political figure in India after the resumption of normal democratic government, apparently was not convinced himself that the problems of unemployment, high prices, and mass poverty could be solved even if the opposition were to win. Not unlike Myrdal, he had concluded that solutions to these problems were impossible without "radical change in the whole society" amounting to a "total revolution," that is, "an all-round revolution, political, economic, social, educational, moral and cultural."[8] While still under detention during the Emergency, Narayan confided in his prison diary:

> The question is can the picture be fundamentally altered through the ordinary democratic process? Even if the opposition wins, will the picture change? I fear no. Laws will be passed and applied, monies will be spent—even if all this is done, possibly without corruption creeping in, will the structure, the system, the "order" of our society change? I think no.[9]

Although Narayan, a Gandhian, originally hoped to bring about a "total revolution" through peaceful means by mobilizing "people's

[7] *Times of India*, February 27, 1977.
[8] Jayaprakash Narayan, "Why Total Revoluiton?" *Everyman's Weekly*, December 22, 1974.
[9] *New York Times Magazine*, March 27, 1977, p. 88.

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direct action" in the form of civil disobedience against an unresponsive (albeit democratically elected) government, radical Marxists despair of using the democratic process at all in carrying out a fundamental social transformation. They accept the view that democracy has failed, and that, as in the Soviet Union and China, an element of compulsion will ultimately be necessary if the institutional changes essential to economic development are to be achieved.

In this article, I shall offer a somewhat different perspective on the extraordinarily complicated problems confronting India. Like Myrdal and a growing number of critics who reject narrowly economic solutions to problems of underdevelopment, I will argue that India's poverty cannot be overcome solely through the evolutionary growth models of neoclassical theory. In India, in the absence of prior institutional change —and no matter how sophisticated the investment plans for "inducing" other investments that have backward and forward linkage effects— one set of investments will not lead to another, or will lead to only a few others and then very quickly to a dead end, if the past is any guide.

At the same time, it is difficult to endorse the opposite view; namely, that revolutionary social transformation is a necessary or, perhaps more important, a realistic precondition for breaking down the social barriers to development. Whether presented as the "broad institutional approach" of the social theorist or the "total revolution" of the political activist, the solution is indeed too comprehensive. In particular, it fails to differentiate between what may be called the *direct* and *indirect* obstacles to economic advance which are part of the social setting in India. I shall argue that the direct constraints are found in the patterns of land distribution and tenure relations. By contrast, the cultural attitudes, caste structures, and power relations which are also part of the Indian environment are more accurately characterized as indirect obstacles, in the sense that they strengthen ideological and political patterns that stand in the way of agrarian reform.

Two important consequences follow from this type of distinction. First, obstacles to economic growth turn out to be more narrow—and therefore somewhat more tractable—than the broad institutional critique allows. Second, by differentiating between direct and indirect social causes of economic underdevelopment, it becomes possible to devise ideological and organizational strategies aimed at undermining the beliefs and attitudes that continue to legitimate inequalities as well as the structures that fragment the peasantry into vertical alignments led by upper-caste, landed elites. Indeed, it was the basic assumption of India's leadership during the days of Gandhi and Nehru that an in-

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formed and organized peasantry could build direct relationships with outside centers of power in both the administration and the political parties, to convert its strength of numbers under a democratic political system into a "nonviolent" sanction for radical reform.

This notion was not based merely on self-delusion or self-interest. The fact is that theories calling for revolutionary social transformation are "non-theories" under Indian conditions, once they are tested against political constraints. Not only are such strategies outside the intention or capability of the government or any organized opposition movement; even worse, they are prescriptions that in practice can only retard social change or trigger social chaos. In India, a frontal assault on the existing social order would, in the best case, delay or abort desired egalitarian changes by fragmenting large numbers of the poorer classes along the more potent allegiances to religion, language, or caste. In the worst case, such an assault would be likely to lead to a prolonged period of disorder and the prospect of eventual national disintegration. In sum, India seems to present a unique case: a society that is unresponsive both to neoclassical models of evolutionary economic change and to direct confrontation for the purposes of sweeping away social obstacles to development.

I

An account of India's development since Independence is itself the most eloquent critique of neoclassical growth theory and the inability of its labor-surplus models to solve problems of mass poverty in the absence of prior institutional change. The basic fact is that only a small minority of the population has been incorporated into the high-productivity, high-wage modern sector of the economy. Despite substantial expansion in industrial output and social overhead capital, the spread effects from the creation of more jobs have been narrow. Eighty percent of the population continue to live in rural areas. Of this vast majority, about the same proportion earn their livelihood directly from agriculture, as cultivators or laborers.[10] Overall increases in per capita net national product have been modest. Reverses in recent years have substantially neutralized earlier gains.[11]

[10] India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, *Census of India, 1971*, Provisional Population Totals, Paper 1 of 1971—Supplement, 3-33, 49.

[11] The annual growth rate in per capita net national product registered its highest levels in the first decade of planning. Increments during the First Plan (1951–56) and the Second Plan (1956–61) were 1.6% and 1.8% per annum respectively. By contrast, the annual rate of growth during the Third Plan (1961–66) declined to 0.3% at constant prices. Except for a brief spurt in 1967–68, and again in 1975–76, annual growth

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There are two reasons for this failure. The first is highly visible and easily quantified. Population, which increased by more than 50 percent in the first half of this century (at annual growth rates of about 1 percent), almost doubled during the next 25 years (as the rate of growth increased to a peak of 2.5 percent per annum). Altogether, the current population of India is at least 100 million higher than economic planners were able to anticipate.[12] This population explosion makes it clear that, for decades to come, new employment opportunities created in the modern industrial sector will be able to absorb only a small fraction of the unemployed and underemployed. Estimates made in 1971—on the basis of population increases that had *already* occurred—project an additional 65 million entrants into the labor force by 1986. This increase alone represents more than three times the existing level of employment in the entire organized sector, including private industry and public enterprise.[13] In addition, there was a backlog of unemployment (as of 1971) estimated at 15 million persons.[14] Chronic underemployment within the rural sector, as measured by a series of pilot studies in the early 1970's, was estimated to affect one-third of the rural population.[15]

The second reason for this failure is less readily apparent, but it takes on greater practical significance for the future, when most new entrants into the labor force will have to find productive employment within the agricultural sector. It is the chronic inability of the vast agricultural economy to achieve the higher levels of output and productivity that are well within the potential of existing technology.

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rates have tended to remain at levels of less than 1%. During the Fourth Plan (1969–74), per capita gains in net national product per annum averaged 0.5%. India, *Economic Survey, 1974–75*, 59; India, *Economic Survey, 1969–70*, 61.

[12] In 1952, the Planning Commission estimated that "for the purposes of our calculations regarding possible rates of development in India in the next few decades," population would continue to grow at the rate of about 1¼% per annum—the rate during the previous ten years. At the end of 25 years, the population was projected to reach 500 million. India, Planning Commission, *The First Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1952), 20, 23.

[13] India, Planning Commission, *Draft Fifth Five Year Plan, 1974–79, Part I* (New Delhi 1973), 3.

[14] India, Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan, A Draft Outline* (Delhi, August 1966), 106-8.

[15] These data were generated through the Pilot Intensive Rural Employment Project launched by the Department of Community Development in 1972–73, as part of the Government's Crash Scheme for Rural Employment. A survey of unemployment and underemployment was conducted in 15 selected blocks, each in a different state, to get data representative for the country as a whole. The results showed that there were approximately twice as many unemployed wage-seeking laborers as anticipated in statistical computations based on 1961 census data. The earlier estimates had projected levels of "surplus" manpower at about 17% of the agricultural work force. (India, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Community Development, unpublished.)

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Such a constraint has been apparent since the turn of the century. The British created railways and road networks, new export markets, and a rising demand for raw materials by domestic industries, all of which spurred a steady increase in the rate of output and per-acre yield of non-foodgrain crops (especially tea, sugarcane, and oilseeds).[16] But they accomplished these changes without a significant diversion of land from food crops or any substantial stimulus to the adoption of commercial practices in the rest of the agricultural economy. More striking, during the 40 years ending in 1947, the percentage increase in output of foodgrains, estimated at 12 percent, lagged far behind the increases in population growth, of over 40 percent.[17] Yield levels, among the lowest in the world, showed almost no increase. What is even more remarkable, small negative growth rates emerged—both in output and yield per acre—for rice, which, accounting for about one-half of India's foodgrain output, is her chief crop. In Greater Bengal (an area which had seven-eighths of its acreage under rice), the yield declines occurred at the same time in which "intensity of cultivation increased considerably," with an estimated addition of six million people to the agricultural labor force.[18] India's experience during this period provides a direct contrast to the pattern of "agricultural involution" reported by Clifford Geertz for Java under similar circumstances; there, it proved feasible to raise per hectare yields to match population growth rates through the application of more labor-intensive techniques of cultivation.[19] In Greater Bengal, the marginal productivity of labor clearly could not be maintained. Per capita availability of foodgrains declined.[20] These decreases were cushioned, but not compensated, by imports. When the imports stopped during the Second World War (after Burma had been occupied by the Japanese), three million persons died of starvation in the famine of 1943.

After Independence, the obvious gap between the actual average yields and the technical possibilities spurred optimism about India's potentiality for rapid agricultural growth. This provided the rationale of the Community Development Program that was inaugurated in 1952. It

[16] George Blyn, *Agricultural Trends in India, 1891–1947: Output, Availability and Productivity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1966), 107-18.

[17] *Ibid.*, 96.

[18] *Ibid.*, 209-10. On the most favorable assumptions, Blyn estimates that after 1911–12, yields per acre for foodgrains in Greater Bengal declined by −0.10% per annum. The raw data indicate a higher rate of decline of −0.55% per annum. The actual rate probably lies between these two limits. *Ibid.*, 219-24.

[19] See Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1963), 28-38; 77-82.

[20] Blyn (fn. 16), 104-5.

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assumed that expansion of 50 percent or more in yield per acre over a fifteen- to twenty-year period was technologically possible with only relatively small changes in production techniques, and using mainly indigenous inputs. Those responsible for the program actually insisted that "even a hundred percent increase (in yields) is not so much a problem of high science. Seeds, composts and green manures, chemical fertilizers to the extent available, line sowing, interculture, irrigation, field bunding and plant protection measures are by no means technical problems. They are mainly matters of organization."[21] The Planning Commission which had been established in 1950 was also persuaded of these possibilities. Launching the drive for rapid industrialization at the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1956, the Commission adopted the goal of "doubling within a period of 10 years of agricultural production, including food crops."[22] Yet, these potentialities were only partially realized. Despite large-scale investments on major and medium-size irrigation projects, the compound rate of increase in production of all crops between 1949–50 and 1968–69 was somewhat less than 3 percent per annum, while gains from productivity averaged 1.3 percent annually.[23]

India's inability to realize her agricultural production potential has emerged in even sharper relief since the introduction of the new agricultural strategy in the mid-1960's. Major departures from previous policies were devised to achieve rapid gains in production, this time through concentration of modern scientific techniques in the 20 to 25 percent of the cultivated area where assured water supplies provided the most favorable environment for increasing yields. The economic rationale was considerably strengthened, moreover, by the technical breakthrough reported in 1965 from the Philippines and Mexico, of the development of highly fertilizer-responsive paddy and wheat varieties with yield capacities of 5,000 to 6,000 pounds per acre—almost double the maximum potential output of indigenous Indian varieties; it was also encouraged by the development at Indian research stations in the late 1950's of higher-yielding hybrid varieties of maize, bajra, and jowar. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1969–74, two-thirds of the target for additional production of foodgrains was supposed to come from the 30 percent of the total acreage under high-yielding varieties of wheat, paddy, maize, jowar, and bajra.[24] Overall, the rate of increase in agri-

[21] S. K. Dey, *Community Development: A Chronicle* (New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development 1958), 91.
[22] India, Planning Commission, *The Second Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1956), 62.
[23] India, Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969–74* (New Delhi, July 1970), 117.
[24] *Ibid.*, 138.

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cultural output that was projected as the result of planting the high-yielding varieties was about two-thirds higher than the level of previous achievements—a minimum of 5 percent per annum.

New requirements for a "package" of complementary modern inputs, including chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery, did stimulate potentially important backward linkages with the industrial sector. New factories, and increases in installed capacity of factories producing fertilizers and pesticides, were put into operation. Firms manufacturing tractors, power tillers, and other agricultural machines proliferated.

The government's initial concern was that bottlenecks of supply would prove to be the greatest constraint on the rapid introduction of modern techniques, given the meager domestic output of essential inputs, shortages of foreign exchange for imports, and political inhibitions against a major role for foreign private enterprise. That concern, however, was soon replaced by worry over the weakening demand for modern inputs. After a dramatic initial spurt in production, the output of foodgrains actually declined. Partly due to a succession of several years of poor weather, harvests in 1973–74, the last year of the Fourth Plan, were somewhat smaller than they had been in 1970–71.[25] The overall rate of growth in agricultural production at 2.8 percent per annum was far short of the plan's target of 5 percent. The distribution of gains, moreover, was extremely uneven. Rapid agricultural transformation was mainly confined to the irrigated wheat area, primarily in three northern states (Punjab, Haryana, and western sections of Uttar Pradesh). By contrast, only small pockets of rapid growth could be created in the much larger area under rice and other foodgrain crops. Indeed, despite the fact that targets for steady expansion of *area* under the high-yielding varieties of paddy were fulfilled (extending to 25 percent of the total acreage under rice), an official evaluation in 1973–74 found that "thus far, the new agricultural strategy does not appear to have made any visible impact on the production of rice."[26]

Modern agriculture, coexisting alongside much larger subsistence sectors, has simply extended and proliferated the scattered enclaves of development into the hinterland. This dual agricultural economy mirrors many of the features characteristic of the overall dualism between the modern and the traditional sectors. Productivity, employment, wage rates, and absolute levels of income are much higher in the modern agricultural sector than in the traditional subsistence economy.

[25] Production of foodgrains reached a peak level of 108.4 million tons in 1970–71, but dropped back to 103.6 million tons in 1973–74. India, *Economic Survey, 1974–75*, 6.
[26] *Ibid.*

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Just as the modern industrial sector has not expanded horizontally but has achieved higher rates of growth through more intensive investment of capital, the modern sector in agriculture shows signs of stabilizing at its present size, and making additional gains in productivity through greater capital investments in mechanization.

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this persistent dualism is provided by the large proportion of the rural population that continues to live below the poverty line. According to estimates made by the Planning Commission in 1960–61—after the first decade of planning—50 to 60 percent of the rural population, or approximately 211 million people, subsisted below the minimum level of consumption (calculated primarily in terms of caloric intake necessary to avoid the onset of malnutrition).[27] Available estimates for the early 1970's reveal a reduction in the proportion of the poor, but a moderate increase in their absolute numbers. About 40 to 50 percent of the rural population, at least 220 million people, are still believed to be subsisting below the poverty line.[28]

Ideologically and politically—not to say morally—it is impossible to ignore these millions. Economic objectives of expanding growth rates, of generating greater investment from domestic production and savings, and of achieving self-reliance (or self-sustaining growth) also require much more rapid increases in agricultural output. Low and erratic gains in agricultural production have been a major factor in India's failure over the period of four Five-Year Plans to achieve its target of overall economic growth of 5 to 6 percent per annum. Indeed, during the 1960's and 1970's, the average rate of growth of the net national product at constant prices actually declined from levels achieved in the early years of planning. Annual increases during the First Plan (1951–56) and the Second Plan (1956–61) of 3.4 percent and 4 percent respectively compare with gains during the Third Plan (1961–66) of 2.6 percent; and, after a three-year plan holiday (1966–69), with the progress during the Fourth Plan (1969–74) of 2.8 percent.[29] These reverses were accompanied by a sharp deceleration in the rate of growth of industrial production—from an average annual increase of over 8 percent in 1956–64 to less than 4 percent per annum during 1969–74.[30] Recurrent food shortages, sharp inflationary price spirals, low availability of domestic

[27] India, Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, "Perspective of Development: 1961–1976, Implications of Planning for a Minimum Level of Living," August 1962, 4-5 (mimeo).

[28] India, Planning Commission, *Towards Self-Reliance, Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, June 1972), 4.

[29] *Economic Survey, 1974–75* (fn. 11), 59; *Economic Survey, 1969–70* (fn. 11), 61.

[30] *Economic Survey, 1974–75* (fn. 11), 10.

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raw materials, shortfalls in industrial output, underutilized capacity (especially in consumer-goods industries), and stagnant or declining rates of public investment have all contributed to the prospect that India will return to a low-level equilibrium in which growth rates do not significantly exceed the rate of population increase.

Any serious effort to prevent what appears to be an incipient enclave pattern from hardening into a permanent separation between the modern and traditional sectors requires a strategy for raising overall productivity in agriculture to levels that at least approach the possibilities already present in the potential of either the traditional or the modern techniques.

II

It is at this point that the process of development runs into direct obstacles because of the pattern of land distribution and land tenure. Although it is "dramatic" to attribute low levels of productivity to irrational religious beliefs and cultural patterns (such as the large numbers of festivals, holidays, and ceremonial occasions which presumably interfere with work schedules that would allow efficient utilization of labor), that explanation is almost entirely gratuitous. The chronic gap between the potential for productivity and actual output can be more parsimoniously (if prosaically) explained by examining the institutions of land tenure that prevent efficient allocation of land, labor, and capital.

The agrarian pattern does not have its origins in religious beliefs, cultural attitudes, or even the exotic social structure of caste. Rather, it derives from the decision taken by the British in the mid-19th century to replace communal forms of landownership with individual proprietary rights in land. The characteristic features of the present agrarian pattern can be summarized as follows:

(1) The overriding constraint is the unfavorable ratio of land to population in the rural areas, which is estimated at 0.71 acre per capita.

(2) The overall scarcity of land is accompanied by extreme inequalities in the distribution of ownership. More than one-quarter of all rural households (26 percent) own no land at all. Another 15 percent own fragments of land of less than one acre. An additional 15 percent own uneconomic or marginal holdings of between 1 and 2.49 acres (i.e., less than one hectare). In brief, the *majority* of all rural households, approximately 57 percent, either own no land or small fragments, or

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uneconomic and marginal holdings of less than one hectare. Together, they own only 7 percent of the land. This is the population that is chronically unemployed and underemployed, the millions of rural poor precariously subsisting just at the border of, or slipping below, the line of poverty. In addition, approximately 31 percent of all rural households operate small and medium holdings of between 2.5 and 10 acres and account for over 33 percent of the land. All of these landless and land-poor households can be contrasted with what passes for large landowners in India, the upper 12 percent of all households who have 10 acres or more and own about 60 percent of the land. Within this group, an even smaller elite, the upper 4 percent, own 20 acres or more each, or 35 percent of the area.

(3) The upper 12 percent or so of rural households can be considered "large" landowners only from the perspective of their size *relative* to the mass of landless and subsistence cultivators. Among this group, for example, only a fraction of 1 percent own holdings of 50 acres or more.[31] Even then, there are considerably *fewer* large *farms* than large landowners. Holdings in all size groups are subdivided into separate parcels that are scattered within and between villages. The tiniest fragments are, of course, contained in the smallest holdings. They may be subdivided into plots of one-quarter or one-third of an acre. However, "large" holdings of 10 acres or more are commonly separated into 7 or 8 parcels of 2, 3, 4 or 7 acres.[32] "Large" landowners, therefore, tend to *operate* small holdings. They do not enjoy advantages associated with economies of scale.

(4) The foregoing pattern of land distribution is associated with a complex system of tenurial relationships in which sharecropping plays a central role. Landowners with tiny plots lease out their holdings to other cultivators and seek additional employment outside the village. "Large" landowners lease out part of their holdings because they tend to have several scattered plots which they find impossible to manage without the aid of tenants. The incidence of tenancy is highest in the densely populated rice deltas where the man/land ratios are least favorable. It is not unusual for 30 to 40 percent of all cultivators to take some

[31] The above estimates are based on a projection for 1969–70 from National Sample Survey data collected in 1960–61, and have been computed by the Indian economist, B. S. Minhas. See B. S. Minhas, "Mass Poverty and Strategy of Rural Development in India" (Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, March 1971), 37 (mimeo).

[32] National Sample Survey, No. 140, "Tables with Notes on Some Aspects of Landholdings in Rural Areas" (State and all-India Estimates), "Seventeenth Round, September 1961–July 1962," (Calcutta: Indian Statistical Institute, April 1966), Draft, 70.

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land on oral lease, or for the proportion of the area operated under such sharecropping arrangements to reach levels of 40 percent or more.[33]

If Marx had not long ago advanced the thesis that production relations can become fetters on the forces of production it would have to be invented to explain India's dilemma at her current stage of development. The present patterns of land distribution and land tenure put major obstacles in the way of increasing per-acre yields, *either* through the more efficient application of traditional labor-intensive techniques *or* the introduction of modern methods. Vast numbers of the landless and those engaged in subsistence agriculture remain unemployed or underemployed for long periods during the year. They have neither the incentive nor the capacity to carry out labor-intensive production schemes that could increase yields within the traditional framework of production. The most obvious case is that of sharecroppers who pay 50 percent or more of their output in rent. They rarely invest in modern inputs, and they certainly do not lavish any extra attention on the cultivation of leased-in land. Nor is there much scope for carrying out overhead labor-investment projects—construction and maintenance of water courses, field channels, wells, tanks, drainage systems—which are critical for increasing productivity through traditional techniques. Individuals are unable to undertake such land-improvement schemes, and groups of individuals find no incentive to do so. The government's efforts after Independence, to establish village councils with statutory authority to carry out construction of capital projects, have foundered on the inequalities of the land-tenure system. It has proved impossible to mobilize "surplus" or underemployed labor on a voluntary basis when the expected gains in productivity will increase economic concentration even more in favor of "large" landowners. It has also proved fiscally impossible—given the large numbers of the underemployed involved—

[33] It is difficult to make accurate estimates of the incidence of tenancy. Most leasing arrangements involve sharecropping agreements that are undocumented in village records. According to interview data collected by the Census Commission in 1961, about 23% of all cultivators were pure tenants, operating wholly leased-in land; in many states, 30 to 40% of all farmers took some land on oral lease. (*The Statesman*, June 1, 1968.) This situation has probably not changed significantly in recent years. Early in 1977, the Agriculture Ministry's Director of Land Reforms offered an "informed estimate" to the effect that approximately 20 to 25% of all agricultural holdings are cultivated by tenants; probably as much as 40% in the densely populated rice regions of eastern India. Interview, New Delhi, January 8, 1977. Reports of field research in diverse regions of the rice areas confirm that sharecropping is a pervasive feature of the tenurial pattern. See Wolf Ladejinsky, *A Study on Tenurial Conditions in Package Districts* (New Delhi: Planning Commission 1965); Frankel, *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), 61-64; 87-88; 127-31; 165.

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for the government to mount rural works programs on the scale required, and still pay normal market wages to laborers for work done on such projects—not only because the cost is staggering, but also because inflationary pressures are generated as the result of scarce wage goods, especially foodgrains.

The patterns of land distribution and land tenure also present intractable obstacles to carrying out the productivity revolution promised by the capital-intensive technologies under the programs that employ high-yielding varieties. Except in areas where landholdings are consolidated and two or three times the size of the national average (conditions which exist only in the "green revolution" wheat areas),[34] "large" landowners, like small and marginal cultivators, find it uneconomic to invest in modern agricultural techniques. The large landowner is rarely able to realize the maximum return from his investment because the size of his *operational* holding is usually less than the optimum area for the efficient cultivation of the high-yielding varieties. In fact, this problem is a pervasive one in the rice areas, where the installation of minor irrigation works (percolation wells, pumpsets, and tubewells) is necessary to supplement supplies of water from surface irrigation projects,[35] but where the command area of the smallest mechanized

[34] Punjab and Haryana, the heartland of the green-revolution wheat area, are the only two states in which consolidation operations have been carried out over the entire sown area. In the majority of states, land consolidation is still in the early stages of implementation. (India, Planning Commission, *Report of the Task Force on Agrarian Relations*, New Delhi 1973, 97.) There were also fewer small operational holdings in these states than in India as a whole. According to data collected in 1960, the average size of operational holdings in India (i.e., all lands that are part of the same economic unit, including leased-in land) was 6.6 acres; almost three-quarters of all holdings were less. By contrast, data for the undivided Punjab (before it was bifurcated into Punjab and Haryana in 1966), showed that 42% of all holdings were 10 acres or more. "Data collected in the 16th Round of NSS on Operational Holdings," 1 (mimeo).

[35] The existing canal irrigation systems are inadequate for the efficient cultivation of the high-yielding varieties on several counts. They were initially designed with traditional cultivation techniques in mind to spread water as widely and thinly as possible, and to provide protection in time of drought, rather than to supply the higher water levels per acre that are necessary for the introduction of scientific agriculture. In addition, the canals have no cross-regulators to allow for controlled rotation of watering. They also lack channel systems that reach directly into the farmer's field. The result is that cultivators cannot be certain of receiving supplies at the exact time and in the amounts required. None of the irrigation systems, moreover, have master drainages. Finally, irrigation water is usually sufficient for only one wet-rice crop during the main growing season. The growth cycle of the high-yielding varieties is basically unsuited to the monsoon patterns of much of the rice-growing area. The new varieties are best cultivated as a second crop during the sunny, dry season. In practice, therefore, the efficient adoption of modern techniques requires the installation of minor irrigation works to tap underground water as an assured source of supply all year round. See B. Sivaraman, "Scientific Agriculture is Neutral to Scale—The Fallacy and the Remedy," Dr. Rajendra Prasad Memorial Lecture, December 27, 1972, Indian Society of Agricultural Statistics, 26th Annual Conference, Kalyani.

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works is a minimum of five to ten acres. It is, moreover, financially difficult for even large landowners to install several such facilities, costing $400-$1,000, on a number of scattered holdings. But without assured water, neither the large cultivators nor the small and marginal holders will make higher outlays for modern inputs—especially the fertilizers and pesticides required by the high-yielding varieties—when the investment is likely to be lost if rains are inadequate or there is flooding.

Some landowners simply have no interest in land development or in maximizing output from their holdings. Under existing tenurial arrangements, they receive reliable income effortlessly by collecting rent and interest on loans. If they own land in irrigated areas, they can look forward to the additional pleasing prospect that their holding is bound to steadily appreciate in value.[36]

If it appears plausible that direct obstacles in the pattern of land distribution and tenurial relations are sufficient in themselves to account for a large part of India's problems of stagnation and mass poverty, it is reasonable that solutions should first be sought in a change of the agrarian pattern rather than in an undifferentiated assault on the entire social system. At the same time, although the former focus is narrower —and appears at first glance somewhat more manageable—the effective implementation of agrarian reform would ultimately amount to a program of radical social change.

It is possible, of course, to consider a strategy for raising agricultural output that does not go much beyond consolidation of existing ownership holdings and is aimed at increasing economies of scale. However,

[36] Tenurial arrangements have been directly blamed for the slow progress of agricultural modernization in the Kosi area of North Bihar, where major new irrigation projects carried out during the 1960's and early 1970's were expected to irrigate about 1.8 million (gross) acres annually. In 1973, however, figures showed that utilization had reached only about 25% of the potential. A field investigation by the Land Reforms Commissioner concluded that, while technical difficulties explained part of the problem during the main growing season, "the reasons for the gross under-utilization of water during the [autumn] and summer seasons are rooted in the agrarian structure of the Kosi area. The concentration of ownership of land and widespread sharecropping on terms grossly unfair to the sharecroppers are the main reasons for the under-utilization of water during the [autumn] and summer seasons." In particular, landlords with large holdings found it difficult to prepare the land for a second crop within two to three weeks after the main harvest, especially since most of the farms were fragmented and operated by bullock power. At the same time, sharecroppers, who were expected to provide all production inputs and pay one-half the produce to the landowner, could not afford the higher costs of the new techniques, the more so since they usually borrowed money on usurious terms. Landowners, for their part, were not interested in sharing in the costs of modern inputs, because they "look upon their land essentially as a form of wealth, the value of which is appreciating year after year. They are not overly concerned about annual returns." P. S. Appu, "Kosi Area Development, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Reform" (New Delhi, April 1973, mimeo).

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in the absence of any policy for redistribution of ownership rights in land, consolidation will only aggravate the problems of technological dualism and income disparities. Recent data reported by G. S. Bhalla on structural changes in the economy of the Punjab[37]—the heartland of the "green revolution"—suggest that although the growth of total output and income was "phenomenal" after the introduction of the new wheat technology, "dualism has become further entrenched." The basic causes for this pattern are not hard to find. Over the ten-year period, 1961–71, there was little diversification in the economy. The proportion of workers engaged in manufacturing actually declined somewhat, even though the share of state income generated by industry increased—for the now familiar reason that the "whole process of industrialization seems to be the traditional labor saving capital intensive process."[38] Similar tendencies emerged in the tertiary sector, where proportionately fewer workers generated a higher share of income. As a result, income per male worker in manufacturing doubled during this period, and increased by over 60 percent in the tertiary sector. The gains of these urban workers, however, only widened the gap in income disparities between them and the workers employed in agriculture. Between 1961 and 1971, the agricultural sector had to absorb a growing share of the total working population. Yet, these workers, whose numbers as a proportion of the labor force increased from approximately 55 percent to about 62 percent, were producing almost the same share of the state's income over the entire ten-year period. Gains in income per male worker in agriculture increased at a lower rate of about 30 percent. This aggregate figure masked growing disparities within the agricultural sector. Although all classes of cultivators who managed to adopt the new technology experienced some improvement in output and income, the gains from the introduction of modern methods were very unevenly distributed. In the Punjab, the size of holding required for economic viability using the new technology is estimated at 8 acres; therefore a large number of cultivators with very small holdings were simply unable to make the transition. Worse yet, the number of marginal holdings of less than 5 acres increased by three times between 1961 and 1971, from 17 percent to over 56 percent of total cultivating households. Such figures clearly indicate

[37] The data on the Punjab economy presented in this paragraph are drawn from the analysis prepared by G. S. Bhalla, *Punjab Economy: Growth and Prospects*, Occasional Papers, No. 2 (New Delhi: Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University 1976).

[38] *Ibid.*, 15.

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that a majority of the rural population in even the most advanced and prosperous agricultural area of India were still having difficulty meeting their minimum needs. In fact, according to official surveys, more than 40 percent of the rural population were living below the poverty level.

The consequences of introducing the "Punjab model" of agrarian modernization into the rice areas are not difficult to imagine. In these regions, the *initial* problems of inequality in land ownership, number of marginal holdings, incidence of sharecropping, and percentage of landless laborers are all more extreme. By comparison with the Punjab, gains are likely to be even more heavily skewed, increases in disparities larger, and the rate of displacement greater relative to the pace of creation of alternative job opportunities outside agriculture. Thus, while dispossessed sharecroppers and marginal farmers swell the ranks of "surplus" laborers, a small minority of big farmers operating consolidated holdings will find it economically advantageous to mechanize farm operations.

If, for these reasons, we rule out the undiluted "capitalist" pattern of agrarian reorganization, we are confronted with alternatives that require (a) some significant redistribution of land, and (b) some degree of change in agrarian organization from individual to cooperative patterns of economic activity. Such a new pattern might take one of several forms, but it must provide opportunities for development schemes that cut across the boundaries of individual fragments and farms. Possible organizational models range all the way from the "integrated" programs of area development now popular with the World Bank (involving mainly a compulsory consolidation of landholdings, and government-funded complementary land- and water-development works at the local level, with costs recovered from taxes on the beneficiaries) to more radical proposals, endorsed in India's first three Five-Year Plans, for the reorganization of all economic activity in agriculture, including production, into cooperatives. Whatever the ultimate pattern, however, the first step, once we rule out free-market models, involves the prior need for land redistribution to ensure minimum levels of economic viability to larger numbers of small holdings. Yet, because of the overall constraint of the unfavorable man/land ratio, even "moderate" proposals for land redistribution set a very low ceiling on the size of household ownership holdings.[39] If, for example, a ceiling

[39] A household is defined for survey purposes as a group of persons who normally live together and take their meals from a common kitchen. The household ownership holding includes all plots of land, whether cultivable or not, owned by the household.

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is placed on household ownership holdings at the low level of 20 acres, only those households who already own *some* land (although less than 5 acres), would be provided with a minimum holding of roughly one hectare. Such a redistribution alone could reduce the number of persons living below the poverty line to approximately one-third of the rural population.[40] Most of these persons—the landless—would presumably improve their condition as the result of additional employment opportunities that are generated in the wake of agrarian reorganization. Specifically, small farmers who pool their resources can create additional capacities for investment in capital projects (for instance, construction of communal tubewells to serve several small contiguous holdings) that spur higher overall levels of economic activity in the agricultural sector.

Even this "moderate" proposal requires the redistribution of 43 million acres of land, that is to say, 13 percent of the cultivated area. It also affects large numbers of landowners who, along with their families, amount to not less than 30 million persons.[41] At that, such a land reform is not revolutionary. It poses no challenge to the institution of individual property rights. It is, however, radical. It involves a substantial redistribution of assets that are the chief source of wealth and income in an agricultural society. On that account, it inevitably threatens the entire structure of social prestige and power relations that closely parallel the pattern of land ownership. It certainly goes far beyond reforms that have previously been achieved through legislation. Under existing land-ceiling laws, a total of only 4.1 million acres of surplus land has been formally transferred from private landowners to the government.[42]

III

If the direct cause of India's development problem lies in her patterns of land ownership and land tenure, and the solution to the problem is radical land reform, the need for compulsion could presumably

[40] Minhas (fn. 31), 6, 7. There are normally four to five persons per household in the size class of holdings of less than five acres.

[41] *Ibid.*, 6, 36.

[42] Approximately 2.3 million acres of surplus land were vested in the government under land ceiling legislation enacted by the states during the 1960's. *Report of the Task Force of Agrarian Relations* (fn. 34), 96. Another 1.8 million acres were taken over by the government under amendments to existing legislation enacted after 1972 (as of December 31, 1976), with the possibility that effective implementation of the amended Acts might yield an additional 2.6 million acres. Estimate provided by the Director of Land Reforms, Interview, New Delhi, January 8, 1977.

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be justified by historical precedent. It has often been pointed out that drastic land reforms have taken place only by fiat from above or as part of a major revolutionary upheaval of the type experienced in Russia and China. Alternatively, dissent has been repressed by the state from above or swept away by mass violence from below.

The prospect that land reform in India could be carried out through the first means, that is, by government fiat from above, is extremely dim. Even if an authoritarian government professing commitment to social reform were to gain control of the major means of repression in the state, not enough power would be concentrated in the central government to carry out land redistribution in the face of probable strong opposition from local elites. In actual fact—as the performance of the central government during its almost two years of unlimited emergency powers suggests—an authoritarian political system is as likely to be a "soft state" as the democratic political system it replaces. The national government has no direct administrative apparatus reaching down to the village level. The ruling Congress Party had depended on intermediaries drawn from among those with power and influence in local linguistic, religious, and caste groups to mobilize the peasantry for political participation. The new Janata Party is a coalition based on the Congress (O)—created by dissident former members of the Congress Party after the 1969 split in the parent organization—the Socialists, the Bharatiya Lok Dal (centered in Uttar Pradesh), and the Jan Sangh. It has virtually no political machinery of its own reaching down into the villages. On the contrary, in parts of north India, it was heavily dependent for election workers on the Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association), the militant Hindu nationalist youth organization that had provided the backbone of the Jan Sangh party apparatus. Indeed, precisely *because* old beliefs, attitudes, and established religious and caste institutions—rather than class—have been such vital rallying points for popular organization in large parts of rural India, the government would find it virtually impossible to use compulsion for the purpose of carrying out social change.

The political constraints on imposing radical social change from above are not, as is now frequently asserted, located in inappropriate parliamentary institutions imposed during and inherited from the days of colonial rule. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the diverse internal cleavages which have traditionally divided the Indian subcontinent and still compete with more recent class divisions as the basic principle of political interest and political action.

Within India's boundaries there are fourteen major linguistic group-

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ings, each claiming a unique cultural heritage; a large Muslim religious minority, accounting for one-sixth of the total population; and, at the core of the social structure, over three thousand endogamous caste groups. The entire national political structure is, in fact, built upon accommodation of these linguistic, religious, and caste sentiments and structures as the only way to accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political system, and maximize the possibility of peaceful adjustments of social conflict that arise during the development process.

Language has been granted formal recognition as a legitimate principle of political organization since 1956, when the states were reorganized around linguistic boundaries and kept their wide federal powers over public order, welfare, and development, *including land reforms.* If, for example, we were to apply Stalin's definition of nationality, it can be argued that there are fourteen "nations" in India, in the sense that each linguistic State is "an historically evolved stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."[43] There is, moreover, no dominant national group comparable to the Great Russian, nor is the largest linguistic group—Hindi speakers—dispersed throughout the country.[44] On the contrary, the linguistic state rather than the national government has provided a main focus of extended feelings of political solidarity, especially since state leaders have successfully claimed access to government resources on a regional-linguistic basis.

Diverse linguistic communities are not the only subnational unit around which the peasantry is politically organized. Indeed, within each "nation" there are multiple centers of personal and parochial loyalty that have played an even greater role in arranging peasant participation. Caste, in particular, has been used as a natural building block, both by political interest groups and by party organizations in ways that have split the solidarity of the poor.

Caste associations—at the district, state, and regional levels—have united previously isolated but essentially comparable subcastes to emerge as active pressure groups in local and state politics. They have

[43] Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1950), 16.

[44] Whereas Great Russian accounts for the language of over 58% of the population and Great Russian speakers are dispersed throughout the Soviet Union, Hindi users total about one-third of the national population in India and are concentrated in the northern Ganges plains. See Selig Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 304.

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encouraged an exclusive and intense loyalty among their members, which inhibits the development of overlapping memberships or cross-cutting class pressures. Although in theory the caste associations enable the lower castes (and, what is often the same, the poorer classes) to use their large numbers to gain influence, access, and power for the community as a whole, in practice it is only the very small, upwardly mobile element that is able to benefit from government concessions won in the name of the group. The caste associations, therefore, have made little contribution to the growth of equality or direct peasant participation in politics. On the contrary, the leaders of caste associations have often been able to extract political concessions precisely *because* they were known to be able to mobilize large numbers of people by appealing to traditional ascriptive loyalties.[45]

Even more important than the adaptation of caste structures to new roles as interest groups has been the direct use of caste by politicians in building party organizations. In general (although with notable exceptions at the state level), national political parties have not recruited from among the poor peasantry. Instead, they accommodated themselves to the existing power structures as the easiest way to win votes. The advent of universal suffrage did displace the tiny English-educated upper-caste urban professionals from key positions in party organizations; but the major beneficiaries of the change were individuals in the most prosperous sections of the dominant landowning castes—individuals who could exploit a wide network of traditional caste, kinship, and economic ties (of dependent sharecroppers and laborers) to organize a large personal following. The rate of politicization of low-caste, lower-class members was slowed down by this process. Such groups did not act independently in making demands on the political system. Rather, they related to the political process only through the dominant caste leadership.

The prototype for this pattern of vertical political organization was pioneered by the Congress Party, which developed the art of accommodation to its highest degree. The Congress Party succeeded by adapting to local power structures. Typically, it recruited from among those who were members of the dominant landowning castes, and, within this caste, were the leading members of the large landowning group.[46]

[45] See Frankel, "Democracy and Political Development: Perspectives from the Indian Experience," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969) 448-68, esp. 450-56.

[46] The most comprehensive empirical study of the grass-roots political organization of the Congress Party is Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1967), 467-68. Data collected in five districts in widely separated parts of India showed that "district party organiza-

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Such local notables put together the basic units of the Congress Party organization. The units were composed of the leaders' kin, caste fellows, and economic dependents. The wider district, state, and national party organization represented a complex pyramiding of these vertical (multicaste and multiclass) factional alliances. Significantly, the majority of Congress Party members retained primary loyalty to their faction or, if the party dissolved, to the kinship and caste groupings at its core rather than to the party. As a result, the relationship between the leaders of the local faction and state and national political parties was often asymmetrical: the authority of the former was largely independent of party identification; in many cases, the power of the latter depended on support of the rural elites.

Under such conditions, the obstacles to land reform by fiat from above are obvious. In order to rally the support of the poor peasantry who are the potential beneficiaries of its land reform policies, the ruling party would have to operate through the very local elites it wants to displace.

The alternative of carrying out land reform from below appears equally implausible in the absence of a class-based party organization. It is, of course, conceivable that the central government could use radical populist rhetoric denouncing the large landowners as "exploiters" in order to encourage "spontaneous" action, such as strikes by laborers and seizures of land by tenants. It could also restrain the police and the courts from intervening to provide protection for those members of the landed classes whose granaries are looted, homes burned, lands occupied, and so on. The danger of such a strategy—especially where class consciousness or the degree of peasant organization is low—is that large-scale social struggle will spill across class boundaries and trigger civil violence. Under Indian conditions, that could threaten national unity. The potential for widespread social violence is almost boundless. There is, first of all, the "national" issue. To cite Stalin once more:

> The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout about the "fatherland," claiming that its own cause is

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tions are usually run by peasant proprietors. At the village and district levels, the prominent Congress leaders are property owners and typically, although not always, members of the dominant caste within the local community." The major qualifications to this generalization are that conflict within village elites made it impossible for the Congress Party to recruit all local leaders; and lower-status, but more numerous, peasant-proprietor castes were challenging traditional elites for positions of local leadership.

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> the cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its "countrymen" in the interests . . . of the fatherland. . . . As far as the peasants are concerned their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the "land" . . . then the mass of peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.[47]

Second, there is the possibility of large-scale communal violence. Animosity has, in fact, smoldered and occasionally flared between Hindu and Muslim communities since the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. In that year alone, half a million persons died when Muslim minorities in Hindu-dominated areas and Hindus in Muslim majority regions were slaughtered. Conflicts between Hindu landlords and Muslim tenants would not necessarily be any easier to contain.

Third, in parts of rural India and particularly in the South, there are possibilities of cruel caste conflicts. Cleavages drawn on the basis of landed and landless classes closely parallel the traditional divisions between pure and polluted castes. In many villages, the landlord is a Brahmin, and the landless farmworkers are Harijans, descendants of the despised untouchables.

Finally, even within the lower castes, poor peasants may be divided by different perceptions of their economic interest into those who own some land and those who own none at all. Some peasants will simply choose to remain loyal to their old patrons. In such cases, relations between landlords and the landless may settle into a permanent adversary pattern, with both sides organizing rival private armies or "volunteer" groups that polarize the poor into "loyal" workers and tenants, and those who join the rebels.

Whether it instigates reform from above or below, an authoritarian form of government is therefore not likely to be any more successful than the "soft" democratic state in carrying out institutional change—given practical political constraints on the use of compulsion for this purpose. On the contrary, an authoritarian political system might be counter-productive at this time, by creating even more unfavorable conditions for social reform because it may freeze existing power relationships at the local level while dominant landowning castes still have the upper hand.

Is there any solution? In the immediate future, the realistic answer is that one is not likely to appear. But if we are thinking in longer time horizons about the direction in which India should move in order to

[47] Stalin (fn. 43), 28-29.

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generate the political capacities necessary to carry out social change, the assumption that authoritarian political structures offer the best hope appears unfounded. On the contrary, democratic institutions may contain a better possibility of weakening both the legitimacy and the power of landed elites without risking the social disorder of a direct confrontation.

The basic condition for nonviolent social change, or social change that holds out at least the potential for limiting violence short of the point at which it threatens national unity, is the solidarity of the poor. The basic obstacle to mobilizing the poor on the principle of their shared poverty is the vertical pattern of political organization which in the past has fragmented the peasantry around ties of religion, caste, kinship, and economic dependence.

Such structures can be indirectly undermined even if they cannot be directly destroyed. Traditional values and attitudes that legitimate ascriptive inequalities sanctified by the religious myths of caste can be eroded by political ideologies endorsing egalitarian norms. The dominant landed castes who until now have played a strategic role as intermediaries between the peasantry and the wider political system can be outflanked if the more numerous lower castes are organized for political participation in horizontal class alignments. Under Indian conditions, democratic rather than authoritarian institutions offer the best prospect for indirect ideological and organizational assaults on the dominant position of the landed castes.

Indeed, the first part of a process of ideological change is already well advanced. After thirty years of Independence, during which the Constitution, the Parliament, the dominant political party, and the basic principles of national policy embodied in the Five-Year Plans all endorsed egalitarian and socialist goals as an integral part of the development approach, low-caste landless and land-poor groups are making the first tentative distinctions between the sacred and secular spheres. Literacy, education, the demonstrable liberative powers of modern science and technology, and, not least, the principle and practice of adult suffrage itself, have created a receptive environment for new slogans of economic and political equality. In the landmark elections of 1971 and 1972 at the center and in the states, Mrs. Gandhi, deserted by large numbers of local influentials in the wake of a split in the Congress Party, still managed to win unprecedented majorities among the rural poor by cutting across regional, parochial, and caste lines with a direct class appeal to "abolish poverty," including a prom-

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ise to carry out land reforms.[48] The most recent national election of 1977, which ironically brought about Mrs. Gandhi's defeat, offered further confirmation that large numbers of the peasantry have begun to participate directly in the national electoral process in response to political issues and appeals that transcend religious, factional, and caste divisions.

In the years since the 1971 and 1972 elections, the grass-roots organizational effort that was required, state by state, to transform such nascent sentiments of solidarity into effective pressure from below for the implementation of land reforms was, unfortunately, never undertaken. The reasons are complex and outside the scope of this article.[49] Even if such organization had been attempted, of course, the outcome would still be uncertain.

One conclusion seems warranted. The political conditions for a democratic restructuring of India's agrarian economy are more favorable now than they have been at any time in the recent past. New egalitarian norms are beginning to erode the old caste and factional loyalties that buttressed the previous patterns of vertical political mobilization. At the same time, an organizational vacuum is in the process of developing in the rural areas. The leadership of the democratic parties that have once again been entrusted with power can seize this opportunity to organize the most disadvantaged sections of the rural society with the aim of institutionalizing popular participation—and pressure—as an integral part of the political process. Or, fearing the consequences of a genuine shift in the balance of social forces, they can temporize and attempt to slow down the pace of social mobilization by mending the old patterns of clientelist politics.

It is likely to be a historic choice. The unexpected election of 1977 restored the democratic political order established 30 years earlier, an order that had all but completely collapsed as a result of previous failures to carry out essential social reforms. Should a further breakdown occur, the improbable events of March 1977 are unlikely to be repeated.

[48] See All India Congress Committee, *People's Victory—An Analysis of 1971 Elections* (New Delhi, April 1971); All India Congress Committee, *People's Victory—Second Phase (An Analysis of the 1972 General Election to State Assemblies)* (New Delhi, June 1972).

[49] A detailed analysis of the reasons for this organizational failure is presented in Frankel, *India's Political Economy 1947–1977*, chap. XI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

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Research Note

ANARCHY AND SOCIAL CHOICE: Reflections on the International Polity

By ORAN R. YOUNG*

STUDENTS of international relations have for the last decade or so been fascinated by the idea of utilizing systemic conceptions in their efforts to understand the workings of the international polity.[1] So far, however, the employment of this approach has failed to yield impressive results. It has provided a framework for some useful descriptions of recent developments in the realm of international politics. It has sustained the formulation of some abstract models, but these constructs have proven difficult to apply, in anything but metaphorical terms, to real-world situations at the international level. And it has served as a gloss for some highly inductive work that has not yet generated any impressive lawlike assertions pertinent to international politics. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that disenchantment with systemic conceptions is now spreading among students of international relations.

The purpose of this essay is to propose a new direction and to sketch out a new thrust for systemic thinking about international politics. To this end I shall focus on the processes through which social choices are made in the international polity. There exists an impressive body of theoretical work concerning the generic phenomenon of social choice.[2] But the bulk of that work relates to economic systems, or to political systems that differ fundamentally from the international polity

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[1] Cf. my discussion of efforts to utilize systemic conceptions in the analysis of international politics in Young, "A Systemic Approach to International Politics," Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 33 (Princeton 1968).

[2] The modern classic in this field is Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (2d ed.; New York: John Wiley 1963). For a more general survey of this body of work, see William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1973).

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in a number of respects. In this essay, then, I want to examine the special problems of social choice that arise in political systems like the international polity, and to compare the resultant processes of social choice with those that occur in other types of polities.

A. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITY

The international polity is a member of the class of political systems. All polities are analytic subsystems of social systems, but political systems also differ substantially among themselves. My purpose in this section, therefore, is to provide a brief characterization of the international polity as a background for the analysis of social choice at the international level in subsequent sections.

Above all, I want to emphasize that the international polity is an anarchically organized political system. Literally, anarchy refers to the absence of a ruler. More generally, political anarchy is the condition of any polity that is lacking in formal institutions of government at the system level, and that is highly decentralized with respect to the distribution of authority and power.[3] Defined in this way, anarchy is by no means synonymous with disorder or chaos.[4] There is no *a priori* reason to conclude that the emergence of effective systems of rights and rules is infeasible in polities characterized by a high degree of decentralization with respect to the distribution of authority and power. Some students of politics have hypothesized such a link. In fact, this hypothesis constitutes a classic justification for the creation of formal institutions of government.[5] However, there is every reason to suppose that the link between anarchy and (dis)order will be affected by a variety of intervening factors. In my judgment, certain underlying societal conditions (e.g., the degree of consensus on appropriate forms of behavior and the extent to which strong feelings of community exist in the social system) will be of great importance in this context. But that is undoubtedly an area in which there is a need for additional research.

In addition to its anarchical pattern of organization, the international polity exhibits a number of more specific features that distinguish it from other political systems. I do not wish to overemphasize these distinctive features; they certainly do not make things easier from the

[3] For a general introduction to anarchist thinking, see April Carter, *The Political Theory of Anarchism* (New York: Harper and Row 1971).

[4] For further discussion of this issue, consult Daniel Guerin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1970).

[5] The argument constructed by Hobbes in *The Leviathan*, for example, relies heavily on this hypothesis.

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point of view of efforts to generalize about the whole class of political systems, including the international polity. Nevertheless, I think it would be foolish to ignore these features of the international polity altogether. The distinctive features I find most significant fall into two broad groups: those relating to the actors in the international polity and those relating to the international political system *qua* system.

All the principal actors in the international polity are collective entities rather than individual human beings; most of them are large collective entities. These entities are behaving units that possess some degree of autonomy in the sense that their external behavior is not wholly controlled by some other actor(s). Taken as a set, the actors in the international polity exhibit the following distinctive features:

(1) The international polity is a relatively small political system in terms of membership. The actors in this polity number in the hundreds at most, whereas the actors in many political systems number in the millions. This point remains valid despite recent increases in the number of actors in the international polity.

(2) The international political system exhibits a high degree of heterogeneity with respect to the basic principles of organization of its members.[6] Thus, we now have a range of types of international actors including states, international organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational interest groups.

(3) The actors in the international polity are not only diverse with respect to their basic principles of organization; they also vary substantially along almost all conceivable dimensions. The members of this set of actors differ greatly in such things as population, resources, wealth, power, culture, form of government, type of economic organization, and so forth.

(4) It is reasonable to think of the actors in the international polity as behaving units that make continuous streams of choices among more or less differentiated alternatives. But these actors are complex collective entities whose external behavior is typically a product of various internal interactions.[7] Therefore, the classic models of individual choice focusing on the notions of rationality and utility maximi-

[6] Cf. Young, "The Actors in World Politics," in James Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York: Free Press 1972), 125-44.

[7] The importance of this point is stressed heavily in Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown 1971).

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zation will be of only limited relevance in analyzing the behavior of the actors in the international polity.[8]

(5) The actors in the international polity possess unusually large capacities for physical destruction. Paradoxically, the actors in many political systems can literally exterminate each other, whereas this is somewhat uncommon in the international polity.[9] The distinctive feature of the international polity in this regard is that some individual actors in the system have the capacity to bring about truly large-scale destruction, calling into question the continued viability of the system as a whole.

The other group of distinctive features of the international polity are attributes of the system *qua* system. It is possible to identify a number of interesting features of this type. For the present purposes, however, the following systemic attributes constitute particularly important features of the international polity:

(1) Much has recently been written about global interdependence, and it is fashionable to assert that the level of interdependence in the international polity is rising rapidly.[10] Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this polity is still characterized by a considerably lower level of interdependence among its members than most other political systems.

(2) Virtually everything capable of being allocated among the members of the international polity is distributed in a highly inegalitarian fashion. This is true whether the value at stake is population, natural resources, wealth, power, or prestige. Thus, the level of between-unit inequalities in this political system rivals the level of within-unit inequalities.

(3) The international polity is a global system. Therefore, synchronic comparisons among international polities are not feasible. There is some possibility of making diachronic or longitudinal comparisons among international polities (or states of the international polity) existing during different time periods. But this prospect is impeded by two facts: it is difficult to determine unambiguously when one inter-

[8] For a survey of the classic models of individual choice, see Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky, eds., *Decision-Making* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1967).

[9] Thus, I do not think Morton Kaplan's "unit veto" model constitutes an interesting analogue of the international polity. See Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley 1957).

[10] For a recent review of the relevant literature, see Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes," *International Organization*, XXIX (Autumn 1975), 1021-34.

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national polity (or state of a given international polity) ends and another begins, and it is never possible to control for changes in numerous factors from one time period to another.[11]

(4) The international polity has exhibited remarkable stability or durability over a long period of time with respect to its *fundamental pattern* of organization despite the occurrence of numerous significant changes in the system. The anarchical pattern of organization of this polity dates from the inception of the modern states system; the dominant social choice mechanisms of the system have not changed radically in modern times, and the distinctive features of this polity are attributes of long standing.[12]

B. SOCIAL CHOICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITY

The concept "social choice" refers to the processes through which collective or group decisions are reached in situations where the component actors possess nonidentical preference orderings over sets of differentiated alternatives. The following conditions must obtain for a problem of social choice to arise. First, there must be two or more actors having some degree of autonomy with respect to their choice behavior. Second, the actors must be interdependent in the sense that the outcome for each will be affected by the choices of the others. This condition is often stated in terms of the concept of strategic interaction.[13] Third, the preference orderings of the actors over the relevant alternatives must be nonidentical, though they need not be strictly opposed. In addition, the presence of a unique Pareto-optimal outcome or a solution stemming from the selection of dominant strategies will severely limit the scope for processes of social choice, though it need not eliminate such processes altogether. Although these conditions are precise, they are not highly restrictive. Accordingly, problems of social choice arise frequently in virtually all human groups.

The following observations are pertinent to all problems of social choice. Though the presence of at least two autonomous actors is necessary for the occurrence of social choice, there is no upper limit on the number of actors that may be involved. However, the number of actors

[11] These problems are exemplified clearly in the work of Richard Rosecrance, but they are common to this whole genre of analysis. See Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little Brown 1963).

[12] At this level, then, it does not seem accurate to think of the international polity as a revolutionary political system. For an alternative interpretation, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1968).

[13] For an extensive discussion of this concept, see Young, ed., *Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1975), esp. "Introduction."

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involved is an important variable, and I shall have more to say about this factor later on. Next, problems of social choice may arise in virtually any functional realm or substantive area. Perhaps the classic problems involve distributive issues, but they arise in numerous other areas as well.[14] Beyond this, it is worth emphasizing that social choice can be conceptualized as a form of dispute settlement or conflict resolution. Thus, social choice involves the achievement of collective outcomes in situations where the preferences of the relevant actors are initially incompatible or in conflict. In this connection, the degree of incompatibility among the preference orderings of the actors constitutes an attractive measure of the intensity of the conflict involved.[15]

There are good reasons to expect that problems of social choice will be particularly pervasive in the international polity. Empirically speaking, there can be no doubt that the preference structures of the actors in this political system are widely divergent in many areas. Though distributive issues are important, the divergent preferences of the actors in the international polity extend far beyond the realm of distribution as such. In addition, the fact that the actors are large collective entities typically makes it impossible to reach collective choices through the application of simple and efficient procedures. On the contrary, social choice in the international polity requires extensive efforts to coordinate preferences *within* the individual actors as well as *among* the actors.[16] Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, much of the time, the actors in this polity are preoccupied with efforts to achieve social choices.

1. *Social choice mechanisms.* A social choice mechanism is an institutionalized procedure (though it need not involve formal institutions) oriented toward the resolution of problems of social choice. It is possible to distinguish a variety of types, several of which are generally operative at the same time in any given political system. Markets are of great importance in producing collective choices in

[14] In the present essay, I confine myself to a series of general observations about processes of social choice in the international polity. Subsequent work might focus on social choice in specific international issue areas such as international trade, monetary arrangements, natural resources, maritime commerce, ocean space, and so forth.

[15] Consider the following simple illustration. In the first case, two actors (A and B) have the following preference orderings over three differentiable alternatives: A = 1>2>3; B = 2>1>3. In the second case, their preference orderings over the same three alternatives are: A = 1>2>3; B = 3>2>1. Clearly, it makes sense to say that the intensity of the conflict between A and B is greater in the second case than in the first case. In the second case, their preferences are strictly opposed, whereas in the first case, they can both agree on the proposition that 2 is preferable to 3.

[16] This point is made in a highly persuasive fashion in Allison (fn. 7).

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many economic systems. Under highly competitive conditions, they serve to generate outcomes concerning the production and distribution of private goods among actors possessing nonidentical preference orderings. But markets are not critical social choice mechanisms in political systems. This is so because the operation of markets as social choice mechanisms requires, for instance, the availability of a numeraire resource and the presence of a high level of competition among a large number of actors—conditions that political systems almost never fulfill.[17] Most voting systems are properly understood as social choice mechanisms. They provide at least procedural resolutions for conflicts arising from divergent preferences over well-defined alternatives.[18] Such mechanisms are of central importance in many political systems, both at the level of parliamentary decision making and at the level of popular choice. Similarly, administrative procedures often operate as *de facto* mechanisms of social choice in political systems. They are apt to become important when more direct methods of reaching social choices are difficult to utilize effectively or are likely to generate unfortunate externalities. In such situations, problems of social choice are sometimes transferred to administrative agencies or groups of experts who actually make fundamental choices, although they may assert that they are only implementing the general guidelines that they have received.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that voting systems and administrative procedures constitute the principal mechanisms of social choice in all political systems. Various forms of bargaining aimed at the achievement of negotiated settlements are common in most polities. There are situations in which social choice problems are resolved through the use of physical compulsion. That is, one actor may literally compel the others to accept its preferred outcome in situations initially characterized by divergent preference orderings. In some polities, third-party actions in such forms as arbitration and formal judicial procedures operate as mechanisms of social choice. Here the initial participants agree to transform the problem by accepting the outcome prescribed by a specified third party. Finally, there are situations in which social choices are made through the emergence

[17] See also James Coleman, "Political Money," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1074-87, and David Baldwin, "Money and Power," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIII (August 1971), 576-614.

[18] Voting may not lead to substantive solutions; those who lose a vote need not espouse the substantive position of the winners even though they accept the outcome of the vote as binding. For a survey of theoretical work on voting as a mechanism of social choice, see Riker and Ordeshook (fn. 2).

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of a single actor whose preferences are always followed (i.e., the introduction of a dictator).[19] However, this is a degenerate mechanism of social choice in that it violates the condition that social choice requires two or more *autonomous* actors.

These observations raise two additional issues. There is no reason to assume that all mechanisms of social choice will be equally prominent in every political system. On the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that polities will vary substantially in these terms. In the case of the international polity, it is easy to see that a number of the social choice mechanisms identified in the preceding paragraphs will not be utilized at all, or will be of only marginal significance. For instance, voting does not constitute an important mechanism of social choice in this polity. Though a good deal of voting occurs in the United Nations, that Organization is of only marginal importance in dealing with the central issues arising in the international polity. At the same time, the polity is lacking in other institutional structures that are capable at the systemic level of serving as a framework for the application of voting procedures to major problems of social choice.[20] Much the same can be said about the role of administrative procedures. This mechanism requires the presence of effectual institutions of government in the relevant political system—a condition that is clearly unfulfilled at the systemic level in the international polity.[21] Beyond this, the decentralization of both authority and power in the international polity serves to guarantee that dictatorship will be irrelevant to the achievement of social choices in this political system. Although, as I argued earlier, problems of social choice are apt to be pervasive in the international polity, there are compelling reasons to conclude that several mechanisms that are prominent in other political systems will be largely irrelevant here. Consequently, the remaining mechanisms of social choice will bear a heavy burden of use.

Criteria for the evaluation of mechanisms of social choice are of course normative standards. In principle, it is possible to identify an unlimited range of such standards. However, the following criteria strike me as particularly interesting in connection with efforts to com-

[19] This is essentially Arrow's condition of dictatorship. For a fuller discussion, consult Arrow (fn. 2).

[20] This is not to say that voting is unimportant below the level of the system as a whole. It is obviously important within many states, and plays a role of some significance in certain supranational institutions.

[21] However, administrative procedures play some role in reaching social choices in certain subsystems of the international polity. For instance, such phenomena seem quite prominent in the context of the European Communities.

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pare the international polity with other political systems. First, there is the criterion of decisiveness. Do the actors in the system accept the results of a given mechanism of social choice as decisive or definitive? Are there problems associated with the implementation of these results or are the outcomes largely self-executing? Second, it is relevant to ask about the efficiency of alternative social choice mechanisms. The crucial issue here pertains to the transactions costs of arriving at social choices.[22] Are some of the mechanisms less efficient than others in that they are apt to produce higher transactions costs? Are mechanisms of social choice likely to vary substantially with respect to the incidence of the transactions costs among the actors in the system?[23] Third, there is the issue of whether or not the outcomes produced by a given mechanism of social choice are just or equitable as far as the interests of the actors in the political system are concerned. The introduction of this criterion raises all the conceptual issues associated with the problem of justice.[24] I am particularly interested in the special problem of distributive justice, but that focus does nothing to eliminate many of the conceptual difficulties surrounding efforts to employ justice as a criterion of evaluation. Fourth, to what extent are specific mechanisms likely to generate externalities outside the realm of social choice itself?[25] Some of the sharpest controversies about mechanisms of social choice that operate in the international polity (e.g., organized warfare) focus on the alleged externalities of these mechanisms. I am particularly—though not exclusively—concerned with negative externalities flowing from the operation of social choice mechanisms at the international level. Armed with these criteria of evaluation, let me move on now to some comments about the most important social choice mechanisms in the international polity.

2. *The central range.* Due primarily to its highly decentralized or anarchical pattern of organization, certain mechanisms of social choice

[22] For a general discussion of transactions costs, see E. J. Mishan, "The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay," *Journal of Economic Literature*, IX (March 1971), 21-24.

[23] There is no reason to assume that the transactions costs associated with any given mechanism of social choice will be distributed equally among the relevant actors. Consider, for example, arrangements in which the loser in a judicial procedure is obliged to pay all the court costs.

[24] For a wide-ranging discussion of the concept of justice, consult John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971).

[25] An externality is an inadvertent byproduct of an action undertaken for other purposes, whose consequences are not taken into account by any market mechanism. For a variety of perspectives on externalities, consult Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian, *Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy* (New York: Dunellen n.d.).

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that are prominent in other political systems are not widely utilized in the international polity. Empirically speaking, the central mechanisms of social choice at the international level can be grouped under the headings of bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and organized warfare. These mechanisms form a rough continuum from pure bargaining in which physical compulsion is absent, to all-out warfare which is dominated by physical compulsion. There are of course numerous mixed situations; it is important not to overemphasize the distinctions. Bargaining processes sometimes occur in conjunction with wars, and highly coercive practices are frequently employed during international negotiations. Nevertheless, I believe it is correct to conclude that bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and organized warfare constitute the three prominent nodes along this continuum.

In the context of social choice, bargaining involves efforts to reach collective or group choices through negotiations in which the participants make offers and counteroffers, and in which outcomes occur only when all relevant participants agree to a specified settlement.[26] A necessary condition for the occurrence of a negotiated settlement is the existence of a "contract zone" (i.e., a set of one or more outcomes that all the participants would prefer to an outcome of no agreement or conflict). But that is not a highly restrictive condition in the case of the international polity. While conflict is pervasive in this system, there are in fact only few cases in which there is no outcome that all the relevant participants would prefer to an outcome of no agreement.[27] This situation, combined with the tendency of both organized warfare and coercive diplomacy to produce unfortunate results, makes bargaining the dominant mechanism of social choice in most international interactions. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, among those interested in the analysis of bargaining, students of international politics have been especially prominent.

An examination of international bargaining in the light of the preceding criteria yields some interesting conclusions. To begin with, there are sometimes problems of decisiveness with respect to bargaining. The initiation of negotiations in no way guarantees that the participants will ultimately reach a negotiated settlement; we are all familiar with cases in which a settlement is never reached, or reached only after protracted negotiations. At the international level, there are some special problems

[26] For an extended analysis of the principal theoretical models of bargaining, see Young (fn. 13).

[27] See also Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960).

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associated with the bargaining process which I have described elsewhere as bargaining impediments.[28] They include the relatively underdeveloped state of international frameworks for bargaining, the low level of trust among many actors, and fears of being victimized by the manipulative activities of others. Nor is the mere articulation of negotiated settlements always sufficient to resolve problems of social choice. When it comes to the actual behavior of the relevant actors, it is frequently difficult to operationalize general formulas contained in negotiated settlements. Problems of implementation and sluggish performance are not uncommon, and actual cheating is by no means unknown at the international level.

Transactions costs associated with bargaining as a mechanism of social choice are apt to be relatively high in the international polity,[29] due not only to the impact of various bargaining impediments, but also to the complexities of reaching negotiated settlements among large collective entities in contrast to integrated individuals. At the same time, these transactions costs will generally be much lower than those associated with organized warfare and coercive diplomacy. Therefore, the prominence of bargaining as a mechanism of social choice in the international polity stems from its *relative* efficiency rather than from any claim to efficiency in *absolute* terms. The distinctive features of the international polity virtually guarantee that the transactions costs of bargaining in this polity will increase steeply as a function of the number of autonomous actors involved in any given set of negotiations.[30] For empirical confirmation of this proposition, one only has to look at recent negotiations pertaining to such matters as environmental questions, food, international monetary arrangements, and a new regime for the oceans. Under the circumstances, there is every reason to expect the actors in the international polity to search for ways of circumventing this problem. The most important results of this search will most likely be agreements among subsets of the members of the international polity (e.g., regional or functional groupings),[31] and efforts on the part of small groups of great powers to impose

[28] Young, *The Politics of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968), chap. 10.

[29] Since the transactions costs of smoothly functioning market mechanisms are low, many economists have tended to react hostilely to bargaining as a mechanism of social choice. But that is essentially a normative stance rather than an empirical conclusion.

[30] On the general tendency of transactions costs to increase as a function of the number of actors involved, see Mishan (fn. 22), 22.

[31] I have recently discussed this phenomenon in a detailed case study; see Young, *Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific* (London and New York: Pinter and Nichols 1977).

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outcomes on the other members of the international polity (e.g., certain arms control agreements). Given the number of autonomous actors in the polity at this time, I believe it is highly improbable that general international congresses can serve as genuinely effective mechanisms for the resolution of important problems of social choice at the international level.

It is undoubtedly true that there is a growing feeling that the distributive results of bargaining are seriously unfair or inequitable at the international level; that is a central theme of recent debates about such things as *dependencia* and North-South problems.[32] However, one of the principal lessons to be drawn from efforts to construct rigorous theories of bargaining (notably game-theoretic models) is that notions like fairness and equity are extraordinarily difficult to pin down in connection with bargaining processes.[33] I do not say this in order to defend the existing situation. Rather, my point is that notions of fairness and equity constitute external criteria in the context of bargaining processes: analyses of bargaining as such are not sufficient for efforts to reach conclusions relating to the distributive justice of the outcomes at the international level. Finally, I do not think that bargaining as a mechanism of social choice in the international polity is likely to generate unusually severe negative externalities. Bargaining processes do sometimes generate unintended consequences in such areas as the dissemination of information. But such phenomena do not strike me as particularly dangerous at the international level. Perhaps the most serious problems of negative externalities associated with international bargaining stem from the fact that it often takes considerable time to reach negotiated settlements. The mere passage of time can produce negative consequences quite independent of the intentions of the actors. Examples are the military casualties that occur during efforts to reach a negotiated settlement and the serious depletions of fish stocks that take place during protracted negotiations about international managerial arrangements for the very stocks in question.[34]

As a social choice mechanism, organized warfare involves the use of large-scale violence or physical compulsion to force others to accept

[32] See, for example, the essays in C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence Krause, eds., *World Politics and International Economics, International Organization*, XXIX (special issue 1975).

[33] R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley 1957), esp. chap. 6; Young (fn. 13).

[34] For an intriguing case study involving various species of great whales, see George L. Small, *The Blue Whale* (New York: Columbia University Press 1971), esp. chap. VII.

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one's preferred outcome in situations where preference orderings diverge substantially.[35] The idea of conceptualizing war as a mechanism of social choice will undoubtedly seem objectionable to some, since it suggests that war may serve a function in the international polity. One does not necessarily defend war or any of its consequences, however, by recognizing it as an important mechanism of social choice. Even from the point of view of efforts to minimize the use of violence and physical compulsion at the international level, it would be foolish to deny or ignore the role that war has played in resolving problems of social choice in the international polity.

Organized warfare does raise numerous problems as a mechanism of social choice, quite apart from its unfortunate consequences along other dimensions. It cannot even be counted upon to produce decisive results for problems of social choice. The initial issues or war aims tend to become blurred and distorted during the course of a war. Many wars end quite indecisively, so that the issues involved must eventually be dealt with through some process of bargaining in any case. And even when warfare is temporarily decisive, it is not uncommon for the defeated party to reopen the issues at stake as soon as it regains its strength. The transactions costs—both direct and indirect—associated with war as a mechanism of social choice are of course notorious and have risen dramatically in the last century and a half. They must be thought of as encompassing such items as prewar defense expenditures and the negative consequences associated with the militarization of societies, as well as the actual destruction of life and property. In my judgment, the increases have been particularly dramatic in the realm of indirect costs in comparison with direct costs, though I do not expect that this view is acceptable to all students of international politics. In any case, the rapidly rising transactions costs of organized warfare cast considerable doubt on its viability as a central mechanism of social choice in the international polity. Although I see no reason to believe that this will lead directly to an "era of negotiations" at the international level, I do think it lies at the heart of some notable recent developments in the realm of social choice in this polity.

It is not easy to defend the results of organized warfare in terms of any recognizable conception of distributive justice. The classic idea of trial by combat presumably rested on some notion of divine intervention in favor of the side whose cause was just. But that idea is clearly

[35] This is essentially the perspective of Clausewitz, who conceptualized war as politics carried on by other means. See Karl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power*, Collins transl. (Chicago: Henry Regnery 1962).

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irrelevant in assessing the distributive consequences of modern warfare. There is of course the somewhat degenerate criterion of "might makes right," but this is hardly a satisfactory basis for any respectable defense of the distributive consequences of warfare (though it certainly crops up with some frequency in various thinly disguised forms in actual international interactions). I would argue that there is no compelling defense of the distributive consequences of warfare in the contemporary international polity, though that certainly does not prove that warfare will necessarily decline in importance.[36]

Curiously, the situation with respect to the externalities of organized warfare is somewhat more complex. We are accustomed to thinking about the negative externalities of warfare, and it is unquestionable that the prospect of such externalities constitutes an issue of utmost importance in the nuclear age. Nevertheless, it will not do to ignore the fact that there is a well-developed intellectual tradition that associates a variety of positively valued externalities with warfare. In essence, many of the relevant arguments are extreme forms of the propositions advanced by the school of Simmel concerning the functions of social conflict.[37] A great number of them would lose their significance in the context of nuclear warfare. But it would be a serious mistake to overemphasize the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the contemporary international polity, thereby ignoring the fact that the wars that have actually occurred in recent times have all been conventional wars.

Finally, let me turn to the phenomenon of coercive diplomacy. I employ the term "coercive diplomacy" to refer to the use of belligerent (but largely nonviolent) moves together with persistent threats of violence to induce others to acquiesce in one's preferred outcome in situations of social choice.[38] So conceived, coercive diplomacy covers a range of activities lying between pure bargaining and large-scale warfare. It resembles bargaining in that it does not actually involve violence on any significant scale, and it resembles warfare in that it involves both preparations for the use of violence and the articulation

[36] The issue I am concerned with here bears little relationship to the question of "just wars." My concern is with the distributive consequences of warfare rather than with the justness of various causes of warfare.

[37] For an exposition of these arguments, see Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1956).

[38] On coercive diplomacy, consult, *inter alia*, Young (fn. 28); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little Brown 1971), and Coral Bell, *Conventions of Crisis* (London: Oxford University Press 1971).

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of threats of violence. Coercive diplomacy is certainly not a phenomenon of recent origin in the international polity. Nevertheless, the prominence of coercive diplomacy has increased considerably in recent times because of the rapidly rising costs associated with war *per se*. Though the actors in the international polity have grown more cautious about initiating the use of large-scale violence, they are not willing to rely entirely on bargaining unsupported by serious threats of violence or on other mechanisms. Consequently, episodes like the various postwar crises over Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis have become salient in the international polity.

This discussion suggests that in recent times coercive diplomacy has acquired prominence largely because of problems with other mechanisms of social choice rather than because of its own intrinsic attractions. In fact, I would argue that coercive diplomacy is relatively unattractive from the point of view of my criteria of evaluation. As far as I can tell, coercive diplomacy is particularly indecisive as a mechanism of social choice. The results typically lack both the physical compulsion of warfare and the sense of legitimacy associated with a negotiated settlement that is accepted voluntarily. Moreover, exercises in coercive diplomacy commonly terminate in vague symbolic actions whose significance is subject to varying interpretations during the ensuing period. The recurrent crises during the postwar period over Berlin and the Taiwan Strait provide clear illustrations.[39] At the same time, the transactions costs involved in coercive diplomacy are extremely high. Essentially, the indirect costs of coercive diplomacy are the same as those of organized warfare; the only real saving lies in the realm of direct costs. In addition, there is always the chance that coercive diplomacy will degenerate into overt warfare—a possibility that must be regarded as a serious cost of coercive diplomacy even if we discount this cost through the introduction of some sort of subjective probability estimates. Despite its contemporary prominence, then, coercive diplomacy is a rather expensive mechanism of social choice that often fails to yield decisive results.

I also see no persuasive reasons to defend coercive diplomacy on the basis of its performance with respect to the criteria of distributive justice and externalities. In general, its results are apt to be favorable to those actors who already control the principal resources of the international system. Furthermore, the use of coercive diplomacy places great emphasis on certain types of manipulative skills that are often discussed

[39] See Young (fn. 28), chap. 12.

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under the heading of brinkmanship.[40] Although there is no reason to suppose that skill at brinkmanship will always go along with the possession of material wealth, it is difficult to regard the consequences of exercises in brinkmanship as inherently fair or equitable. Of course, coercive diplomacy is unlikely to generate some of the most dramatic negative externalities associated with large-scale warfare. And some will place positive valuations on certain skills, as well as on technological developments that occur in research programs justified by the requirements of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, its widespread use tends to generate a pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty and various "doomsday" attitudes that must be regarded as serious negative externalities of this mechanism of social choice.

3. *Third parties.* There is one additional mechanism of social choice that deserves attention in this discussion. It involves the transformation of problems of social choice by turning them over to designated third parties and agreeing to accept their decisions as binding. Such third parties may make decisions on any of a number of bases (ranging from the application of strict codes to the use of the principle known as *ex aequo et bono*). This procedure differs from other mechanisms of social choice in that the ultimate outcomes do not flow directly from the actions of the initial parties.

While third-party settlement constitutes a major mechanism of social choice in most political systems, its role is highly restricted in the international polity. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that it is of no importance at the international level.[41] Two types of third-party settlement occur with some frequency in the international polity: judicial settlement and arbitration. Judicial settlement occurs where the relevant third party is a formally organized and continuously operative court. At present, the International Court of Justice is the principal institution of this type at the systemic level in the international polity. In spite of its limitations, the Court has dealt with a number of important situations such as the Corfu Channel case, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case, and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. The other form of third-party settlement usually goes under the heading of arbitration. This procedure occurs when the actors involved in a problem of social choice agree to third-party settlement on an *ad hoc* basis and select an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators for the case at hand; prior agreement to abide by the deci-

[40] See Schelling (fn. 38); Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," in Young (fn. 13), 343-63.

[41] See also R. P. Anand, *Studies in International Adjudication* (Delhi: Vikas 1969).

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sion of the third party is necessary here just as it is in the case of judicial settlement. Though arbitration is not widely used in the international polity, it does occur from time to time, for instance in the Alabama Claims arbitration, the Island of Palmas arbitration, the Clipperton Island arbitration, and the British Guiana Boundary arbitration.

Why is third-party settlement somewhat marginal as a mechanism of social choice in the international polity, even though it is of central importance in many other political systems? It has been argued that this situation is attributable to the absence of capabilities of enforcement at the international level and to the generally anarchical pattern of organization of the international polity. I do not believe, however, that explanations of this sort go to the heart of the problem. It is clear from the evidence cited in the preceding paragraph that enforcement capabilities do not constitute a necessary condition for third-party settlement. And the use of arbitration, at least, need not raise any questions concerning the development of governmental institutions at the systemic level. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine actors agreeing to accept a third-party settlement in the absence of some measure of mutual trust; and the emergence of trust will normally depend heavily on the societal subsystem of the overall social system in contrast to the polity. That is, mutual trust tends to emerge in situations characterized by an underlying sense of community and by compatibility among the actors with respect to such things as central attitudes and beliefs. In addition, third-party settlement is undoubtedly more effective in systems that can handle large numbers of cases whose individual significance is not great than in systems featuring relatively small numbers of crucial cases. The first set of conditions facilitates the emergence of a kind of "case law," together with a widespread presumption that it is natural to turn to third-party procedures in resolving problems of social choice. In terms of these factors, it is easy to see that the distinctive features of the international polity are not likely to provide a congenial environment for third-party settlement.

Although not widely used, third-party settlement fares relatively well in terms of my criteria of evaluation in those cases where it does play a role. Third parties are capable of rendering fairly clearcut decisions, despite the fact that they sometimes avoid issues or deliberately obscure the implications of their findings in order to minimize the chances of having one or more of the actors reject their decisions. There is of course the problem of implementation in conjunction with this social choice mechanism, but it is not especially severe at the international level (in contrast to the municipal level) because third parties can only obtain jurisdiction

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in cases where the actors accept it voluntarily. The transactions costs associated with third-party settlement are certainly not negligible, particularly if we include the costs of preliminary negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the idea of handling a given problem through third-party settlement. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in these terms third-party settlement compares favorably with the central range of mechanisms of social choice in the international polity.

There are still questions concerning the appropriate measures to be used in judging the fairness of the decisions of third parties,[42] and there is no guarantee that third parties will always be influenced decisively by the requirements of justice. Most third parties have interests of their own, and they are certainly not immune to the impact of expediency.[43] However, I believe a compelling case can be made for the proposition that third-party settlement constitutes a mechanism of social choice that is generally more sensitive to questions of justice than the others discussed in this essay. Finally, I see no reason to conclude that third-party settlement will generate serious negative externalities. All this is not to suggest that third-party settlement is likely to grow in importance during the foreseeable future; I myself see little evidence pointing in this direction. But such procedures do have a number of attractive features.

Even when they cannot resolve problems of social choice on their own, third parties often play roles of some importance in the international polity. They may attempt to facilitate the resolution of problems of social choice among specified actors without producing the ultimate outcome or settlement themselves, through mediation, conciliation, or good offices. This is in fact a complex topic, and I have discussed roles for third parties along these lines in some detail elsewhere.[44] Here, I wish to make only two simple points. Though activities like mediation and conciliation do not constitute mechanisms of social choice in themselves, they are often highly relevant to efforts to cope with problems of social choice. Activities of this type are far more pervasive in the international polity than full-scale third-party settlement, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that they are less powerful from the point of view of resolving the social choice problems.

[42] See the discussion of criteria of fairness for arbitration schemes in Luce and Raiffa (fn. 33), chap. 6.

[43] Young, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVI (March 1972), 51-65.

[44] Young, *The Intermediaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1967).

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C. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND RULES

I shall use the phrase "international rights and rules" as a form of shorthand.[45] Briefly, rights are sociopolitical relations "defining the position of each individual [actor] with respect to the utilization of scarce resources."[46] So, for example, the idea that states are entitled to full sovereignty over their natural resources is a right in the contemporary international polity. The term "rules," by contrast, refers to behavioral prescriptions or well-defined standards setting forth actions (including prohibitions) that members of some specified subject group are expected to take (or omit) under appropriate circumstances.[47] The rule associated with the phrase *pacta sunt servanda* is illustrative of this category.

There are those who argue that effective rights and rules are not feasible in highly decentralized or anarchically organized political systems like the international polity. But this argument rests on the false premise that the availability of enforcement capabilities or organized sanctions constitutes a necessary condition for the viability of rights and rules. The recent work of a number of prominent students of international law has clearly demonstrated the feasibility of rights and rules.[48] It is easy to show that there are extensive systems of rights and rules associated with each of the major mechanisms of social choice that operate at the international level. Thus, there are elaborate arrangements pertaining to diplomatic immunities and negotiating procedures which serve to provide a framework for international bargaining processes. The laws of international warfare are extensive, though the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations have created certain ambiguities concerning the applicability of these laws. In recent times, there has been a distinct development of conventions of crisis to regu-

[45] For a wide-ranging analysis raising numerous general questions about rights and rules, see H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961).

[46] Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," *Journal of Economic Literature*, x (December 1972), 1139.

[47] Although laws constitute a particularly prominent category of behavioral prescriptions, there are various other types of prescriptions, such as moral rules and social norms.

[48] Consult, *inter alia*, Morton Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York: John Wiley 1961); Richard A. Falk, *The Status of Law in International Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); and Gidon Gottlieb, "The Nature of International Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law," in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order*, IV, *The Structure of the International Environment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 331-83.

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late the use of coercive diplomacy in the international polity. And of course there are detailed rights and rules pertaining to the use of both judicial settlement and arbitration at the international level.

The links between processes of social choice and the operation of rights and rules are of great importance in all political systems.[49] Rights and rules serve to establish an institutional setting within which processes of social choice take place in political systems. They channel and circumscribe the behavior of the actors. At the same time, the initial selection and the alteration of rights and rules will ordinarily emerge as problems of social choice in any given polity. In this final part of the essay, I want to comment briefly on several aspects of these links, with special reference to the international polity.

1. *Are rights and rules neutral?* Are rights and rules ever neutral with respect to the impact of their operation on the interests of the actors in a political system? Do they serve merely to provide a framework for the achievement of social choice in an orderly fashion, or do they influence the outcomes of processes of social choice as well? This issue has been treated more extensively in analyses of such problems as the regulation of externalities in municipal systems than in studies of the international polity.[50] In my judgment, however, the principal conclusions are largely applicable to the case of the international polity as well.

There is widespread agreement that the distribution of values flowing from the use of specific mechanisms of social choice will be substantially affected by the content of the associated rights and rules.[51] And there is no reason to conclude that the international polity will be an exception in these terms. For example, the elimination of strict rules requiring full and adequate compensation for expropriated property would significantly damage the interests of investors in their interactions with the recipients of foreign investment. The introduction of 200-mile exclusive economic zones adjacent to coastal states would result in a transfer of wealth of considerable proportions from various distant-water states to the relevant coastal states. Similarly, the development of strict liability rules pertaining to vessel-based pollution would improve the situation of those concerned with the maintenance of environmental quality at the international level, but damage the interests of major

[49] For a variety of insights on these issues, see James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1962).

[50] Arguments concerning the Coase theorem, for example, typically focus on these issues. For a particularly helpful example, see Alan Randall, "Coase Externality Theory in a Policy Context," *Natural Resources Journal*, XIV (January 1974), 35-54.

[51] *Ibid.*; also Warren J. Samuels, "The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Economics," *ibid.*, 1-33.

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shipping firms and consumers of goods transported on marine highways. Additional examples of this kind would reinforce the general conclusion. Although the members of any given polity will ordinarily prefer the presence of some system of rights and rules to the absence of any effective rights and rules, the distributive impact of specific systems of this type will never be neutral.

The non-neutrality of rights and rules guarantees that both their selection and their alteration will devolve into problems of social choice.[52] The resultant processes will almost always constitute mixed-motive interactions. The actors in the international polity can be expected to prefer the presence of some relatively well-developed system of rights and rules to the absence of any such system, though they may disagree considerably with respect to their preferences among alternative systems.[53] But the fact that such common interests exist in no way implies that the actors will refrain from resorting to organized warfare from time to time to resolve their disagreements concerning appropriate rights and rules for the international polity.

There is much work to be done on the comparative statics of rights and rules.[54] It would be of great value to identify alternative systems of rights and rules for the international polity as precisely as possible and then to ask questions: Which actors would be advantaged or disadvantaged by the introduction of specific rights and rules, and what mechanisms would produce these results? Although we would not reach decisive conclusions about the relative desirability of alternative systems of rights and rules, we would be more likely to understand the preference orderings of various actors in the international polity with respect to alternative systems.[55]

The foregoing argument also helps to clarify why actors seeking hegemony in a given political system tend to concentrate on efforts to control the content of the basic rights and rules. To the extent that a hegemonic actor can dominate the formulation of rights and rules, it can secure its own favored position in the polity without engaging in costly struggles with subordinate actors concerning problems of social choice. That is undoubtedly an efficient method of achieving imperial

[52] Current efforts, in the context of the Law of the Sea Conference, to formulate new rights and rules for the use of the oceans constitute a classic illustration of this phenomenon.

[53] For a general analysis of mixed-motive interactions, see Schelling (fn. 27).

[54] For a more general work raising questions about rights and rules from this perspective, consult Buchanan and Tullock (fn. 49).

[55] In other words, I do not think Rawls's conception of the "veil of ignorance" is relevant to most real-world situations. On the role of this concept in Rawls's work, see Rawls (fn. 24), esp. chap. III.

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dominance where it can be employed successfully.[56] For this reason, apparently minor conflicts sometimes take on the proportions of epic struggles in the international polity when they symbolize clashes over the continued viability of important segments of the underlying system of rights and rules. I would argue that this is why conflicts like the Boer War and the Vietnam War acquired such far-reaching significance at the international level.

2. *Dynamics of rights and rules.* It is tempting to think of systems of rights and rules as relatively stable and unchanging. Stable systems allow actors to become thoroughly familiar with the workings of individual rights and rules. They minimize uncertainties about processes of social choice that create problems for collective entities as well as for individual human beings. Moreover, stable systems give rise to the relatively noncontentious activities associated with codification, in contrast to the conflictual processes of social choice that characterize efforts to adapt rights and rules to changing conditions in a political system. Nevertheless, systems of rights and rules tend to change continuously in most polities. Ultimately, rights and rules reflect underlying social, economic, and political realities; these realities are never perfectly static in a social system. Then, too, actors disadvantaged by the rights and rules that exist in a polity will always have incentives to exploit changing conditions to undermine the dominance of these rights and rules, and to advance claims relating to revised or altered systems of rights and rules.[57] Therefore, while polities are apt to vary substantially with respect to the rate of change in their systems of rights and rules, it would be a mistake to think of any political system as perfectly stable or unchanging in this realm.

There can be no doubt that, in anarchically organized political systems like the international polity, it is particularly difficult to achieve consciously coordinated or guided changes in extensive systems of rights and rules. Efforts to achieve such results are apt to be inconclusive, time-consuming, and costly. This fact is unlikely to provoke much comment during periods in which underlying social, economic, and political realities are relatively stable. But it lies at the heart of many criticisms of the international polity during periods of flux, such as the

[56] The preponderant positions of Great Britain during the latter part of the 19th century and of the United States during the period following World War II constitute clear examples.

[57] I use the notion of advancing claims in this connection in much the same way that McDougal uses it. See Myres S. McDougal and Associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1960).

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present. Observations concerning this phenomenon are no doubt latent in many proposals for the introduction of centralized institutions of government in the international polity. Though this line of reasoning is perfectly understandable, I believe it fails completely to come to grips with other features of the international system which make such proposals unworkable.

Although coordinated or guided alterations are difficult to achieve, changes in rights and rules commonly emerge from the confrontation of claims and counterclaims advanced by individual actors in response to changes in underlying social, economic, and political realities.[58] That is, such changes are *de facto* products of numerous uncoordinated processes of social choice going on simultaneously. There is good reason to conclude that such *ad hoc* changes in rights and rules are common not only in the international polity, but also in many political systems that are far more centralized with respect to the distribution of authority and power. Such changes often are initially ambiguous, difficult to codify, and sometimes contradictory, but they are no less real and important because of these attributes.

[58] Again, my argument concerning this point parallels the perspective of McDougal, *ibid.*

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Review Articles

URBAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By HENRY BIENEN* and MICHAEL N. DANIELSON

Thomas J. Anton, *Governing Greater Stockholm: A Study of Policy Development and System Change*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 237 pp., $12.75.

Pauline H. Baker, *Urbanization and Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 1917–1967*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 384 pp., $19.75.

Michael A. Cohen, *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, 262 pp., $14.75.

Wayne A. Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975, 319 pp., $12.50.

Stephen L. Elkin, *Politics and Land Use Planning: The London Experience*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 196 pp., $12.95.

Robert C. Fried, *Planning the Eternal City: Roman Politics and Planning Since World War II*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, 346 pp., $19.50.

William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, 166 pp., $15.00.

Howard Wolpe, *Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 414 pp., $17.75.

Introduction

URBANIZATION increasingly attracts the attention of students of politics. This concern reflects the growing significance of urbanization for all kinds of political systems as more and more people live in cities and urban settlements spread across the landscape. Everywhere urbanization expands and complicates political tasks. Governments must finance and provide a growing range of public services for an interdependent urban population. Specialized agencies must be organized and staffed to collect garbage, direct traffic, operate water systems, and provide other urban services. Difficult policy questions must be faced concerning migration, land use, housing, and the distribution of costs

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and benefits among different components of the population. Inevitably, the growth of cities complicates the territorial division of authority between central governments and subnational units, as well as among local entities. All of these developments generate conflict as various interests compete for services, land, jobs, and other rewards. Typically, political conflict is intensified by the diversity of urban populations, as different classes and castes, and ethnic, racial, and tribal groups live in close proximity in cities and compete for scarce resources.

Because many aspects of urbanization are similar in different societies, urban politics provides a rich opportunity for comparative analysis. Rural-urban migration has the same general features in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and scores of other developing nations. So does traffic congestion in New York, London, Tokyo, Istanbul, Manila, and most of the rest of the world's major cities. As a result of these shared characteristics, urban development tends to generate similar pressures, conflicts, issues, and choices for different political systems. For example, the allocation of a critical resource—urban land—poses common problems, trade-offs, and frustrations in both rich and poor countries, in socialist as well as in capitalist societies. In all these political settings, industrial development competes with housing for urban land, low-cost shelter with other kinds of housing, and public facilities with other uses of land. Local groups typically resist disruptive changes in their community, while city officials universally struggle to devise and enforce plans that will affect the land-use decisions of economic enterprises, housing developers, transport authorities, and other public agencies.

To emphasize similarities in urbanization and its political implications is not to suggest that urban development is the same everywhere. Obviously, major differences exist in the nature of urbanization, and these differences have important consequences for political behavior. Urban development is not uniformly distributed either across the planet or within individual countries. A number of political systems, most notably the smaller states of Western Europe, are almost completely urbanized. Elsewhere in Europe, as well as in North America, Japan, and parts of Latin America, urban areas encompass substantial portions of the national population. Other countries such as China, France, India, Turkey, and the Soviet Union have developed large urban populations while retaining substantial numbers of rural dwellers. Still others remain primarily rural, despite the rapid growth of a few urban centers. Within some countries, urbanization has produced a network of major cities, industrial centers, and market towns. In

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others, urban development has been heavily focused in one place, usually the national capital, resulting in the emergence of a primate city which monopolizes political, economic, and social development.

The timing of urbanization also strongly affects political competition and the evolution of political and bureaucratic organization. Most developing countries are experiencing the early stages of urban growth, a period when rural-urban migration plays a major role in the rapid expansion of cities. As urbanization proceeds, natural growth and migration between cities come to dominate the process, which is the situation in most of the highly developed urban countries. Complicating the question of timing are basic differences in the early stages between those countries that began to urbanize rapidly in the 19th century and those whose urban development is more recent. The sweeping urbanization that transformed North America, Europe, and Japan resulted primarily from industrialization; most rural migrants were drawn into the cities to man the machines of an expanding industrial economy. By contrast, explosive population growth has been the primary factor underlying urban migration in the developing world during the second half of the 20th century. The newer cities also have experienced much higher rates of natural increase than did the industrial cities at a comparable stage in their development. As a result, most cities in the Third World have grown much faster than their economies, particularly their industrial economies.

Even where industrialization has been rapid, as in Kenya, Nigeria, and Mexico, urban industrial employment has not expanded at anything like the rate of urban population growth. Thus, in cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, large numbers are employed in the informal sector, or unemployed, or moving between rural and urban areas. In most of the developing world, the combination of rapid growth, weak economic bases, and large migrant populations shapes urban politics—a politics characterized by severely limited resources and intense demands for jobs, land, and urban services, a politics of urban marginals with few organizational resources.

Given the importance of these differences, students of comparative political analysis are faced with the necessity of assessing urban factors as well as political variables. To date, more insights have been provided into the urban than the political side of the equation. An expanding literature deals with urbanization from a number of disciplinary perspectives, both in comparative terms and in the context of a lengthening list of individual countries. Studies that treat political variables explicitly, however, are still relatively rare. An important

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exception is the analysis of urban politics in the United States, which has blossomed in the last two decades, with the publication of extensive case studies, detailed examinations of power, and comparative explorations that display increasing sophistication. Elsewhere, most studies tend to focus on government rather than politics. Governmental structure, financing arrangements, and the nature of urban problems—rather than the distribution and use of political influence—are the principal concerns of this large and useful literature.[1]

All of the studies under review are exceptions, in varying degrees, to this general trend. Each book focuses on political variables as the key to understanding urban politics. Thomas Anton and Stephen Elkin examine closely the roles of elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats, and other participants and nonparticipants in Stockholm and London. Robert Fried concentrates on the interplay of Roman political interests in the context of "the fiercely competitive and chaotic processes of urban multiparty democracy" (p. 1). William Taubman's central presumption is the existence of political conflict throughout the Soviet political system, which he characterizes as "a huge bureaucratic arena in which bureaus compete, bargain, and negotiate to such a degree that although all are officially subordinate to one central leadership there is virtually no sphere of administration immune from bureaucratic politics" (pp. 5-6).

Michael Cohen examines the relationships among public policy, social stratification, and political conflict in Abidjan. Pauline Baker analyzes a changing and unstable power structure in the context of the socially heterogeneous and politically fragmented city of Lagos. Wayne Cornelius is interested in the generation of political demands on government; at the same time he sees the government's outputs as factors that structure political support, opposition, and political participation in Mexico City. Howard Wolpe, in his study of Port Harcourt,

[1] See, for example, William A. Robson and D. E. Regan, eds., *Great Cities of the World: Their Government, Politics and Planning* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications 1972); Annmarie Hauck Walsh, *The Urban Challenge to Government: An International Comparison of Thirteen Cities* (New York: Praeger 1969), as well as the individual studies that form the basis for this comparative volume: Allan G. Austin and Sherman Lewis, *Urban Government for Metropolitan Lima* (New York: Praeger 1970); Hans Calmfors, Francine F. Rabinovitz, and Daniel J. Alesch, *Urban Government for Greater Stockholm* (New York: Praeger 1968); David T. Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government* (New York: Praeger 1968); Katherine Marshall Johnson, *Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca* (New York: Praeger 1970); Eugen Pusic and Annmarie Hauck Walsh, *Urban Government for Zagreb, Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger 1968); Annmarie Hauck Walsh, *Urban Government for the Paris Region* (New York: Praeger 1968); and Babatunde A. Williams and Annmarie Hauck Walsh, *Urban Government for Metropolitan Lagos* (New York: Praeger 1968).

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examines the relationship between modernization and communal change, but deals less explicitly with political variables. He does, however, try to come to grips with the ways in which geo-ethnic conflicts are associated with economic inequalities and competition.

All these books have a common concern with the ability of political systems to deal with the forces of urban growth and change. Moreover, all of them, except Elkin's study of central London, focus on the politics of urban development in cities experiencing rapid growth. During the period of Anton's study, Stockholm was adding 20,000 inhabitants annually. As a result, he recites a familiar litany of growth-related problems: "population dislocation, a severe housing shortage, inadequate mass transportation, inadequate service delivery, [and] uncoordinated service delivery in new housing areas" (p. 4). Rapid expansion produced the same kinds of problems in Rome and in many Soviet cities, and in the process generated demands for governmental action similar to the demands generated in Stockholm.

The growth of cities in industrial countries pales before the figures for Lagos, Abidjan, Port Harcourt, and Mexico City. Greater Lagos has been growing at more than 10 percent per annum over the last decade. All the studies of developing countries are thus understandably preoccupied with migration into the cities and with pressures on scarce urban services and inadequate resources.

As a result of these common interests, all the authors except Wolpe analyze urban politics in the context of issues such as land use, housing, industrial and commercial development, and the provision of basic city services. Approaching urban politics from this developmental perspective has considerable attraction for comparative analysis because all urban political systems have to deal with such basic questions. These issues are bound to involve local governments and interests regardless of the formal allocation of powers among the various levels of government. And since the political stakes are usually high, these issues provide useful arenas in which to observe the activity and influence of a wide range of potential participants in urban politics.

Within the general context of these shared concerns and themes, the eight studies vary considerably in scope and approach.[2] The studies of

[2] Elkin's inquiry is the most limited in terms of scope. He concentrates on central London and rests his analysis on two detailed case studies of planning decisions made in the early 1960's by the London County Council, which until 1965 was the governing body of the inner portion of the London metropolitan area. Fried too focuses on planning within a single local jurisdiction. But the scope of his study is considerably broader than that of Elkin, in part because Rome's city government encompassed most of the undeveloped land where growth occurred in the decades following World

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industrial countries wrestle with one overriding question: What factors, they ask, account for the ability of a political system to develop policies that effectively shape urban development? The studies of Mexico City and the three African cities, on the other hand, try to see elite-mass relationships evolving in new urban contexts. They all seek to analyze patterns of resource distribution, social mobility, and class formation; and to greater or lesser extents they look at the impact of public policies on social and political groups.

Controlling Urban Development: Power and Values

Elkin and Anton assess the comparative ability of political systems to control urban development, with the United States serving as the benchmark. Elkin tries to explain why land-use planning in London involves so little controversy and political interaction, compared with similar decisions in the United States. Anton, pointing to the renewal of Stockholm's central core, its new subway, and planned suburban communities, asks why the Swedes have done so much better than the Americans in terms of "imaginative and well-executed development planning" (p. 4). Fried and Taubman, on the other hand, are concerned with explaining failure rather than success. Fried explores why Rome's plans and developmental controls have had so little impact on the forces of urban growth or the quality of life, while Taubman examines the irony of the widespread absence of effective urban planning in the planned society of the Soviets.

None of these studies finds governmental structure by itself to be a critical factor. Rome, for example, has a highly integrated formal structure of local government, with relatively little functional or territorial fragmentation of local authority. The city council and its executive committee control all municipal agencies, including the boards that operate public transportation, water, gas and electric power, as well as other public services. The city of Rome also has an extensive territorial jurisdiction that encompasses more than 600 square miles.

War II. Anton's frame of reference includes an entire metropolitan area whose political turf was divided among the city of Stockholm and 28 suburban governments. Taubman's study has broad scope, since he examines the entire Soviet Union in general terms and deals with more than a dozen cities in some detail. Cornelius focuses on six communities, widely dispersed around the periphery of the urban area; his aim was to examine various kinds of urban dwelling environments. Baker is concerned with central Lagos, but she ranges widely over time and issue areas, as does Wolpe. Cohen's work is almost a country study of the Ivory Coast seen through the prism of Abidjan.

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As a result, growth in Rome has occurred largely within the city limits, and independent suburban jurisdictions have not played an important role in Roman politics. Yet, as Fried emphasizes, this integrated governmental structure has been unable to develop timely or effective controls on development. Delays in the planning process have meant that much of the growth that was to be regulated had already occurred by the time Rome's first postwar plan was unveiled in 1966. Since then, controls on development have been so weak that "hundreds, perhaps thousands, of new structures and entire subdivisions have been built—illegally—on sites designated as future parks, highways, streets, schools, and shops" (p. 3).

Local authority in the Soviet Union is concentrated in the city council and exercised through its executive committee within local jurisdictions that typically encompass entire urbanized areas. But these integrated arrangements have not ensured either the production of timely plans or their effective implementation. In 1960, half of the Soviet Union's cities lacked municipal plans, including such major urban centers as Kiev, Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Odessa. Because of the inability of local governments to control growth, Taubman argues, housing and city services throughout the Soviet Union "were distinguished by their shortage, and by the haphazard way they were mixed with industrial enterprises in poorly planned neighborhoods and cities" (p. 24).

Far more important than governmental structure in all four of these studies is the general political setting. For Elkin, the key to understanding urban politics in Britain lies in a political culture that discourages participation and encourages hierarchical decision making. Englishmen, Elkin asserts, tend to place great trust in those who hold positions of authority.[3] Deference to authoritative decision makers is reinforced by attitudes that legitimate strong parties and governance through party majorities. Because of this general perspective, few people expect to participate in local politics. Expectations are further dampened by formal arrangements that provide only infrequent opportunities for participation.[4] With public involvement limited, neither elected officials nor planners come under much outside pressure on

[3] In treating this question, Elkin relies heavily on the work of Eric Nordlinger in *The Working-Class Tories: Authority, Deference, and Stable Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1967).

[4] Public hearings are not common in British local government. There is no formal public participation through referenda on policy or spending questions. Nor are the courts readily available to those who wish to challenge governmental actions, as is the case in the United States.

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most issues. Moreover, in the absence of strong pressures by the constituency, elected officials generally exhibit little interest in questions of land use. As a result, Elkin finds that major decisions tend "to be the product of a cooperative search among a limited number of planning officers and [elected council] members" rather than the product of bargaining and competition among a large number of participants as is customary in the United States (p. 74).

Basic attitudes concerning participation and local government also play a major role in Anton's analysis of urban politics in Stockholm. Like London, Stockholm has developed a political system in which officials enjoy considerable freedom of action in developing and implementing public policies. Opportunities for participation by the general public are limited to periodic municipal elections. Referenda are not used, public hearings are rare, and few interest groups have developed on the local level to facilitate public participation. Underlying this weak articulation of interests, in Anton's view, are prevailing attitudes that minimize the value of political participation and collective action. This general predisposition against political involvement has been reinforced by the lack of strongly perceived interests at the local level. Few urban Swedes are motivated to participate because they have a strong attachment to the localities in which they happen to live. Nor are the stakes of local politics generally perceived in terms that might stimulate widespread participation. In contrast with the United States, where local units are widely seen as defenders of status or providers of special advantage, local government in Sweden is viewed largely in terms of the quality of local services. As in Britain, this perspective fosters a conception of urban government as a job for experts with specialized training and knowledge. The fact that most Stockholmers are relatively satisfied with the services provided by the local government further reduces the propensity of the general public to participate. Urban politics, as a result, is largely left to public officials.

Fried also considers urban political behavior to be substantially rooted in the national political culture. Romans, often with good reason, have "little respect for the impartiality, fairness, and wisdom of public policy decisions" (p. 66). Public officials in turn have assumed with considerable justification that the general public is selfish, and impossible to govern. The result is a political system characterized by a pervasive lack of public confidence in government. Relatively few Italians are willing to sacrifice private goals for public ends. Because of these attitudes, policies on land use and housing are much more

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difficult to develop and implement than in London or Stockholm. A greater variety of interests seek to participate, and a substantial portion of those affected refuse to comply with the policies that finally emerge.

Taubman also bases his analysis on the impact of underlying societal values on urban politics. The distribution of political influence in Soviet cities, he contends, is fundamentally shaped by national priorities which place a heavy emphasis on economic production. Throughout Soviet history, industrial development has had a higher priority than construction of housing and provision of city services. Decisions affecting the location of industry—and thus basic patterns of urban development—are made by industrial managers. Almost always, these decisions have been designed to maximize production rather than optimize the quality of urban life. In view of the national priorities as well as the natural orientation of managers of economic enterprises toward industrial production, they have sought to conserve their resources by minimizing investments in "nonproductive" sectors such as housing and urban services. To do so, industry has sought locations where city services already were available, and in the process has frustrated repeated efforts to limit the growth of Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities. Where the industries have had to provide housing and services, they have usually built in accordance with their own needs rather than in harmony with city plans.

Because production is so highly valued by the Soviet system, local officials have only a limited influence on industrial enterprises. Under the law, Soviet cities possess formidable powers to control development, enforce compliance with plans, regulate housing construction, and provide urban services. In practice, local officials have little leverage on industrial development. Basic decisions affecting the location and capacity of industrial enterprises are made by national ministries which are under no obligation to consult local officials or to comply with their plans. Industry and local government are directed by separate organizational structures which come together only at the very top of the Soviet system. In fact, there is practically no way to bridge the gulf, since neither the Council of Ministers in Moscow nor the Central Committee of the Communist Party can devote much time to meshing the plans of thousands of industrial enterprises with those of hundreds of cities. In the face of these structural arrangements and underlying national priorities, cities are bound to deal with industries from a position of weakness since "city officials seeking to influence an enterprise must worry about the enterprise's superior, a powerful industrial agency

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that itself does not need to worry about most city officials and their superiors" (p. 45).

In essence, all four studies argue that power relationships in the city flow from values dominant in the society. Economic enterprises have usually prevailed in Soviet urban politics because of the high value placed on industrial expansion. A similar outcome results from a very different political culture in Rome: Privatism and distrust of government have produced a political system in which economic interests and private market forces have far more influence on urban development than public officials. In London and Stockholm, on the other hand, positive attitudes toward government have combined with passive views toward political participation, thereby permitting public officials to dominate the politics of urban development while economic and other interests are weakly articulated on most issues.

Controlling Urban Development: Parties and Elections

Other political factors—such as political parties and electoral arrangements—are seen in each of these studies as reinforcing basic urban power relationships. Reinforcement results because all of the major elements of a political system are affected by the same general values that shape the distribution of influence in cities. Elkin, for example, emphasizes the role of London's electoral arrangements and party system in enhancing the autonomy of public officials. Council members in London are not required to live in the constituency they represent —and most do not—thus weakening the bond between local interests and the London County Council. In addition, rewards for elected officials are internalized through the party system on the basis of loyalty, party service, and ability. As a result, council members have little to gain and much to lose by breaking rank with their party colleagues to support local causes or to encourage participation by "outsiders." Nor do the major parties usually seek to mobilize electoral support on the basis of local issues. Instead, elections in London are contested largely in terms of general national issues.

Parties and electoral arrangements also reinforce the insulation of officials from the constituency's pressures in Stockholm. As in London, local elections usually do not involve local issues. City parties are branches of national parties which contest local elections largely in terms of national issues. Since 1970, the distinction between city and national campaigns has been further blurred by scheduling municipal

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elections at the same time as national elections. Ties between elected officials and voters are further weakened by the use of party lists rather than individual districts in local elections. With party lists, election depends primarily on a candidate's position on the list rather than on his appeal to the public. Voters select parties rather than candidates, with council seats allocated among parties in proportion to their share of the vote, and to candidates according to their position on the party list. As a result of these arrangements, party leaders rather than voters largely determine which individuals will be elected, thus making council members and candidates much more responsive to party leaders than to the public. This system also substantially insulates the party leaders from the electorate, since their positions at the top of the party list practically guarantee election. The net effect of these arrangements, Anton concludes, has been to create an elite of elected officials, "the little monarchs of Stockholm" who are "remarkably free from localized constraints" (p. 149).

Comparing Industrial Urban Settings

By emphasizing political variables, the studies under review make a valuable contribution to the comparative analysis of urban politics. Urbanization is bound to generate political conflict. Inevitably, there are winners and losers in the competition for benefits, advantages, and scarce resources in complex urban settings. Even in a political system like Stockholm's, which has been able to undertake far-reaching programs of urban development and renewal, Anton finds that "conflict was endemic, difficult to manage, and occasionally beyond resolution" (p. 135). Because conflicts constantly arise as cities grow and change, urban political systems cannot avoid what Fried calls "the difficult task of adjusting old interests to new interests" (p. 1). The task of the urban political analyst, as these books make clear, is to examine how conflicts are manifested and resolved in a particular system.

The studies also underscore the need to investigate urban politics in a broad frame of reference. As indicated, Anton, Elkin, Fried, and Taubman cast their nets widely, emphasizing the importance of general national political settings in shaping the distribution of influence in cities. Each of them recognizes the importance of national arrangements which allocate formal powers, resources, and priorities. Taubman emphasizes the dependence of Soviet cities on higher authorities "for advice and consent, and for money, materials, and manpower" (p. 40). Anton sees national involvement in local affairs as so per-

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vasive in Stockholm that "local and national governmental levels are not viewed as separate structures, but as constituent units of the same structure" (p. 168).

Another lesson that emerges from these studies is the need to press urban political analysis beyond formal arrangements. As Fried points out, the fact that the city government of Rome derives all of its authority from the central government, and that every important city decision is subject to review and possible revision by national officials, does not necessarily mean that the Italian Government dominates Roman politics. In practice, sweeping formal authority is tempered by political, administrative, and financial constraints. During the period under study by Fried, the national government was "dealing with a city government controlled by a powerful and autonomous Christian Democratic party faction, closely tied to eminent figures in the Catholic church. A city government with this kind of protection and patronage possesses a good deal of de facto autonomy" (p. 168). Further enhancing the city's autonomy was the limited administrative capability of the national government to oversee local decision making on a systematic basis, as well as the unwillingness of the national government to provide the financial resources that would be required if its central authority over Rome were to be exercised more directly.

Taubman's study also benefits from the author's willingness to press beyond the traditional preoccupation with the operations of local government. As he points out, a highly monolithic portrait of Soviet urban politics emerges if the analyst concentrates only on municipal administration. From this limited perspective, "urban Party and higher-level government authorities virtually dominate the city government" (pp. 111-12). But this set of political actors clearly does not monopolize power if urban politics is broadened to include decisions involving the interests of industrial agencies. On these questions, local party leaders, like city officials, generally lack significant influence over the industrial agencies which make key decisions that affect urban development. As a result, "on questions relating directly or indirectly to industrial growth and operations, industrial interests . . . come closer than do urban Party (officials) to constituting a 'ruling elite' " (p. 112).

To emphasize the collective strengths of these studies is not to suggest that all are equally successful in dealing with each of these considerations. Elkin treats London's relations with the central government in overly general and rather mechanistic terms. Anton and Taubman are less sensitive than Fried to the complex dynamics of central-local relations. In both Sweden and the Soviet Union, one suspects that local

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political figures have more resources available in their dealings with the higher levels of government than these accounts allow for. Fried provides a detailed account of the role of political parties in Rome, but by comparison with the other studies, he fails to integrate this analysis very effectively into his general themes.

More serious is the inadequate treatment of bureaucratic politics in all but one of these inquiries. Only Taubman explicitly recognizes the significance for urban politics of the existence of large and specialized agencies with parochial perspectives and competing interests. In Soviet cities as in others, specialized agencies "pursue selfish interests—self-preservation and growth. . . . They defend their territory. They resist encroachments. . . . They fear changes that would reduce the scope or importance of their functions, that would reduce resources needed to perform their duties, and that would increase responsibility without adding new resources" (p. 18). Probably no aspect of urban politics is more universal than these characteristics of functionally specialized bureaucracies. Yet Anton and Elkin ignore this factor, and Fried treats it only marginally. Anton depicts a political system dominated by elected officials, in which bureaucrats apparently carry out complex policies unencumbered by parochial interests or interagency rivalries. Elkin, by contrast, finds that career officials are the most influential participants in London's land-use politics. In light of that conclusion, his failure to analyze the internal politics of these powerful bureaucracies is puzzling.

Another weakness that these studies have in common is a lack of adequate attention to urban politics at the grass roots. Taubman deals with Soviet cities wholly in terms of elite interaction—with governmental, party, and industrial elites apparently able to operate free from the pressures of constituencies. Anton dismisses the significance of citizens' inputs in constructing his model of an urban political system dominated by official elites. Only at the end does he turn, belatedly, to the grass roots in an attempt to explain the growth, in the late 1960's, of strong community opposition to official plans and programs in Stockholm. Suddenly, interests whose lack of articulation had been the key to his analysis take on new importance. In light of these pressures, Anton wonders whether "the game itself is changing" (p. 204). The growth of neighborhood power, he suggests, may provide a significant counterweight to the influence of political parties and official elites. The problem here is not Anton's lack of sensitivity to the importance of these developments, but his failure to treat them as an integral aspect of his analysis. What is dealt with as an afterthought

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is clearly central to understanding the importance of Anton's critical explanatory factors. Lack of interest and involvement on the part of citizens provided a political setting in which official elites could dominate politics in Stockholm. Over time, however, the insensitivity of this elite, both to the desires of the population (for more human urban environments in particular) and to its changing nature (essentially becoming younger, better educated, more affluent, and more politically active), spurred involvement by citizens, thus jeopardizing the old base of official influence.

Elkin experiences similar problems in his treatment of grass-roots politics. Like Anton, he concentrates on a period when neighborhood and community interests were weakly articulated. Elkin is aware that important changes have occurred in recent years, noting at the outset that "the principal change in London politics from the early 1960s to the early 1970s is a citizenry growing more knowledgeable of and involved with local government decision-making" (p. x). Unfortunately, the limited scope of his study prevents him from integrating these changes into his overall framework of analysis. As a consequence, Elkin too is unable to give adequate attention to changes in a key variable over time. The necessity for studies of urban politics to account for the dynamics of participation is underscored by Elkin's own hypothesis that "the minimum concentration of influence and authority required to operate a planning system will become increasingly difficult to find . . . as larger and larger numbers of citizens take an increasingly critical stand toward government in general and become more forceful advocates of views which grow out of this orientation" (p. 11).

Class Interests and Public Authorities

By comparison with the four studies of urban politics in industrial countries, the analyses of Mexico City, Port Harcourt, Abidjan, and Lagos are, above all, concerned with change. The basis of elite authority in these cities has changed over time; the social composition and occupational structure has altered; and the social and economic base of political organization has also changed. However, Cornelius, Baker, Cohen, and Wolpe do not agree on whether city politics in developing countries is communal or class politics. Although the strength of this group of studies lies in their authors' willingness to deal with changes in cities over time and in their sensitivity to the social basis of city politics, they provide little perspective on bureaucratic politics, even though all four ostensibly deal with public policy

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outputs of government. Nor do all of them deal as forcefully with the ways in which political variables affect urbanization as they handle the effects of urbanization on politics. Undoubtedly, they share the view of most observers of cities in the Third World, who usually perceive urbanization as overwhelming politics, with politics a more dependent variable, structured by macrosociological forces.

Cornelius and Cohen, however, explicitly set out to examine the ways in which political organizations and policies affect patterns of urbanization. Although neither study reveals the decision-making processes inside public bureaucracies, Cornelius successfully relates policy processes in Mexico City to urbanization and urban politics. Cohen focuses on a growing political administrative class in Abidjan that monopolizes resources and creates policies which lead to maldistributions of income, unbalanced regional growth, and an intensification of class conflicts. His analysis, however, so grossly dichotomizes between public authorities and the masses that we cannot understand the interests and actions of those who possess public authority or of the "masses."

Cohen regards the major distinction in African political life to be between the rulers and the ruled. He is explicit in arguing that a dichotomous and zero-sum relationship exists between the two classes. He sees the origin of this dichotomous relationship in the colonial experience and the founding of African independent states. Access to the state allows accumulation of private property and the establishment of rules governing the use of property. When Cohen examines the patterns of urban resource distribution and social mobility (pp. 42-66), he convincingly demonstrates the connection between access to government and shares of resources obtained in urban areas. He concludes that because public authority is so important, "political conflict in Africa, when it concerns public policy and resources, is in fact class conflict."[5] Lines of social stratification are derived from the distribution of public authority (p. 185). Although Cohen is correct in attacking the insistence of many African leaders that their societies are without class cleavage, he is attacking a straw man.[6] Rural-urban cleavage would appear to be still meaningful in the Ivory Coast.

[5] Cohen does not define class until p. 194, where he says that his definition of class structure is suitable to African conditions: "Classes are categories of people sharing common political and economic interests arising from their access to public authorities and the public resources and opportunities which they control."

[6] And although he is correct in arguing against Samir Amin's mechanical description of three classes in the Ivory Coast (pp. 194-95), what is needed are more categories for encompassing class cleavage, not a reduction to the two categories of the rulers and the ruled. See Samir Amin, *Le developpement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions de Minuit 1967) 195-97.

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The rural sector may be neglected, but we wonder whether it is as invisible as Cohen makes it out to be. The Ivory Coast's wealth is based on agricultural exports. Houphouet-Boigny continues to stress his rural roots as planter and peasant (p. 129). Are there no alliances between rural and urban elites? Are there no gradations of status and power in rural society which are relevant to an understanding of urban politics?

Cohen *defines* all kinds of conflict as class conflict because he traces conflict to struggles over public resources. Thus, he regards students as part of the ruled because they get money from the Ministry of Education (p. 81). Since he does not consider the students' status, future income, and possibilities of social mobility, student protest becomes class conflict. Cohen also does not examine any conflict that is not mediated by government. Even granting that attempts to influence public authorities in the distribution of resources may be the element crucial to conflict in the Ivory Coast, we still wonder whether there is not some kind of conflict that is not mediated by public authorities.

Territorial/neighborhood urban interests have grown in many African cities. Cohen finds territorially-based neighborhood associations to be antithetical to ethnic associations; he also considers functionally- or occupationally-based interest groups to be antithetical to ethnic ties. Territorial/neighborhood groups may not always be compatible with occupational groups either. Neighborhood may be an independent base for organization. As Wolpe shows, the nature and salience of issues determine urban conflict at given times. People move in and out of associations or give weight to their membership in first one and then another group. Cohen admits that there are subtypes of urban conflict within his categories of rulers and ruled, but he plays these subtypes down in order to maintain his dichotomy. From time to time he mentions ethnic conflicts in the military (p. 136), ethnic balancing within ministerial appointments (p. 148), or ethnic struggles over employment. But he treats these ethnic conflicts as residual. We never really get a feeling for the rich diversity of African urban neighborhoods. Not all diversity is encompassed in ethnic terms, of course. Cohen mentions, but does not deal with, conflict behavior of new and old immigrants (p. 204). Differences in housing, modes of transportation, and access to services create different demands and institutional structures. He sees them all as differences subsumed by his two categories wherever demands are made on public authorities for redress.

For Cohen, the very making of demands constitutes class conflict. "Feeling that excessive rents unfairly restrict living standards and

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social mobility, the tenants organize collectively to present their demands to public authorities. Theoretically, this conflict is class conflict because it occurs between the rulers and the ruled" (pp. 101-2). We would like to know if in fact those making demands for lower rents relate these demands to the character of authority in the political system. Do they make common cause with those who make demands for clean water in a neighborhood? Do members of tenants organizations see themselves in class terms?

Why Cohen uses class as a category at all eludes us. At one point he says, "it is less important to use the category of 'class' to understand contemporary phenomena than it is to appreciate the basic political cleavage of rulers and ruled . . ." (p. 195). What he seems to describe in Abidjan is interest politics. Elites engage in pressing their demands for better pay, upward mobility, and privileges at different levels. They direct themselves to specific characteristics of urban policy (p. 198). According to Cohen, masses engage in kinds of interest politics that are fundamentally different because mass demands, if fulfilled, would be redistributive. But the actual demands he presents, and the dialogue with government in which associations of tenants and the unemployed are engaged, seem interest-specific. His argument describes the process as follows: Cross-ethnic politics have emerged in the Ivory Coast because public authorities have failed to make good their promises for socioeconomic development. Because the government's decisions on land, housing, social services, and education cut across tribal/ethnic lines, politics has created classes, and interest groups have emerged to present grievances to public authorities. The latter develop new strategies to accommodate or repress political demands. Groups then develop new responses.

It would be possible to follow the contours of this model of demands, public response, and new group demands without concluding that either a clearcut class politics is emerging or that the mass demands are inherently destabilizing. Indeed, Cornelius uses a system-response model; but by being very concrete about the nature of the demands, by looking at the responses of public authorities, and by differentiating between interest groups and neighborhood groups, he provides a much more complicated, and more realistic, analysis of urban politics.

Political Participation and Urban Policies

Cornelius tries to understand why urbanization in Mexico has failed to produce uniform responses among migrants between cities or

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within cities. He argues that variables operating at the level of city government are not the crucial determinants of individual attitudes and behavior (p. 227). In Mexico City, he maintains, we must distinguish among the backgrounds of the masses that have migrated to the capital. Do the migrants originate in rural areas or small towns? How many times have they moved before coming to Mexico City? Do they come from areas proximate to the city? Why do they migrate? The need to be specific about the migrants is only a first step. It is also necessary to specify the nature of the community in which the migrants settle. Is it a new community? How was the neighborhood formed? Did the government support or oppose settlement in the area? What kinds of services are provided to the local dwellers? What kinds of social and political networks exist in the local community? Does the individual migrant belong to political and social networks that are outside the space where he resides? Cornelius insists that structural and situational variables that relate to a migrant's community of residence are crucial determinants of incentives, attitudes, and behaviors. He also treats party and governmental responses to demands and political and bureaucratic organizations' structuring of demands as structural and situational variables.

To summarize Cornelius's findings in Mexico City is to outline the model he constructs. Migrants were comparatively young when they moved; most but not all were agricultural workers or subsistence farmers. Economic factors were the most important determinants of migration (p. 21). Networks of relatives were important for the decision to migrate and the process of getting established. None of this is new information. The great majority of the sample (which was composed of people in six different communities, including squatter settlements at different levels of development, a low income subdivision, and government-initiated communities) showed improvements in the family's income level and occupational status; they were satisfied with urban life compared to the rural life they had known (pp. 23-24). The substance of political demands and political attitudes depended on the nature of the community of residence (including the community's leadership), contact with government, and governmental performance. Demands were usually concrete and particularistic: security of land tenure and abode were often the overriding ones. Depending on the kinds of urban services in existence, most respondents regarded transportation, clean water, personal security, schools, and public markets as next most important. But perceptions varied widely by type of local community (p. 173).

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Cornelius makes the important point that we must be very careful in not jumping to the conclusion that increasing political awareness and "objectively" defined needs are *ipso facto* translated into pressures on urban or national governments. A good deal of the literature on urbanization in developing countries has postulated the revolutionary potential of the urban poor because scholars have assumed that the urban poor have many needs that government cannot or will not meet, and further, that the poor have the desire and resources to organize against government. The urban context is often described as one where increased political participation and demands will have a destabilizing effect because they create stresses on institutional capacities to deliver benefits. Cornelius argues that there is no automatic link between individually felt needs and political demand making that will put heavy stress on the system.

Politicization of individual demands is one of the most crucial areas for analysis. Cornelius looks at the elements that go into the process: general attitudes toward government and the political system, channels for demand making, governmental reactions (including the ability to coerce), and strategies chosen for demand making. The last depends on other factors; and indeed, all the variables interact. The local party organizations available for channeling demands can also provide payoffs for migrants. The evolution of local leadership groups and the overall structure of the ruling *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* depends on the nature of constituencies and interactions among elites and non-elites. Contact between politicians, government officials, and the poor usually takes place in the context of community-related activity (p. 228). Demands often are not aggregated across communities. The particularist nature of the demands, the kinds and levels of resources migrants have, and the channels for demand making all operate to work against system-wide demand making which has a high overt political content.

Partly because of high economic growth rates, the ruling party has been able to provide urban services to unorganized people and to give security of urban land tenure to many. Making a variant of machine politics work depends on a continually growing pie, so that elites and non-elites do not perceive politics as a zero-sum game. It is much harder to make the politics of economic redistribution work through the channels of decentralized political and bureaucratic structures. Demands for redistribution and equity are not likely to be satisfied by providing a cleaner water system. So far, the demands of the urban poor in Mexico City, and in developing countries generally, have not

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been for redistribution, but for better living standards for themselves and their children. A politics of redistribution is also avoided when the system is seen as open for opportunity; that is the case in Mexico City among migrants.

Cornelius suggests that threats to the system may appear when real growth slows down; the first threat may come from better-educated people who have been in the city for longer periods than migrants. The former often have more contacts outside their local communities, greater expectations, and many more political resources. Latin American and Mexican experience suggests that native city residents and sons of migrants do not easily form political alliances with newer migrants. They may be economic competitors.

Since urban population grows faster than new jobs in Mexico (as in most developing countries), newer migrants face increasingly difficult economic problems. But so do the city dwellers who are in place. Although support for the regime may diminish, the government can play off various urban groups against each other. Cornelius argues that although personal income in Mexico City was more unequally distributed during the 1960's than in most major Latin American cities, support for the regime remained high among the poor because city-wide, or nationwide, distribution of income was not their major concern. Policies that stress redistribution could lead to loss of support for a regime if the high growth rate were sacrificed and the government were less able to provide new services.

Cornelius's study shows the many variables relevant to the politics of urbanization in developing countries. Similar factors may not operate elsewhere in the same interrelationships as they do in Mexico City, but Cornelius points out the critical factors and analyzes one important pattern of interrelationships. He richly documents the Mexican case study, and his analytical framework and operationalizations allow for comparisons.

Urban Inequality and Public Policy

In the Ivory Coast, Cohen maintains, changes in specific urban policies and types of official actions rarely provide solutions to real problems in housing or employment (p. 150). Outputs change but outcomes do not. There are, however, many constraints between outputs and outcomes in Abidjan and in all cities of the Third World. No one governmental policy can "deal with" growing unemployment and the flows of rural-urban migration. Rural investment, wage policies, or

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population-control policies might alter the dimensions of rural-urban migration over time. In the short run, however, neither the Ivory Coast nor most other African, Asian, and Latin American governments have the tools and abilities to end unemployment in cities or to provide decent housing for their urban populations. Indeed, providing decent housing may only increase the flow to the cities. Improving wages for low-paid urban workers has the same effect. For these reasons, Cohen is against incremental urban reform. He considers incremental change to be only an output, not an outcome (p. 158). It is, of course, permissible to oppose policies for incremental change, but it is nonetheless necessary to recognize that such policies can result in outcomes.

Cohen documents the obvious inequalities in living standards in Abidjan, but he notes that the income pyramid has been expanded in the middle (pp. 53-54). In 1967, 27.5 percent of households in Abidjan received 50 percent of total incomes, while 50 percent received only 30 percent. But there are much sharper inequalities in many other African cities. Indeed, the Ivory Coast shows a relatively high share of income for the middle 40 percent of the income population. While the Ivory Coast is classified as a country with a high degree of inequality of income—the lowest 40 percent of its income population received only 10.8 percent of GNP in 1970—the middle 40 percent had a higher share than either Tanzania's and Zambia's; the top 20 percent had a lower share than all the other countries in Black Africa classified as having a high inequality of income. And among all African countries, the Ivory Coast and Zambia were well below the others in shares of the population whose income fell under the poverty line of $50 (U.S.) per capita.[7]

We are not arguing that the Ivory Coast is an egalitarian society. We do not disagree with Cohen's points that the specific policies developed for urban services, housing, land use, and education are designed to preserve and increase privilege, and that employment generation has not kept pace with gross economic growth. We do argue that Cohen's dichotomous zero-sum model is not useful, and that the urban policies that Cohen describes are more complex and differentiated than he allows.

Cohen characterizes urban policy in the Ivory Coast as a "double or nothing" policy (p. 33). He refers to the emphasis on high-quality

[7] Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem" in Hollis Chenery and others, *Redistribution with Growth* (London: Oxford University Press 1974), 8, 12.

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housing, on growth-producing industries rather than employment-generating enterprises, and on spatial planning according to ultramodern standards. Double or nothing means either ultramodern or poverty conditions. For Cohen, these policies reflect the gap between masses and elites, since the ultramodern standards are for the rulers. Under these policies, Cohen sees little social mobility from the "have not" to the "have" category.

The bundle of urban policies that Cohen analyzes should not all be lumped together as "double or nothing." It is much harder to justify high standards for building construction than it is to justify a strategy maximizing growth rather than maximizing employment. Maximizing growth may be wrong and misguided, but people can argue about long-run and short-run opportunities for employment. The unrealistically high standards for housing have constrained growth in the private housing market; they are also markedly inegalitarian. Cohen seems to think that his review of housing policy in Abidjan shows just how inegalitarian the urban system is. True, only one percent of the population of Abidjan lives in modern, European-style homes and apartments. But only 26 percent live in squatter housing. Again, the nature of the inequality is not so sharp by comparison with other capitals in developing countries where squatter settlements contain more than a quarter of the city's population.[8] Cohen also blames public policy for severe unemployment problems in Abidjan and other cities in the Ivory Coast (p. 41). We must ask whether any African countries have been successful in lowering urban unemployment—including countries that have invested in rural areas (for example, Kenya and Tanzania), and have tried policies to limit wages in the higher brackets of the labor force?

Cohen cites many individual examples of governmental responsiveness to demands of the urban population. People have received indemnification for removal from urban land. Wages have been raised for low-paid workers. Rents have been lowered. Dialogues between "rulers

[8] Actually, Cohen does not say that what he calls "spontaneous unlotted housing" of traditional African styles and materials is squatter housing. This is for him the lowest strata of housing. In Lima, at least 25% of the city's residents are squatters; about the same proportions have been given for Djakarta and Manila. In Mexico City and Caracas, a larger share of the population consists of squatters. For some estimates of the squatter proportions of various cities, see Joan Nelson, *Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Countries*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Paper No. 22 (Cambridge 1969), 72-73; Marc Howard Ross, *The Political Integration of Urban Squatters* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1972), 4.

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and ruled" have been carried on. Such urban benefits increase the gaps between rural and urban areas. The relatively high growth rates of the economy allow the leaders of the Ivory Coast to pay off groups and co-opt individuals. A similar pattern exists in Kenya, another African country with comparatively strong growth. These payoffs go on while an administrative-political class continues to accumulate land and business concens.

It is one thing to be able to demonstrate that a highly acquisitive elite rules in the Ivory Coast. It is another to blame this elite for high unemployment, poor housing, and inadequate services. How much weight should we give to the effect of specific public policies on the shape of inequality? In the past, it has been the conventional wisdom among many economists that there may be some sharp trade-offs between redistribution and growth.[9] Ahluwalia, however, maintains that there is no strong pattern relating changes in distribution of income to rate of growth of GNP.[10] He finds some confirmation of the hypothesis that inequality of income at first increases and then decreases with development. This conclusion would appear to provide room for policies to make a difference, since higher rates of growth do not inevitably generate greater inequality. The real questions are: What must a country do to generate high growth rates, and what are the effects of specific growth patterns on inequality in a particular country?[11]

[9] A recent, unpublished paper by Gustav Ranis, "Growth and Distribution: Trade-offs or Complements" (Yale University, n.d.), reviews the question of competition or complementarity between growth and distribution. Ranis notes that most evidence to date points in the direction of inevitable and severe conflict between most measures of equity in a society and the society's growth performance. William R. Cline also undertakes a review of the literature on growth and distribution in "Distribution and Development: A Survey of Literature," *Journal of Development Economics*, I (February 1975), 1-42. Among those who have seen conflict between growth and distribution, and a worsening of distribution patterns at early growth stages are: Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review*, xxxxv (March 1955), 1-28; Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1973). Among case studies, see R. Weisskoff, "Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Puerto Rico, Argentina and Mexico," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, No. 16 (December 1970), 303-32; Albert Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 62 (May 1972), 391-402.

[10] Ahluwalia (fn. 7), 13, 17.

[11] When Cohen comes to discuss the problem of inequality in the Ivory Coast (pp. 208-28), many of his own proposals can be described as intermediate goals and incremental, rather than proposals for social and political transformation. He is in favor of aiding low-cost housing construction, more training of nationals for middle-level jobs, more decentralization of decision making, and decentralized administration of public services. If there really is only one meaningful cleavage in urban Ivory Coast between rulers and ruled, it is rather odd that proposals for greater equality are aimed

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Ethnicity and Class

In Third-World countries, discussion of patterns of inequality and urban political development have frequently been couched in terms of the relative importance of class and ethnic variables. In contrast with these studies, as well as with much of the urban political research undertaken in the United States, social factors such as class, race, and ethnicity do not play major roles in the analyses of Stockholm, London, Rome, and cities in the Soviet Union. Nor is much attention paid in the European studies to migration and the role of newcomers in urban politics. In part, this is because the European societies are relatively homogeneous. While Fried and Elkin pay considerably more attention to social factors than do Anton or Taubman, all of them emphasize the absence of the kind of social cleavages that mark urban politics in the United States and many other societies. Rome, for example, has no sizable racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Moreover, regional differences are a less important source of conflict in Rome than in northern Italian cities. London at the time of Elkin's case studies (1961) was remarkably homogeneous—at least in comparison with most American cities—with nonwhites then constituting only four percent of the population.

Both Elkin and Fried see class as politically more important than other social cleavages, yet neither assigns a central role to class conflict. In London, "class divisions shaped the voting patterns in local elections as well as provided the major base for controversy over land use, housing and related matters" (p. 87). By and large, however, class conflict was channeled into support for one or the other of the two major parties. As a result, class differences were not an important source of political mobilization on particular local issues—in contrast to the situation in the United States, where class considerations play an important role in local conflicts over housing, education, and welfare. In Rome, political parties also serve to channel class conflict. Moreover, Fried argues that class conflict has been moderated by Rome's spatial pattern, which tends less to divide neighborhoods along class lines than is commonly the case in American metropolitan areas.

Of the four studies on cities in developing countries, Cornelius's is the one least concerned with ethnicity, although it is concerned with

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not at a fundamental restructuring of social and political relationships, but at institutional or policy changes that are more likely, in Cohen's terms, to be outputs, not outcomes.

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variation in rural origins. The author is very sensitive to neighborhood and community differentiations which he does not subsume under class; he refuses to treat all variables as proxies for income or class. While Cohen asserts the importance of class over ethnic ties in Abidjan, it is Wolpe, in his study of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, who confronts a number of topics in the literature on communalism and urbanization. Wolpe argues that the processes of modernization themselves produce new communal cleavages and heighten old ones. Thus, communalism should not be equated with traditional, anachronistic antagonisms.

Port Harcourt was an excellent city in which to examine the interaction between social cleavage and political and economic change. For one thing, Port Harcourt became an Ibo city surrounded by non-Ibo areas; eventually, when the Rivers State was carved out of Nigeria's old Eastern Region, it became a city located in a state dominated politically by non-Ibos. Also, the Ibo language community in Port Harcourt was itself split. Wolpe is able to spell out the political changes between Ibo subgroups, and he shows the growth of new political and economic arrangements in Port Harcourt.

The reversal of political status for the Ibos after the defeat of Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War gave Wolpe a chance to show how intra-Ibo communal splits became irrelevant when the Ibos as a whole were threatened. Similarly, Wolpe shows that specific religious and occupational issues (pp. 177-212) cut across communal cleavages at various times. Wolpe's illustrations of the issue specificity of various cleavages are useful to have. But no new formulations emerge. Indeed, where Wolpe does try to break new ground on the vexing issue of class versus communal cleavage, the case study does not prove to be completely satisfactory.

Wolpe's study of protest by the proletariat (pp. 177-94) shows that in the mid-1960's, political and economic groupings which centered on occupational and income differences proved transient in Port Harcourt. They were "once again subordinated to the communal identities of region and nationality" (p. 194). Indeed, Wolpe argues—correctly, we believe—that while support for strikes in Port Harcourt cut across communal lines, "this meant not the erosion of communal identities but, rather, their temporary displacement" (p. 178). In his concluding chapter, however, Wolpe maintains that communalism is not an independent political force in its own right, "but rather a channel through which other interests are directed and made manifest" (p. 233).

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Wolpe follows Sklar in asserting that in Nigeria tribal movements may be created and instigated by new men of power who try to further their own special interests "which are, time and again, the constitutive interest of emerging social classes. Tribalism then becomes a mask for class privilege" (p. 233).[12]

It is true that in Africa—and elsewhere—men who strive for political power have used communal feelings and have built on old antagonisms for their own ends. These ends may well be the furtherance of their own status, power, and economic well-being. Rural as well as urban areas provide contexts for politicians' or state officials' use of communal cleavage. It seems odd, however, to conclude that communalism is not a force in its own right and always a phenomenon dependent on other forces. Wolpe does so because he sees virtually all communal conflict as rooted in competition between individuals for the scarce resources of wealth, status, and power (p. 233). According to Wolpe, modernization exacerbates cleavage both because it has "the effect of reorienting formerly separate peoples to a communal system of rewards," and because it makes men more alike in that they have the same wants (p. 7). But nowhere does he show that the wants of people in urban areas are more alike than those of people in rural areas. Wolpe demonstrates that access to resources changed for different groups at different times, and that new resources became available to new men—resources such as education, organization, oil, and new occupations. But competition is always over wealth, status, and power. "Class" and "non-class" societies do not differ in this regard. Neither do rural and urban societies.

What differs in urban contexts are the amount and kinds of resources available for competition, and the structures through which people compete. It is the form of the struggle and the relative weight of the factors which lead us to describe conflict as class or communal. Naked opposition of cultures—that is, the dislikes of some people for the habits, smells, foods, or hairstyles of others—may be quite rare as a dominant motive for conflict. It is more likely to occur in urban than in rural societies, if for no other reason than the proximity of different groups in urban contexts.

From Wolpe's own stories and case materials we are left with the conclusion that Port Harcourt remained a society with communal cleavages at its base because it was easier for elites to organize conflict

[12] Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration—A Radical Approach," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v (May 1967), 6.

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around communal—that is, language and ethnic/geographic—ties than it was to organize it around class—that is, income and occupational—ties. Where it is easier to organize groups on the bases of language, geography, and ethnicity—no matter who is doing the organizing or why—we might well talk of communal societies. Urban life may provide new frustrations and insecurities based on class, but old ties (or new ones formed on non-income, non-occupational bases), may be easy to maintain. Language, a sense of belonging, blood relationships, or the very desire to belong to a communal group (even to an invented group), are all resources for would-be leaders. These resources are building blocks of organization as good as union dues or shared job experiences.

We must ask why those who use communal feelings around which to organize are so often successful in accomplishing their short-run goals. For Wolpe, these geo-ethnic conflicts have a class base. True, some groups have distinct advantages over others; but in Port Harcourt, poor Onitsha Ibos threw in their lot with rich Onitsha Ibos rather than with poor Owerri Ibos. Wolpe also reveals how difficult it was to function for those Ibo leaders who wanted a political base beyond their own provincial groups. And he shows how hard it was for non-Ibo leaders to emerge as city-wide powerful figures since their support did not rest on a large voting bloc or a commercially strong base (pp. 155-56). That is an old story; it means that although ethnic conflict may be interwoven with inequality, ethnic or communal conflict cannot be reduced to a study of inequality of resources.

We must further ask why the new men of power contend with each other in ethnic terms. Why do they not see their class interests, and why do they not form a cohesive elite against the have-nots? Stratification exists within communal groups in Port Harcourt as well as between them. Wolpe says that a class of men emerged within each of Port Harcourt's geo-ethnic communities which was apart from the communal rank and file. Yet these men led communal groups against each other. They saw it to be to their own advantage to organize mass support on a communal basis. Moreover, these new men remained tied to communal groups—and not only by political needs. They, too, sought prestige, succor, and belonging in communal groups. We should not assume that modernization which does not end communal feelings for non-elites would end these feelings for elites who remain self-conscious about their roots. Indeed, we have seen that new elites are created by modernization in many industrial countries—frequently from minority groups, but from majority groups too. As they become

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conscious of their ethnic ties, these new elites are often the carriers of ethnicity.[13]

In answer to the question why leaders organize around communal identities, Wolpe states that communalism in Port Harcourt "impinged only upon political recruitment and patronage—issues upon which the prestige and recognition of immigrant groups depended—and did not affect routine council/municipal deliberations such as finance, road and market maintenance, school construction and the like" (p. 156). But why was it that patronage and recruitment seemed the key issues in Port Harcourt? Because residences in Port Harcourt were communally heterogeneous, school construction and roads were not communally defined issues. But then, why did not organizations grow up on a residential base? Elsewhere in Africa, where residence in cities is communally segregated, fierce communal struggles have arisen over market sites, occupation of market stalls, roads, and schools. The salience of communalism in Port Harcourt, a city with residential heterogeneity by communal groups, leaves us with more questions than answers.

It would have been useful if Wolpe had provided some idea of the residential distinctions that do exist in Port Harcourt; there are finer differentiations than the good and the bad side of the tracks. But *Urban Politics in Nigeria* is not a study of intra-urban differences in spatial or housing terms beyond the gross distinction between the haves and the have-nots.

Spatial Concerns

Political behavior in urban areas cannot be disaggregated, and political variables cannot be isolated, unless neighborhood settings are examined and the relationships between power holders and groups that organize demands are put in the spatial context of the urban environment. It is a strength of Cornelius's study of Mexico City and Baker's analysis of the political history of Lagos that they do both.

Baker's case study ranges over fifty years, from 1917 to 1967, marshaling both historical information and recent survey data on local leaders. She asks questions familiar to students of community power:

[13] It would have been welcome if Wolpe's respondents, both elites and non-elites, had given us a sense of their own feelings about communal ties. We have relatively little of this information for urban milieus in Africa, especially for elites, although we have data generated from responses to survey questionnaires. See, among others, Marc Howard Ross, *Grass Roots in an African City: Political Behavior in Nairobi* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1975); William J. Hanna and Judith L. Hanna, *Urban Dynamics in Black Africa* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton 1971).

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Who rules at what periods? What is the relationship between formal structures and local influence? In order to get at the structure of influence in Lagos, she examined chiefs and market women, and extensively interviewed individual leaders. The mixed methodologies employed are necessary to get at the structure of influence in a city as socially heterogeneous as Lagos. For Baker shows that Lagos retains traditional characteristics of ethnic homogeneity and communal land tenure, while at the same time it is a booming industrial port and a commercial and administrative center.

Spatial distributions are very important in Lagos. The indigenous core of the city is made up of a landed *lower* class consisting mostly of Yoruba Muslims. The city is built around a permanent traditional community, but the majority of urban residents are transients (p. 45). Because of the severe shortage of land, there is no complete ethnic segregation anywhere in Lagos, but lower-class people tend to live in much more homogeneous ethnic communities than wealthy people.

Lagos abounds in contradictions. Baker, like Wolpe, shows a pattern of circulation of different types of leaders. In Lagos, as in Port Harcourt, the variables of political change were not simple transformations from traditional to modern attributes. The sequence went from modern characteristics of wealth and education possessed by a small number of Africans (often non-Nigerians), to wealth separated from education in an ethnically mixed group of Nigerian nationalists, to a new middle-class group of Yoruba immigrants, to dominant indigenous Lagos Muslims, whose ethnicity—and Lagos origin—was their strategic resource. The ruling political strata in Lagos changed from aristocracy to nationalist oligarchy, to ethnically homogeneous middle class, to communally based leaders (p. 73). Each group utilized different resources. Economics was never irrelevant, but a movement from communal to class politics did not occur. The process of urbanization in Lagos led to class differentiation expressed in different styles of housing, distributions of wealth, and occupations and wages; but always, spatial distributions and ethnicity interacted with changing economic and demographic patterns to produce complicated political alignments. Baker concludes that—except for one period, 1917-1938—of all the major groups in Lagos, those based on class or economic cohesion proved to be the weakest; and, during that exceptional period, the African elite based on education and wealth was also a highly distinct cultural group, united by origin as much as by socioeconomic background (p. 113).

When Baker looks at political behavior in Lagos, she shows that lack

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of class solidarity in the urban community can be attributed to the social composition of the working class and the structure of the labor movement. "The majority of the urban working class is a heterogeneous collection of wage earning immigrants whose economic concerns are limited to personal and immediate material gains" (p. 113). Urban workers seek no alliance with the rural peasants or the urban unemployed. Trade unions protect the privileges of those who have jobs, and ethnic unions provide more gratifications for their members than trade unions. Only the Lagos Muslims who live in central city areas are united by blood, locality, land, origin, class, and ethnicity. For other groups, the plurality of identities conflicts rather than reinforces interests (p. 114).

Baker describes a rather unstable power structure in Lagos. Power and status do not rest only—or even principally—on economic resources; "vertical class divisions are crosscut horizontally by ethnic, clan, kinship and communal stratification" (p. 8). She shows the fragmented nature of leadership in Lagos, a city that is socially unintegrated and politically fragmented, and in which the boundary between local and national politics is not clear.

National Centers

All studies of politics in major national centers, especially centers that are dominant capital cities, must come to grips with the relationship between national and city politics. For Cohen, the study of urban policy is an inquiry concerning the future of Africa; he identifies national political processes in the Ivory Coast with the politics of policy making in Abidjan. Cornelius is always aware that local differentiations in Mexico City are played out in the context of the centralization of national resources in the capital. Wolpe's study of Port Harcourt is set in a national and regional context, but does not probe very deeply into it. Yet communal politics in Port Harcourt can only be understood with reference to competition among Nigerian elites.

Baker acknowledges that in Lagos the power structure and political behavior are affected by authoritative institutions through which community influence is channeled. But though she outlines the formal constitutional structure of city government and places Lagos in a wider regional and national setting, she does not show how the outputs of government affect patterns of competition and participation in the contemporary period. We do not see governmental performance as an independent factor affecting support for or disaffection from the

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regime. Perhaps this lack occurs because Baker is aware of the gap between formal structures and local influence in Lagos. City, state, and national bureaucrats were not quite part of the political system she examines. And yet, she does examine relationships between those who work in administrative structures and the party people, the local notables, and interest groups. The role of the Lagos City Council gets some attention; Baker shows that its performance was measured in terms of the degree to which public services conferred benefits on the dominant Lagosian communal group (p. 284). Still, the City Council was not always the most critical government body affecting the distribution of resources and support in Lagos, as compared to national institutions.

The fact that a city is a national capital clearly affects a variety of important political factors. To what degree, for instance, does the close relationship between municipal and national officials in Stockholm (a central factor in Anton's analysis), result from the fact that Stockholm is the capital of Sweden as well as its largest city, economic and cultural center, and major area of growth? Comparative analysis with other large Swedish cities presumably could shed light on this question, but Anton understandably limits his analysis to Stockholm's complex political system. Fried attempts to tackle this problem by concluding his study with a comparison between Rome and other major Italian cities. Unfortunately, he lacks comparable data on the other cities to match his richly detailed materials on Rome. As a result, he is forced to rely on aggregate socioeconomic and expenditure data which shed little light on the significance of the political factors that form the keystone of his Roman case study.

One way to avoid these problems is to look at a number of cities before examining a particular city. Taubman does this in his analysis of Soviet urban politics. His approach permits factors such as the size, age, and economic base of cities to be examined comparatively. It also facilitates analysis of the consequences of a city's being a national or regional or provincial capital. Taubman shows that Moscow and Leningrad fare better than other cities because their city and party officials have more prestige and influence than their counterparts in less important urban centers; in turn, that fact substantially increases the chances of Moscow or Leningrad to prevail in cases of conflict with industrial ministries. As illustrated by Taubman's study, the price to be paid for a multi-city approach is a lack of detailed analysis of political behavior in particular settings.

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Conclusions

What, it may be asked, do we gain from yet another study of migrants, or urban administrative structures, or the politics of land use? One useful but limited product is information about politics and policies in particular cities. Of greater importance is the fact that new research can contribute to understanding the political life of particular nations. What is most promising is that such studies can provide a base for more systematic comparative analysis of general political processes. The underlying attraction of urban politics for comparative analysis is the opportunity cities provide for examining allocation and conflict in settings experiencing similar kinds of socioeconomic change and political demands. Urbanization and urban contexts pose problems that permit analysis of broad topics such as political power, elites, interest aggregation, and governmental boundaries. Within urban contexts, we can examine comparatively the formulation and implementation of various policies designed to deal, for example, with controlled growth, uneven development, and decentralization.

Despite flaws, gaps, and significant differences among them, the books under review are extremely useful case studies. None of them, to be sure, provides a theoretical treatment of urbanization that leads to general formulations about politics in urban centers. Nevertheless, these studies speak to broad concerns and illuminate conflict in settings that are similar with respect to many of the kinds of problems faced by urban political systems, but different with respect to resource bases, national settings, and political outcomes. All emphasize that urban areas are part of wider national political cultures and environments that shape urban political processes into distinctive national patterns. Unlike most studies of an earlier generation of work on urban government, these books provide, to various extents, insights into the workings of national political systems. At the same time, they illuminate many of the central political problems that recur in urban contexts. In so doing, they furnish a base for more systematic comparative analysis of urban political systems.

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RATIONALIST THEORIES OF POLITICS: A Midterm Report

By RONALD ROGOWSKI*

David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, 194 pp., $7.95.

William A. Niskanen, Jr., *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Chicago and New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971, 232 pp., $9.95.

Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972, 232 pp., $10.95.

Abram de Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*. San Francisco and Washington: Jossey-Bass, Inc.; Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1973, 347 pp., $14.95.

THE organized study of politics, it now appears, is undergoing its fourth great scientific revolution of the past century.[1] In the 1930's and 1940's, the formal-legal assumptions that had ruled the discipline for fifty years[2] were displaced by a "realism" that admitted the importance of psychology and coercion.[3] In the 1950's, behaviorism began its successful final purge of all that was, or seemed to be, unmeasurable or unobjective.[4] In the 1960's, the Parsonian sociological model, prin-

* For detailed criticisms of an earlier draft I am grateful to Arthur Aufses, Jerry Hough, and David Price. In fairness to them, I should probably add that I have not in every instance taken their advice.

[1] For a definition of the concept, see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1962), chaps. 9 and 10.

[2] For an excellent, if hostile, sketch of the formal-legal method, see Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1955), chap. 1.

[3] Parallel shifts occurred in comparative and in international studies. In comparative work, the pioneers were Catlin, Merriam, and Lasswell; in the international field, Schuman, Spykman, and Carr. See, respectively, Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1963), 17, and Rogowski, "International Politics: The Past as Science," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (December 1968), 401-8.

[4] Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review* [hereafter cited as *APSR*], Vol. 55 (December 1961), 763-72; Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1967), 183-90.

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cipally by means of its derivatives—the theories of political culture and of the political system—rose almost to the status of a new paradigm.[5] Now, as David Mayhew remarks in one of the works under review here, there appears to be a discipline-wide "drift . . . from the sociological toward the economic" (p. 3); an abandonment of the Parsonian view of man as essentially nonrational, governed by enculturated norms and values, and an acceptance of the classical *homo economicus*, man as rational maximizer of his own advantage.[6]

The "drift" is in fact close to being a sharp turn. Anthony Downs on voting; Mancur Olson on collective action; Kenneth Arrow and Peter Fishburn on collective choice; Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Boulding, and Robert Axelrod on conflict; Duncan Black and Robin Farquharson on the effects of voting systems; William Riker, Michael Leiserson, and Robert Axelrod on coalitions[7]—the theories of these rationalists have become, if not the received truth, the guideposts of normal science (in Thomas Kuhn's sense[8]) in their respective fields of political science. John Rawls's essentially rationalist treatment of justice has achieved for many students a similar influence in norma-

[5] The seminal works in political science were, of course, Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409, and David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383-400. In both, the debt to Talcott Parsons is explicit. The influence of these two theories is suggested not only by the copious references to their original proponents, but by the dominant position in the discipline of areas of research that derive from them: political socialization; political values, norms, orientations; the performance and responsiveness of political systems; deprivation and its political consequences.

[6] The most lucid and, I hope, not accidentally the most influential statement of these opposed alternatives has been Brian Barry's *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan; Toronto: Macmillan 1970), esp. chaps. 1 and 4. To identify rationalism with "the economic approach" is, however, misleading: nearly all economics is rationalist, but not all rationalist work is economic. See beolw, p. 303.

[7] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row 1957); Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965; New York: Schocken 1968); Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1951); Fishburn, *The Theory of Social Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973); Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960; New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books 1963); Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper and Brothers 1962); Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics* (Chicago: Markham 1970); Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958); Farquharson, *Theory of Voting* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1962); Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games," *APSR*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 770-87, and "Game Theory and the Study of Coalition Behavior," in Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1970), 255-72.

[8] Kuhn (fn. 1), 10-11 and chap. 3.

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tive inquiry.[9] In many other areas in which nonrationalist interpretations still largely prevail—the study of participation, of legitimacy and stability, of constitutional choice, of political leadership, of bureaucratic organization, and now of legislative behavior—rationalist alternatives at least present a challenge that no serious student can ignore.[10] Even by two of the most demanding standards of scientific revolution—the infiltration of the field's leading journals and the production of textbooks—rationalism's progress is advanced.[11] What John Harsanyi and William C. Mitchell foresaw in 1969—that rationalist theory was, in Mitchell's phrase, "the shape of political theory to come"—now seems more than probable.[12]

Because rationalism is at once the most rigorous and the most general theory of social action that has been advanced in this century, these developments are welcome. Yet the very speed of the theory's acceptance threatens it. The "in" theory, no less than the "in" book,[13] is both a mark and a curse of our profession; as we race to join the latest explanatory bandwagon, we too often lose sight of a theory's basic elements, or bend it to purposes that it cannot serve. The theory of rational choice has by no means wholly escaped these dangers.

I hope to offer in this essay a clarification and an interim evaluation. I shall try to say what rationalist theory is and what it is not, what its

[9] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971). As merely one example of the response among students of politics, see the symposium in *APSR*, Vol. 69 (June 1975), 588-674.

[10] See, among others, Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1970); Rogowski, *Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974); James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1962); Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971); Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press 1965); Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown 1967); and the volumes by Niskanen and Mayhew under review here.

[11] Articles in rationalist theory, most of them on Downsian spatial analogies, constitutional choice, coalitions, or the "paradox" of voting, have appeared frequently in the *APSR* since about 1966: see, most recently, the symposium on "Participation, Coalitions, Vote Trading," *APSR*, Vol. 69 (September 1975), 908-69. Two textbooks have appeared to date: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1973); Steven J. Brams, *Game Theory and Politics* (New York: Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan 1975).

[12] Harsanyi, "Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969), 513-38; Mitchell, "The Shape of Political Theory to Come: From Political Sociology to Political Economy," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), 101-36.

[13] Brian Barry, "Review Article: 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,'" *British Journal of Political Science*, IV (January 1974), 79-80.

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main varieties and achievements have been, and why its advance has been so rapid. Then, illustrating my points from the four works under review, I shall suggest what to me seem to be the promise and the danger that the theory now holds.

Delimiting Rationalist Theory

The theory of rational choice, the great majority of its practitioners have agreed, rests on one and only one premise: that, at least in specific areas, individual conduct is wholly determined by the endeavor to relate means to ends as efficiently as possible.

Four points of this definition require elaboration. First and most importantly, the ends—the given individual's goals—are not specified. We do not assume, except in very limited circumstances and by derivation from the basic premise, that an individual will seek to maximize income, power, votes, or any other particular "good." Hence no goals that are pursued with tolerable consistency[14] can be called "irrational": if a person seeks above all else a life of poverty and abnegation, and if he pursues that goal consistently and efficiently, his behavior is rational in every generally accepted meaning of the term.[15]

The objection is frequently raised at this point—it was done first, I think, by Pareto[16]—that such catholicity must render the theory tautologous: ends are inferred from acts, and every act then becomes "rational." But manifestly inefficient means *may* be chosen. A parent, distraught at news of an injury to his child, may in his confusion choose a route to the hospital that he knows is not the shortest. Unless we are extreme Freudians, we do not infer that he did not *want* to get to his child as quickly as possible; we rather say, quite rightly from the standpoint of rational choice, that in his distress he behaved *irrationally*. And if irrationality is possible, then of course the theory is not tautologous.

Second, one must emphasize that human conduct, at least in a specific area, is *wholly* determined by rationality. Since Weber, social scientists have for the most part considered that, although some (un-

[14] A person's goals are conventionally considered tolerably consistent if they form at least a weak transitive ordering: if, for example, I prefer Ford to Carter, and either prefer Carter to McCarthy or am indifferent between them, then I am tolerably consistent only if I prefer Ford to McCarthy.

[15] Since the identical point was made rather emphatically by Downs (fn. 7), 37, almost twenty years ago, I see little excuse for the confusion that still widely prevails.

[16] Vilfredo Pareto, *Sociological Writings*, ed. by S. E. Finer, trans. by Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger 1966), 183; (*Treatise on General Sociology*, chap. 2, § 150).

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specified) human actions are rational, others (equally unspecified) are determined by value-rationality, affect, or tradition.[17] Carl Hempel has shown this woolliness to be scientifically indefensible.[18] One must proceed within the specific area—voting behavior, coalition-formation, or whatever—solely from the rationalist premise; and the great majority of rational-choice theorists have done so.

Third, the premise of rational choice applies solely to *individuals*. Statements of the form, "The nation-state seeks always to maximize its power," are not rationalist, unless they are derived by strict logic from rationalist premises about individual behavior.

Finally, the definition speaks only of endeavor and not of success. Rationalists do not expect people to have perfect information. What appears in the circumstances to be efficient may be "objectively" irrational; yet that is no disproof of the rationalist premise.[19]

Specified in this way, rationalist theory is quite distinct from two accounts of human action with which it is commonly confused, namely vulgar Marxism and relative deprivation. Vulgar Marxists assume that people strive to maximize wealth and status; rationalists, as I have argued, make no assumptions about people's goals. Theorists of relative deprivation—I am thinking here mainly of Ted Robert Gurr—have imported, principally from psychological work on frustration and aggression, many assumptions about what people desire, and about how they perceive and react to deprivation.[20] Because these assumptions are not derived from, and indeed in many cases directly contradict,[21] the rationalist premise, relative deprivation is not rationalist.

These distinctions are not idle ones of pedigree, but are essential to parsimony. The glory of rationalist theory has been its power, its ability to imply a great range of testable hypotheses from few assumptions. Every ill-considered introduction of additional—or worse, of contradictory—premises weakens it. In theory as in drama, *dei ex machina* spoil the show.

[17] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1964), 17-18; (Part 1, chap. 1, § 2).

[18] Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan 1965), 166-71.

[19] Cf. Pareto's distinction between "logical" and "subjectively logical" actions in *The Mind and Society*, ed. and trans. by Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1935), I: 76-77; (§ 150).

[20] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), chaps. 2-5. See also James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 5-19. On the psychological antecedents of Gurr's work, see particularly his "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 245-78.

[21] Cf. Gurr's rejection of the thesis that "violence is a learned response, rationalistically chosen and dispassionately employed" (fn. 20), 32.

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Varieties of Rationalist Theory

Rationalist political theory has shown significant achievement in at least six major subfields, each with its distinct antecedents and line of development. These have as their subjects:

1. conflict and strategy;
2. coalitions;
3. participation and influence;
4. institutions;
5. collective choice;
6. constitutional choice and legitimacy.

The theories of *conflict and strategy* originated in two-person game theory. They analyze such topics as deterrence, bargaining, the measurement of conflict and the likelihood of its resolution, and the development of standards of arbitration that predict or prescribe the form of resolution. At first applied almost exclusively to international and other potentially belligerent relations, these analyses have long since been extended to the study of bargaining between parties, within legislative committees, and in a host of other domestic situations.[22]

Work on *coalitions* derives from *n*-person game theory. It has attempted to predict the formation of coalitions, the division of spoils in parliamentary and international politics,[23] the behavior of factions within parties, the allocation of power among major social groups in divided societies, and the relative influences of constituencies in legislatures.[24] Work of the last type has now begun to influence significantly court decisions on reapportionment.[25]

Analyses of *participation and influence* have concerned such questions as why people participate at all (e.g., by voting, contributing, engaging in violence), how they choose among various ways of participating, and how effective various methods of participation are likely to be. This work has its origins in the economics of consumer choice

[22] The change can be observed in the pages of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* beginning about 1967; for an early example, see Ann Douglas, "The Peaceful Settlement of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (March 1957), 69-81.

[23] Specific theories usually predict either the coalition(s) that will form or the division of the benefit, but not both. A lucid first exposure is Morton D. Davis, *Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction* (New York and London: Basic Books 1970), 145-78.

[24] Leiserson (fn. 7); Rogowski (fn. 10), 198-205. For general reviews of indices of voting power, see Riker and Ordeshook (fn. 11), chap. 6; Brams (fn. 11), chap. 5.

[25] See especially John F. Banzhaf III, "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," *Villanova Law Review*, XIV (Winter 1968), 304-32, and citations there given.

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and in the model of the competitive marketplace; Olson and Hirschman are still its major exponents.[26]

Rationalist theories of *institutions*—parties, governments, bureaucracies, legislatures—have tended to draw on the economics of the firm, and of oligopolistic competition or monopoly. The institution is taken as the analytic equivalent of the economist's idealized firm, albeit one whose goal is the maximization of votes or budgetary allocations rather than profits. Alternatively—and in line with the revisionist view of the firm taken by Cyert and March[27]—these institutional goals are taken as constraints within which individual members seek to maximize such personal benefits as salary, rank, or chances of re-election. Broadly speaking, Downs on parties and Niskanen on bureaucracies belong to the first category; Downs on bureaucracies and Mayhew on Congress belong to the second.

Theories of *collective choice* deal with the aggregation of individual into collective preferences by means that include voting. The central questions are: first, whether any method of voting can in all circumstances simultaneously satisfy a number of abstractly desirable criteria, or whether in at least some circumstances "anomalies" or "paradoxes" (such as that of Condorcet, treated generally by Arrow) must arise; and second, whether particular voting methods are especially susceptible to anomalous outcomes or to manipulation by interested voters. Although this field owes its modern revival to an economist (Arrow), and although it has engaged the attention of many gifted students of politics, technical requirements have confined its significant development almost entirely to logicians and applied mathematicians: Yasusuke Murakami is perhaps the most eminent of the former, Peter Fishburn of the latter. Only Robin Farquharson's inventive application of *n*-person game theory to the subject has challenged this monopoly.[28]

Theoretical work on *constitutional choice and legitimacy*, finally, includes both positive and normative analyses. Rabushka and Shepsle's present volume represents the former, Rawls's *Theory of Justice* the latter; other works, such as Buchanan and Tullock's *Calculus of Consent*, fall somewhere between. The principal question in this subfield is how people choose, or ought to choose, among constitutions in the broad sense: allocations of power, systems of voting, basic principles of

[26] Olson (fn. 7), esp. 22-33; Hirschman (fn. 10), esp. appendices B and D.

[27] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1963).

[28] Murakami, *Logic and Social Choice* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1968); Fishburn (fn. 7); Farquharson (fn. 7).

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social and political organization and of justice. The analysis, although it draws on the resources of economics, game theory, and formal logic, originates in contract theory as developed in political philosophy.

This brief overview suggests two points. First, rationalist theory is not merely an application of "economic tools of analysis" to political subjects.[29] The methods and models have come from a much broader range of disciplines and are increasingly "self-evolved," tailored by political scientists to the particular requirements of their research. The latter trend is particularly noticeable in the study of collective choice and, as de Swaan's book makes clear, in work on coalitions.

Second, and perhaps more obvious, rational-choice theory largely disregards the traditional division of political science into American, comparative, international, and similar fields. Indeed, it shows little respect for the venerable Weberian distinction between prescriptive and descriptive analysis. The latter difficulty should not concern us unduly: every science, as it becomes accurate, serves increasingly as a useful guide to action; and the obviously prescriptive implications of, say, game theory or economics should trouble us no more than those of child psychology or epidemiology. The transcending of the other traditional subject areas of the field, however, is a powerful practical obstacle to understanding and to adequate testing. Few political scientists have the breadth of knowledge to exploit or to examine critically the full implications of even one field of rationalist theory.

Reasons for Acceptance

Why has an already highly articulated and rather complex theory gained so rapidly in acceptance among students of politics? Three principal reasons can be advanced: a change in what Kuhn has called the rules and the quasi-metaphysical assumptions of a science;[30] a shift in the general climate of American intellectual opinion; and, deserving of much fuller treatment than it can be given here, a general tendency to theoretical faddishness in the social sciences.

In the 1950's and 1960's, political scientists—particularly, it seems, graduate students—developed a new interest in the philosophy of science. The influence of, among others, Braithwaite, Popper, Nagel,

[29] I depart here from the view of William Mitchell (fn. 12), 106, who contends that "the new political economist . . . employs economic tools of analysis." See also Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Relationship Between Economics and the Other Social Science: The Province of a 'Social Report,'" in Lipset (fn. 12), chap. 6, esp. pp. 140-42.

[30] Kuhn (fn. 1), chap. 4.

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Margenau, and Hempel grew;[31] and, as one consequence, the rules of legitimate inquiry in politics began to change. The largely inductive and intuitive style that had characterized even behaviorist explanation became unacceptable; instead, serious practitioners demanded hypotheses that were both *deductively derived* from a few basic axioms and *falsifiable*. The goal was no longer interpretation and understanding, but the cold elegance of Karl Popper's "hypothetical-deductive" theory.[32] At the same time, on the ontological or, in Kuhn's phrase, "quasi-metaphysical" level, the assumption seemed to gain ground that explanation must be tied to individual behavior and not to some reified system. Whether this owed more to the withering critiques to which systemic theories had been exposed,[33] or to emulation of the corpuscular assumptions of classical physics, is uncertain.

Both developments undermined the received Parsonian framework[34] and its twin offspring in political science, the theories of political culture and of the political system. Political culture was attacked for its lack of deductive rigor;[35] systemic theory, as constituting "not a 'theory' at all" but simply "a set of concepts and definitions."[36]

Rationalist theory, on the other hand—as its advocates did not hesitate to point out—was nothing if not deductive; it was focused exclusively on the individual; and, despite occasional lapses into tautology,[37] it usually produced clear and empirically testable propositions. Simply on the ground, then, of changed scientific attitudes, rational-choice theory had a considerable advantage.

A more powerful factor was the general shift in American intellectual opinion. Much as the experience of the First World War and of the totalitarian movements and regimes of the interwar years had

[31] Two popular anthologies of the period illustrate the point: Maurice Natanson, ed., *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader* (New York: Random House 1963), and Leonard I. Krimerman, ed., *The Nature and Scope of Social Science: A Critical Anthology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1969). Also widely read were: Henry Margenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1950), and Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (fn. 18).

[32] See especially Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson 1959), chaps. 3 and 4.

[33] Most notably by Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper & Row 1959), chap. 9.

[34] The sociologists were among the first to recognize this: see George Casper Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Robert E. L. Farris, ed., *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1964), chap. 25, in which Braithwaite, Nagel, and Hempel are invoked to show that "current functional theories are non-theories" (p. 967).

[35] E.g., in Barry (fn. 6), 165-68.

[36] Harsanyi (fn. 12), 514.

[37] See, for example, Barry's strictures (fn. 6), 15-16.

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made formal-legal political science seem vapid and foolish,[38] the discovery in the 1960's and 1970's of a previously unimagined capacity for violence and corruption in American government and society forced a recognition that much of the political "science" of the previous two decades had been mere ideology and obfuscation.[39] The same discovery made far more attractive any view of politics that seemed to emphasize the cynical pursuit of self-interest. In 1966, students generally rejected Downs as unrealistically Machiavellian; in 1976, at least in my experience, students took Machiavellianism for granted and raised only technical questions of exposition.[40]

Rationalism has advanced, finally, because of the theoretical faddishness of the discipline. The idealized Kuhnian model of scientific growth contains five stages: a "pre-theoretic" confusion of concepts and assumptions; the emergence of a logically coherent, parsimonious, and powerful theory; the logical and empirical elaboration and "tightening" of the original theory (the exercise that Kuhn calls "normal science"); the emergence of findings that are anomalous to the accepted theory (possible only because of the precision of that theory); and the reconstitution of the theory to resolve the anomalies, the process that is called "scientific revolution."[41]

The social sciences, with the exception of economics, are generally held to have remained mired in the pre-theoretic stage;[42] in fact, they have passed repeatedly through the second stage, that of theory-formation. Hardly a year goes by in political science without the proposal of another "grand theory," often enough one that is logical, parsimonious, and at least potentially powerful and accurate. Some half dozen of these have, in the three decades since World War II, gone on to gain wide acceptance in at least parts of the discipline.[43]

The departure from the idealized model occurs in the third and sub-

[38] See again Eckstein (fn. 3), 24, and Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1943), 4-6.

[39] In particular, political analysts of the earlier period tended to consider American society and politics synonymous with "modern," "developed," or "democratic" forms: e.g., Gabriel Almond's lyrical treatment of "Anglo-American" political culture in his seminal "Comparative Political Systems" (fn. 5), esp. 398-400, or Robert A. Dahl's ode to the "American Hybrid" in *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1956), chap. 5.

[40] Both groups, of course, were making Downs out to be much more of a Machiavelian than he was; but that is not the point here.

[41] Kuhn (fn. 1), esp. chaps. 2, 4, 6, and 8.

[42] See, for instance, *ibid.*, 15.

[43] Among these have been atomization theory, group theory, structural-functionalism, theories of political culture and political socialization, some theories of the political system, and neo-Marxist theory.

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sequent stages. Instead of the elaboration and refinement of theory that characterize other "normal" sciences, there is ordinarily a frantic rush to *extend* the new theory to all possible, and some impossible, areas of application. To this slavering after the "in" theory we owe such questionable efforts as the treatment of the House Appropriations Committee as a political system and the squeezing of Austrian politics into a structural-functional framework.[44]

The reasons for this faddishness, I suspect, have much to do with the peculiarities of our career incentives. While the reputation of the aspiring natural scientist is based principally on his development of existing theory and his correction of the mistakes of others, that of the social scientist turns crucially on demonstrations of originality and of up-to-date familiarity with the literature: the rewards go, not to the good experimentalist[45] or the good critic, but first to those who erect new theoretical edifices and second to those who adapt and extend them most rapidly and inventively.

The scientific consequences are almost wholly bad. In the rush to extend their application, theories are not refined but debased: deductive rigor is relaxed, tautologies and *ad hoc* hypotheses are introduced, and empirical investigation is neglected in favor of subsuming what is already accepted as known. Against this background, the emergence of anomaly does not entail theoretical revision, but (rarely) a tenacious defense of the original propositions against all evidence, or (more commonly) a blurring of issues and a further dilution of the theory into merely descriptive jargon. From either point, there follows a gradual retirement into a kind of "old theories' home," where the senile relict —crotchety and ranting in the first case, sweet and vapid in the second —receives the distant veneration of the extended family and the unwilling visits of the graduate-student young.

This pattern has applied almost universally in 20th-century political science: David Truman's work, as Dowling long ago pointed out, was in many ways only a trivialization of Bentley's;[46] political culture has

[44] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," *APSR*, Vol. 56 (June 1962), 310-24; Kurt Steiner, *Politics in Austria* (Boston: Little, Brown 1972).

[45] Voting studies may by now have become an exception. See, for example, the solidly fact-based exchange among Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964," *APSR*, Vol. 65 (March 1971), 131-43, Edward R. Tufte, "Determinants of the Outcome of Midterm Congressional Election," *APSR*, Vol. 69 (September 1975), 812-26, and Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effects of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections," with comments and rejoinders, *APSR*, Vol. 69 (December 1975), 1232-69.

[46] R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," *APSR*, Vol. 54 (December 1960), 944-54.

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become a synonym for public opinion about politics;[47] and each generation of students of political socialization waters down further the very hypotheses that would justify their research.[48] We talk much of "approaches" to theory; the fact is that our theories *become* approaches, and are reduced from there to mere jargon.

Rational-choice theory, as the most recent fad, has undergone the same rapid extension as its predecessors; and, as I shall show below, it has begun to suffer the same trivialization.

The Promise

The great potential of rationalist theory is demonstrated, albeit in rather different ways, by the works of de Swaan and of Niskanen. Niskanen's is an essay in rigorously deductive theory, reminiscent of Downs's *Economic Theory of Democracy*, and perhaps the only contribution of the past two decades that can fully bear comparison with it. De Swaan, on the other hand, presents rationalists with what is rare enough in any branch of political science, a rigorously operationalized and statistically masterful test of a well-defined subfield of theory—in this case, that dealing with parliamentary coalitions.

Niskanen's work belongs to the institutional area of rationalist political theory. His subject is *bureaus,* which he defines as nonprofit organizations that derive at least some of their revenues from grants or appropriations rather than from the per-unit sale of goods or services. The "pure type" of such an organization would be an army, school, or foundation that relies entirely on grants; the Postal Service and AMTRAK, which derive a substantial part of their revenues from per-unit sales of services, are "mixed bureaus." Such mixtures eventually shade off, as in the case of some of the more speculative private colleges of the 1960's, first into nonprofit institutions that derive all their revenues from per-unit sales (e.g., tuition), and then into profit-oriented firms.

To the extent that bureaus do rely on grants or appropriations,

[47] The difference between the questions that one would have expected to result from Almond's article on "Comparative Political Systems" (1956) and the ones that were actually asked in *The Civic Culture* (1961) was already instructive; but, for an extreme case of the subsequent eclecticism, see Richard Rose, "England: The Traditionally Modern Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965), chap. 3.

[48] The criticisms of William R. Schonfeld, "The Focus of Political Socialization Research: An Evaluation," *World Politics*, XXIII (April 1971), 544-78, are particularly cogent.

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Niskanen suggests, their output and budgeting can be usefully analyzed as a situation of bilateral monopoly: a single vendor of some service (defense, education, high-prestige research) faces a single or predominant buyer (a local or national government, an endowment, or a foundation). From this standpoint, two schedules are chiefly of interest to the leading officials of any bureau: the demand curve of the buyer or funding agency, i.e., the maximum price that it will pay for various levels of the given service; and the minimum total costs curve, which describes the minimum cost at which, in the prevailing market, given levels of the service can be provided. (For illustrative examples of two such demand curves and one minimum cost curve, with the characteristic shape of each, see respectively D_1 and D_2, and TC, in Figure 1.)

Now in any enterprise conducted for profit—or, to be more precise, in any in which the managers appropriate a share of the profits—that level of production will be chosen which maximizes the difference between total revenue and total costs. In Niskanen's pure bureau, where all revenue must come from a single buyer, this would amount to maximizing the difference between D and TC; in the illustrated case of D_2, "profit" would be maximized at $Q = 107$.[49]

By definition, however, bureaus are not profit-oriented enterprises; hence they are unlikely to seek the profit-maximizing level of output. What level will they seek? An alternative motivational assumption is required, and Niskanen advances one as simple and as breathtaking as Downs's on elective politicians: bureaucrats, Niskanen hypothesizes, seek always to maximize budgets, i.e., to maximize the total revenue of the bureau. (Thus, for D_2 in Figure 1, the "ideal" output of a bureau is 200 instead of the 107 that would characterize a profit-making firm.) Niskanen's defense of the budget-maximizing hypothesis is partly empirical—"successful" bureaucrats do appear to be those who increase, and not those who cut, their budgets—but, as with Downs, mainly pragmatic: it leads us, by deductive elaboration, to accurate results.

Many of these results are astonishingly impressive, providing not only a logically convincing account of facts already known, but a

[49] $D_2 - TC$ is of course maximized at that value of Q for which $\frac{d(D_2 - TC)}{dQ} = 0$, assuming that second-order conditions are satisfied. Now $\frac{d(D_2 - TC)}{dQ} = (200 - Q) - \left(40 + \frac{Q}{2}\right) = 160 - \frac{3Q}{2}$, which is equivalent to zero when $\frac{3Q}{2} = 160$, or $3Q = 320$, or $Q = 106.67$.

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FIGURE 1



Derived from Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, 48-49.

NISKANEN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN "DEMAND-CONSTRAINED" AND "BUDGET-CONSTRAINED" BUREAUS

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wealth of new hypotheses. Take, as merely one example, a fundamental difference that is illustrated by a comparison of curves $D1$ and $D2$ in Figure 1, namely that between what Niskanen calls "budget-constrained" and "demand-constrained" bureaus. The former, typically "young" agencies whose services do not seem essential, are characterized by weak demand relative to costs. Thus, as in $D1$, the desired maximum budget ($5,000 at $Q = 100$) cannot be achieved, since costs would exceed revenues at that level of output;[50] instead, the bureau achieves an output of 80 units and a budget of $4,800, at which revenues just equal costs. The "demand-constrained" bureau, on the other hand, probably typified by the military, is characterized by high demand and, often, by artificially low costs (the draft), so that the "ideal" budgetary maximum can in fact be achieved: in the illustrated case of curve $D2$, at an output of 200 units and a budget of $20,000.

The graphs reveal some of the implied behavioral differences. The budget-constrained bureau, for example, can increase its budget if it can contrive to cut costs; the demand-constrained bureau cannot. Hence the officials of the former will be motivated to economies to which officials of the latter will be indifferent. For comparable increases in demand, to take another example, the budget of the budget-constrained bureau will rise only slightly, while that of the demand-constrained bureau will rise enormously; hence, while both may be expected to court the funding agency to raise demand (by means of public-relations efforts among the general public and junkets for legislators or trustees), this propensity will be much more marked in bureaus of the latter type.

Some more subtle implications are equally powerful: a change to a more inelastic, or "intense," demand without an actual increase in demand will increase the output and the budget of a budget-constrained bureau with only slight increases in per-unit costs; the same change will cause the demand-constrained bureau simultaneously to *reduce* output, increase total budget, and incur much larger per-unit costs: the typical response, as Northcote Parkinson observed,[51] of any high-demand bureau that has convinced its sponsors that its activities are indispensable. (Was the American military's involvement in Vietnam,

[50] A bureau could of course seek the maximum demand point nonetheless by deliberate underbidding: i.e., asserting to the funding agency that the cost would be lower, and later seeking a deficiency appropriation or supplying less than was promised. Niskanen argues, however, that such breaches of credibility are rather sternly punished by most funding agencies and that bureaucrats have many incentives to remain honest in this respect (p. 42).

[51] Cited in Niskanen, 71.

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as Niskanen at one point seems to suggest, a classic case of the syndrome?)

More generally, Niskanen's point is that bureaus do not so much tend to supply services inefficiently (at any rate in the budget-constrained region) as to oversupply them, ordinarily at least doubling the quantity that perfect competition would have supplied. The problem is even more serious for bureaus in the demand-constrained region, and it is worst of all in such "mixed bureaus" as subsidized transit and postal systems. His suggested remedies include per-unit subsidies in place of block grants, the encouragement of competition among bureaus, and (most controversially) a modified profit system that, for competitive bureaus, would allocate to leading officials some part of any surplus of appropriations over costs.

Niskanen's book has its faults. His discussion of mixed bureaus leaves me at a loss to understand how the Postal Service manages, under declining consumer demand, to reduce output while grants and prices steadily increase. His faith in the "higher elasticity of demand" among constituents of state and local, as opposed to national, governments is difficult to reconcile with the considerably more rapid growth of these lower-level bureaucracies over the past two decades, or with their less than striking advantages of efficiency.[52]

Parts V and VI of the book, which attempt to link the analysis directly to real-world politics, particularly in the United States, come to grief on the shoals of Niskanen's ignorance of the relevant political processes. His understanding of Congress, to judge by his notes (p. 151), rests entirely on a reading of Richard Bolling's *House Out of Order* and Lewis Froman's *The Congressional Process*. Despite frequent allusions to the budgetary review processes of "the Western democracies" generally, he apparently cherishes the delusion that most of these nations' parliaments have strong budget committees (p. 131).

Niskanen's work can, nonetheless, be placed among the dozen most important works in political science of the past decade. Its deductive implications, whose richness I have barely been able to suggest here, will have to be considered in all future research on bureaucracy, budgeting, and the supply of collective goods and services.

[52] Niskanen's ideology blinds him here to a point that one would think congenial to a conservative, namely an explanation of what for convenience may be called the "Rockefeller effect" on state and local spending. Niskanen shows, in an elegant theoretical chapter (chap. 12), that a bureaucrat who expects to be in office only briefly is likely to push immediate costs even higher. Surely it would follow that, where governorships and mayoralties serve as springboards toward national office, state and local spending would tend to rise. But perhaps this is a point on which a former adviser to Governor Reagan is not inclined to dwell.

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De Swaan's work, obviously, belongs to the rationalist subfield of coalition theory. Pitting twelve hypotheses about the formation of parliamentary coalitions against the data of 90 parliamentary "situations"[53] and 108 situation-unique coalitions in nine countries between 1918 and 1972,[54] de Swaan achieves the first well-constructed test and the first reliable results in this field.[55] The results are important and can be summarized briefly. The original von Neumann-Morgenstern minimum-winning criterion, the Riker size principle, and both Leiserson's bargaining principle and his policy-distance dominance model are completely refuted; the best of these does only 0.3 percent better than completely random prediction.[56] Some other hypotheses are less clearly disproved. Only one emerges as well supported: Axelrod's "minimum connected winning" prediction,[57] which does 500 times as well as random prediction and is correct for 55 of the 108 observed coalitions. Axelrod's hypothesis does badly only in the arguably abnormal cases of Israel and Fourth-Republic France, where simple "connectedness"—the proposition that coalitions will consist only of ideologically adjacent parties—holds best. Thus, as de Swaan concludes, "parliamentary majority coalitions tend to be closed along the policy scale and, in times of normalcy, of minimal range" (p. 159).

The work demonstrates three essential qualities of the good experimentalist: a critical logic that can analyze the bases and pursue the implications of the original theory; a thorough and catholic knowledge of the relevant data; and great ingenuity in the devising of crucial tests and operational measures. De Swaan's logical abilities are both destructive and constructive. On the one hand, he demolishes Riker's repeated attempts to derive the size principle deductively (pp. 52-64);

[53] Each newly elected parliament constitutes a new "situation"; in addition, each substantial shift of seats or of partisan affiliations within an existing parliament—e.g., the successive splits of the Gaullist RPF in the Second Assembly of the Fourth Republic—is taken to create a new "situation." See, for example, de Swaan, 187-89.

[54] The countries are: the German Weimar Republic, the French Fourth Republic, postwar Italy, the Netherlands, Israel, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Periods in which the given country or regime did not exist or was under foreign occupation are, of course, excluded.

[55] The earlier work of Eric C. Browne—"Testing Theories of Coalition Formation in the European Context," *Comparative Political Studies*, III (January 1971), 391-412, and *Coalition Theories*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-043 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1973)—is somewhat vitiated by de Swaan's criticisms: see de Swaan, 157-59.

[56] De Swaan, 148-49; the reciprocal of .997 is approximately 1.003.

[57] Axelrod's hypothesis asserts, in essence, that only those coalitions will form which: (a) are winning (i.e., have a majority); (b) are connected, or closed, in the sense of consisting only of parties adjacent to one another on the ideological spectrum, with no "leaps" or "gaps"; and (c) are minimal, in the sense of including no unnecessary parties at either their left or their right extremes. Axelrod (fn. 7), chap. 8.

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on the other, his own demonstration that a policy interval scale can be developed without interval assumptions (pp. 91-104) is a masterpiece. His close knowledge of the history and circumstances of the individual countries saves him from the ills that have plagued naive datamongerers. Finally, both the measures of the relevant variables and the statistical tests—the latter actually developed by a collaborator, Robert J. Mokken, but used with care and expertise by de Swaan—are admirable exercises in precision and ingenuity.

One can, of course, cavil at certain points. Should the success of a hypothesis not be judged by how *long* it is right, as well as by how *often* it is right? Axelrod, for one, has argued that it should;[58] but de Swaan in effect attaches equal weight to coalitions that last only a few days and to ones that last for years.[59] Do de Swaan's findings really argue, as he claims they do (p. 287), for a satisficing or incrementalist view of rationality instead of for the classical maximizing model? I doubt it, and he does not develop the case fully enough to make it convincing. Still, the work is a model of its kind, and an example of what rationalist theory must increasingly do if it is to deserve the acceptance it has received.

The Risk

Niskanen's and de Swaan's contributions, despite their quite different fields and emphases, share rigorous standards of logic and testing. Neither author bends facts to fit theory, or theory to fit facts; as de Swaan rather ruefully notes, one of the hypotheses refuted by his data is his own, proposed with pride only two years earlier (p. 298).

The works by Mayhew and by Rabushka and Shepsle, on the other hand, illustrate the two main ways by which theory is trivialized in political science. Mayhew, eager to build a framework that can fit every fact, concocts a theory of rubber and illusion; Rabushka and Shepsle, eschewing Charybdis for Scylla, force reluctant facts into groaning conformity with a preconceived and unbending theory.

Mayhew's book, I should say at once, undoubtedly deserves Dahl's commendation of it as the "best thing on the subject";[60] it cuts away, lucidly and wittily, generations of myopic concentration on the "norms"

[58] *Ibid.*, 171, 177-79.

[59] A perhaps extreme case is the Lyng government in Norway, which held office for four weeks in 1963. It is weighted equally with the Gerhardsen government, which held power for all of the rest of that parliament's four-year term (1961-1965). See de Swaan, 281.

[60] A pre-publication review, quoted in the dust-jacket blurb.

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and "folkways" of the Congress and its committees, and it adds immensely to our understanding of that often obscure institution. But it is not what Mayhew wants it to be, a "theoretical essay" (p. 9) on the behavior of Congressmen.

He begins the task promisingly enough, imputing to his subjects the single proximate goal of maximizing their chances of re-election. The logic here is familiar from Downs: officeholders who behave otherwise are unlikely to continue to hold office. But, where Downs applied the assumption to monolithic parties, Mayhew, arguing convincingly that the realities of American nomination and election tend to fragment parties, takes as axiomatic the electoral self-interest of the individual Congressman.

Several kinds of behavior can be inferred at once from this assumption and from a knowledge of the electoral system. (1) Congressmen, particularly if they come from marginal districts, will show strong tendencies toward self-advertisement in their constituencies and toward claiming credit for particularistic benefits (dams, post offices, the satisfactory resolution of citizens' complaints) that accrue to their constituencies. (2) They will strongly prefer structural arrangements that facilitate these activities (weak parties; large office staffs; use of the frank; diffused power in committees and subcommittees; distribution of the most visible government benefits on a non-universalistic basis; a strong role as ombudsman for the individual Congressman). (3) Because most citizens' knowledge of the internal processes of Congress is slight, position taking (the introduction of bills, delivery of speeches, casting of roll-call votes) will receive far more attention than will actual efforts to obtain results, except in areas where well-informed and persistent pressure groups are active. In the taking of positions, moreover, the Congressman will ordinarily be utterly servile to what he perceives to be the preferences of his constituency.

We thus arrive, by deduction from simple postulates, at the very model of the modern minor Congressperson: a posturing, publicity-starved, unprincipled, and generally ineffectual timeserver. Because this cynicism *à la mode* comes so close to our received picture, we are powerfully tempted to believe that the theory's assumptions are right. But difficulties arise at once, as Mayhew admits.

For one thing, not all Congressmen behave in this way; for another, those who do not so behave tend to receive disproportionately the esteem and deference of their colleagues and the positions of real power in their respective Houses. (Membership in the three "control" com-

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mittees of the House of Representatives—Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means—is reserved by long custom to representatives who have shown a safe resistance to demagoguery;[61] party leaders in both Houses must ordinarily have passed the same test.) Members have, moreover, established over the years a structure of rules, committees, and leaders clearly designed to save government from the worst effects of craven submission to local opinion and local greed.

Faced with the necessity of explaining these discordant facts, Mayhew postulates a countervailing incentive: Congressmen are motivated not only by the desire to be re-elected, but by a desire to *maintain the institution*, to serve in a body that enjoys some respect and power. Hence, realizing that the conspicuous and unbridled pursuit of self-interest will incur public contempt and invite loss of power, Congressmen are likely to band together to insure the "collective good" of institutional survival.

At least three things are wrong with that argument. First, "institutional maintenance" has not always worked: the National Assembly of the French Fourth Republic, whose problems were in Mayhew's view highly analogous to those of the Congress, failed repeatedly to create sufficiently strong safeguards; and, as Mayhew concedes, Congress itself "is more fragile than it looks" (p. 145) and could easily pursue a similar path. From this uncertainty follows a second and more serious difficulty, namely that the "theory" so amended can explain just about anything. Does Congress manage over the next few years to sustain tough budgetary procedures and to whittle down the enormous electoral advantages of incumbents? Well, you see, there is institutional maintenance, against all odds, asserting itself. Does it, on the other hand, go the route of complete demagoguery, protection of incumbents, and particularistic raids on the Treasury? Yes, Mayhew can again answer, I always said that electoral self-interest was strong, most likely stronger than institutional maintenance; now you see how right I was.

Finally, Mayhew neglects unduly the main historical alternative to purely constituency-oriented legislative politics: disciplined and programmatic parties. Only in Imperial Germany and intermittently in France has the parliamentary reputation been maintained, as in 20th-century America, by deference to control committees and to elders; elsewhere among representative governments, strong parties have given legislators what backbone they had. The reason that Congressmen

[61] Nicolas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," *APSR*, Vol. 55 (June 1961), 345-57, esp. 351-54.

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are craven can therefore only be clarified by explaining, at least as a step in the argument, why modern Congressional parties are weak. Mayhew offers three answers (pp. 20-22): the primary election; the superiority in staff, access to the media, and campaign finances enjoyed by individual candidates as against central party organizations; and, since 1910, Congressional leaders' lack of control over the crucial patronage of committee assignments and chairmanships.

These factors are plausible but not persuasive. Party cohesion in other countries has often changed drastically—increasing in late 19th-century Britain, declining in France after 1953[62]—without any significant change in method of nomination, relative strength of resources, or control of career incentives. The crucial shifts of resources, to the central party organizations in Britain and to individual representatives in the United States, came in fact largely after the rise of the respective party systems.[63] More fundamentally, the factors Mayhew emphasizes are in any event largely subject to legislative control: local voters' control of nominations could be readily undermined,[64] individual representatives' resources trimmed, or patronage over committee assignments returned to party leaders in Congress, by Congressional action. Hence the deeper question must be why members of Congress have chosen not to take such action.[65]

Actually Mayhew's first assumptions, taken seriously, would imply that no assembly elected from districts[66] could ever have cohesive parties. Adherence to party is inherently a riskier electoral strategy than servility to constituency: far more M.P.'s than M.C.'s lose their

[62] Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Vintage Books 1969), 256-63; Philip M. Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London: Longman 1972), 411-12.

[63] The crucial British legislation was the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, which sharply curtailed expenditures by individual candidates but left unregulated those by national party organizations; see, for example, H. J. Hanham, *Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone* (London: Longmans, Green 1959), esp. chaps. 12 and 17. In the United States, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 greatly expanded the resources of the individual representative; see Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman, ed., *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1965), 5-31, at 20-21.

[64] Sharply curtailing individual candidates' expenditures (on the British model), while permitting or even subsidizing the involvement of central party organizations in primary elections, would pretty clearly give the parties the whip hand in the selection of candidates.

[65] To say that of course politicians would never act against their own interest in this way is too easy: they have so acted, for example in Britain in 1883; and we may be supposing their self-interest to be narrower than it is.

[66] As opposed to ones elected from national lists, as in Israel or, in effect if not quite in practice, in Weimar Germany.

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seats at the average election. If politicians sought first and always to remain in office, pursuing other goals only after that one is assured, they would never yield to party discipline in the first place. But Mayhew's basic assumption is wrong: every four years, some Congressmen and Senators abandon secure constituencies to seek the Presidency, thus —it seems safe to infer—choosing a small chance of great power over a great chance of small power.

Once we admit that politicians seek power, and that they seek office only as a means to power, we begin to see a way out of some of Mayhew's boxes. A rationally power-seeking representative might, for example, choose the admittedly riskier path of party cohesion, might indeed see in it a way out of thralldom to his constituency's interest and opinion, *if* he served in a parliament in which organized blocs of votes enjoyed great power, i.e., particularly in parliaments able to dominate or overthrow the executive. A cohesive bloc of 50 Congressmen, for example, certainly represents some power; but a cohesive bloc of 50 members of the German Bundestag, such as the Free Democrats form at present, can determine from day to day who is Chancellor. Strong parliaments, of course, do not insure strong parties; but weak parliaments all but guarantee weak parties, and much of the indiscipline of Congressional parties since 1910 surely is due simply to the growing eclipse of Congress by the Presidency.

Even where parties did not cohere in strong parliaments—as in mid-19th-century Britain, in Weimar Germany, in the France of the Third and Fourth Republics—representatives did not usually pursue the pure individualism of some of their American counterparts, but fragmented into many factions and repeatedly shifted their loyalties from one coalition to another. Here a second apparently important variable enters: the *competitiveness* of elections. Where many voters are independent and few constituencies are safe, incumbents must fear that excessive opportunism will be punished at the polls. Where electoral allegiances are "frozen" by ties of deference, religion, region, or class, and where most sitting members are consequently safe, strong parliaments easily become "houses without windows," obsessed by internal games of personal power seeking.[67]

In parliaments dominated by an independent executive, where, if this argument is right, parties are almost certain to be weak, members will probably serve their constituencies abjectly, as Mayhew describes. If, however, enough members can afford to offend their constituents

[67] Williams (fn. 62), 324-36, 396.

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—which is to say, if enough of them have seats immune to challenge from within and outside their parties—and if presenting a common front against the overweening executive seems the only way of maintaining or gaining power, then some kind of institutional maintenance *à l'américaine* becomes more likely. Curiously, a pattern quite similar to the American one evolved even among the highly ideologized parliamentarians of the German Empire;[68] and institutional maintenance in the Congress itself during the present century has varied, I suspect, with the proportion of representatives who have felt relatively secure in their seats.[69]

Table 1 suggests that these speculations are at least plausible. Regardless of whether they withstand further testing, some such modification of Mayhew's assumptions, and some specification of the con-

TABLE 1

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

PARLIAMENT	COMPETITIVE	UNCOMPETITIVE
STRONG	*Prediction:* strong and responsible parties *Cases:* Britain after 1884, Federal Germany after 1961, France after 1962, U.S. 1876-1896	*Prediction:* fragmented and irresponsible parties *Cases:* Britain 1832-1884, France of 3rd and 4th Republics, Weimar Germany, Italy before and after Fascism
WEAK	*Prediction:* weak parties, craven representatives *Cases:* U.S. in varying degrees since 1896	*Prediction:* weak parties, institutional maintenance *Cases:* France 1958-1962, German Empire, U.S. in varying degrees since 1896

POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF, FOUR MAIN KINDS OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

[68] See, among others: Werner Frauendienst, "Der Reichstag im Zeitalter des persönlichen Regiments Wilhelms II. 1890-1914," in Ernst Deuerlein, ed., *Der Reichstag* (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag 1963), 59-73, at 69-73; Udo Bermbach, *Vorformen parlamentarischer Kabinettsbildung in Deutschland: Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss 1917/18 und die Parlamentarisierung der Reichsregierung* (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1967).

[69] Security in office is, of course, not adequately measured by the partisan competitiveness of districts, or even by the numbers of successful primary challenges. We must ask, rather, how frequent and how geographically widespread both bipartisan competition and serious challenges for the nomination—in which, say, the challenger gains as much as two-thirds of the vote obtained by the incumbent, or 40 percent in a two-way race—have been at various times. I know of no good longitudinal figures on this, but I doubt that many representatives today can feel as secure as some of the Southern Congressional monoliths once did.

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ditions under which different kinds of legislative behavior would be expected, is required.

Rabushka and Shepsle attack a much more general problem, that of political competition in highly factionalized societies. They address particularly those frequently occurring cases in which factional lines follow cultural ones—e.g., where Catholics, or Flemings, or Sinhalese form distinct political blocs.

Typically in such cases, they argue, all issues tend to collapse into a single "ethnic" dimension, which, in a simplified two-bloc model, can be represented as a Downsian policy continuum which runs from complete satisfaction of bloc *A*, through various compromise points, to complete satisfaction of bloc *B* (Figure 2). Given these conditions, two archetypal preference functions can in their view be imputed to representative individuals in the respective blocs: the first, represented here by Figure 2(a), is the "pluralist" or compromising set of preferences, whose holders (as the curve indicates) are risk-averse enough to prefer taking a middle position to running the risk of total defeat (or total victory); the second function, illustrated by Figure 2(b), is typical of "plural" or intensively divided societies, and is characterized by a devaluation of compromise positions and a preference for efforts to obtain the complete satisfaction of one's own bloc, even at the risk of complete victory for the opposition, e.g., a choice of risk *O* over certainty *O'*.

Rabushka and Shepsle contend that ethnic loyalties are generally likely to be plural, rather than pluralist. This tendency will be overridden only to the extent that: (a) few issues of an inter-bloc nature are available for decision; (b) a common enemy binds the blocs together; or (c) resources are abundant enough to keep all blocs relatively pacified (pp. 80-92). In most multicultural societies, these conditions will prevail only under colonial rule, and particularly during the period of anticolonial struggle. Once independence is achieved, the plural pattern is likely to assert itself, with the result that: (1) an "ambiguous" leadership at first emerges, holding out to both blocs some probability of complete satisfaction, and thus giving to each a satisfaction equivalent to that portrayed by point *O* in Figure 2(b); (2) as this duplicity is revealed, separate ethnic extremist leaders outbid each other by taking positions left of *A'* and right of *B'*, respectively, thus offering to their respective blocs satisfactions greater than any the ambiguous leadership can promise; and (3) as one bloc or another threatens to win complete control, the contenders resort to electoral manipulation, dishonesty, and violence. Ceylon, Guyana,

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FIGURE 2



RABUSHKA AND SHEPSLE'S DISTINCTION
BETWEEN "PLURALIST" AND "PLURAL" PREFERENCES

Cyprus, and Northern Ireland, among many others, are alleged to be cases in point.

There are only two problems with these interesting propositions: they do not follow logically from the theory, and they are not true. Logically, the "pluralist" and "plural" curves are mere descriptions: if a person prefers half a chance of a whole loaf to half a loaf, then

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the appropriate curve is of form 2(b); but that can only be *inferred* from risk-acceptant behavior, i.e., precisely the behavior that Rabushka and Shepsle purport to be explaining.[70] This is the old game of explaining opium's sedative effect by its "dormitive power," except that here the "power"—the risk-acceptant curve—need not even imply the asserted effect: if, as seems more realistic, the choice lies between certainty of half a loaf and a one-fifth chance of a whole loaf—points O' and O'', respectively, in Figure 2(b)—then even the risk-acceptant person may quite rationally prefer the former.

Since the deductive elements are so much hand-waving, we are left only with the generalizations that multiethnic societies are likely to have a lot of conflict, and that the conflict is likely to escalate in the absence of any of the three countervailing conditions already named. But even that is wrong. The Belgians achieved independence and a strong unitary government in 1830. For the next eighty years, they had no external enemies. Yet not until after World War I did they begin to emphasize their linguistic divisions; and, even today, they seem to remain predominately risk-averse on the issue. The Dutch required nearly two centuries of independence to discover the salience of their religious divisions; and, having gone to the brink over them in 1912, they proceeded to an amicable settlement. In the last decade, indeed, their religious divisions have abated markedly. And none of the "new" nationalisms—of Scotland, of Quebec, or of Brittany—finds an adequate account in these simple generalizations.

To the extent that Rabushka and Shepsle are aware of difficulties of this kind, they attempt to define them out of existence. If a particular cultural or racial division did not lead to disintegration, it either was not, or ceased to be, "salient"; in other cases, "unique historical reasons" such as "the extreme decentralization of the Swiss Confederation" restricted the "collective goods over which the . . . communities can fight" (pp. 208-9). Odd, then, that a system even more decentralized—that of the pre-1848 Swiss Confederation—should actually have fought a civil war over cultural issues; or, for that matter, that the almost equally decentralized American Republic of the mid-19th century should have sacrificed 800,000 dead to its regional disagreements. Doubtless, Rabushka and Shepsle would be able to think of still other "unique historical reasons" for such contradictory evidence, but their theory would look increasingly like religion rather than science, belief sustained by faith rather than by logic or evidence.

[70] The fallacy is nicely elucidated in Davis (fn. 23), 55-57.

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The Prospect

A theory is promising, first to the extent that it is logically clear and deductively fertile, and second to the extent that the evidence that would sustain or refute it is clearly defined and easily gathered. These two goals may not be easy to reconcile. Rationalist coalition theory is backed by clear and decisive evidence, yet its theoretical foundations are increasingly in disarray.[71] The rationalist analysis of institutions can be marvelously clear and fertile; but conclusive tests of it are hard to imagine, let alone to perform.[72] At the other end of the scale, recent rationalist work on participation and influence has been both logically muddled and, often, empirically untestable.[73]

Between these extremes would range, roughly in descending order of promise, theories of conflict and strategy; theories of legitimacy and constitutional choice; and theories of collective choice. Work on conflict and strategy, consonant with its origins in game theory, tends to be of high technical quality; but some of its most interesting aspects are concerned with bargaining, and these—as Schelling has shown—do not yield easily to methodological rigor. Difficulties of imputing preferences to actors, moreover, often render empirical tests of the hypotheses ambiguous.[74] Rationalist analyses of legitimacy and constitutional choice, some of us continue to insist, can achieve a far higher clarity and power than a quick perusal of Rabushka and Shepsle would indicate; yet there is no denying that this work is generally less rigorous and far more difficult to test than, for example, hypotheses about conflict.[75] At their best, theories of collective choice achieve a mathematical elegance that is unrivaled in rationalist inquiry; but their very abstractness has made them deductively infertile and untestable. Standards of mathematical aesthetics, rather than of social science,

[71] Axelrod's "minimum-connected winning" hypothesis, which achieves the best empirical results in de Swaan's canvass, has no clear deductive derivation.

[72] Cf. Hirschman's discussion of evidence bearing on Downs's hypothesis of ideological convergence in two-party systems: (fn. 10), chap. 6.

[73] See, most notably, William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *APSR*, Vol. 62 (March 1968), 25-42, and the criticisms of it in Barry (fn. 6), 15-18; and John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision-Theoretic Analysis," *APSR*, Vol. 68 (June 1974), 525-36, and the demolition of that piece by Stephen V. Stephens, "The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment," *APSR*, Vol. 69 (September 1975), 914-15.

[74] Davis (fn. 23), 127-33.

[75] It is more *difficult* to test, but in principle probably more testable. An adequate test of many of the central hypotheses of Buchanan and Tullock's *Calculus of Consent* or Rawls's *Theory of Justice*, for example, would demand evidence that we do not now have and that would be costly to acquire; if acquired, however, it would be conclusive.

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have come to govern. There are no logical reasons, but many practical ones, why this should not change someday.

The most interesting *theoretical work* of the near future, then, will probably follow the paths of Downs, Niskanen, Axelrod, Buchanan and Tullock, and Rawls: studies of specific institutions, of conflict, and of constitutional choice and legitimacy. The most interesting *experimental work* seems likely to be in the area of coalitions—extending, for example, the work of de Swaan to nonparliamentary situations —and, again, in theories of conflict and of legitimacy.

This assessment assumes, however, that work in these fields will continue to be as good as it can be. In fact, I doubt that rational-choice theory will be able to resist the dangers of theoretical dilution and debasement. The intellectual standards of political science are too weak, its bent for fads too strong, to prevent the theft and blunting of even its best tools. A discipline that can adopt "quantum leap" as a synonym for "major change" is, I fear, capable of anything.

We must accept, then, that in the rather near future political scientists will begin to write, not "The President really wanted this bill," but "This bill mapped high on the President's von Neumann-Morgenstern scale." The jargon-mongers will again overwhelm us. Yet the brilliance of a Niskanen, the craftsmanship of a de Swaan, are evidence that gold can be found even in a rising tide of dross. This has been no less true of the other approaches: Verba in political culture, Deutsch in theories of the political system, Greenstein in political socialization, have been able, despite the general corruption, to make sensible and informative use of their respective approaches. In rationalist theory as elsewhere, the most important line to cultivate and to defend is not that which divides one approach from another, but that which separates good from bad work. For those of us who believe that rationalist theory offers the most promising avenue in the recent history of political inquiry, the cultivation of that critical sense, and the steadfast application of it to our own work, is all the more crucial.

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

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